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Blending the Law of Sales with the Common
Law of Third Party Beneficiaries
Gary L. Monserud*
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to propose a blend between the law
of sales governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the common law of third party beneficiaries. A revised Article
2 will probably be agreed upon in 2001 and thereafter will be
submitted to state legislatures for enactment.1 Unless there are
unexpected developments, the revised official text will have a
section with alternatives similar to those offered by the current
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts; J.D. 1976,
University of South Dakota School of Law; LLM. 1985, New York University School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance provided by New England
School of Law through a summer stipend for research and writing and expresses his sincere
gratitude for the editorial expertise of the Duquesne Law Review. The author is especially
grateful to his wife, Ann Jones, for her constructive comments on an early draft; to his
research assistant, Paloma Zuleta, for her tireless and good-natured search for case law; and
to his father, Wesley H. Monserud (1921-2000) for his encouragement about a life in the law
which required a vision far beyond the boundaries of his Iowa farm.
1. After a decade of effort, it appears that the revision process is nearly complete. The
chairman of the drafting committee is Professor William Henning, University of
Missouri-Columbia. He has advised the author that at the annual meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL') held July 28 - August 4,
2000, approval of the 2000 annual meeting draft was deferred pending resolution of one main
issue and several lesser issues. The main issue that needs resolution relates to the scope of
Article 2, particularly whether its coverage extends to embedded computer programs. An
example of a less difficult remaining issue is the wording of proposed section 2-313B which
would govern sellers' obligations to remote purchasers created by communications to the
public. Many persons have been involved in the drafting process. Currently, the Reporter is
Professor Henry Gabriel, Jr., Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans. Members of the
drafting committee are Boris Auerbach, Wyoming, Ohio; Marion Benfield Jr., New Braunfels,
Texas; Amelia Boss, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Byron Sher, Sacramento,
California; James White, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Linda Rusch, Hamline
University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Richard Speidel, Northwestern University,
Chicago, Illinois. Professor Henning informed the author on August 8, 2000, that the revision
is on track for approval by both sponsoring organizations, NCCUSL, and the American Law
Institute, at their annual meetings in 2001. As this article was going to press, a November
2000 draft was circulated by Professors Henning and Gabriel. This latest draft does not
contain any changes affecting any arguments made in this article because in relevant parts it
follows the 2000 annual meeting draft.
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section 2-318.2 State legislators will choose among limited classes
of third party beneficiaries and will grant rights to a selected class
to sue for breach of warranty.' There will be ample room for
supplementation by the common law of third party beneficiaries, as
is the case under current Article 2. However, neither current Article
2 nor the most recent proposed revision provides meaningful
guidance as to when and to what extent the common law of third
party beneficiaries should be used to supplement Article 2. This
article suggests a method that courts can use, and arguments that
lawyers can make, for use of the common law of third party
beneficiaries to supplement Article 2, or a revised Article 2,
4
whenever enacted.
This article focuses on the use of the common law of third party
beneficiaries in situations where a claimant has suffered a direct or
consequential economic loss apart from personal injury or property
damage. This article is not intended to address questions about
claimants who seek redress for personal injuries or property
damage. However, it is necessary to discuss Code sections designed
for personal injury and property damage cases in order to show
where the need exists for the use of non-Code law in cases
involving only economic loss.
The project of supplementing the third party provisions of Article
2 with the common law of third party beneficiaries has rarely
received academic attention. A reading of the very substantial
twentieth century commentary on third party beneficiary law
reveals that scholarship usually falls into one of two categories:
Either commentators have written extensively on the common law
of third party beneficiaries while avoiding third party provisions in
Article 2, or they have written about the rights of third parties
2. All citations to current Article 2 in this article are citations to the Official Text. 2000, promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws unless otherwise specified. Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") section 2-318 allows state legislators to choose among three possible rules for
recognizing third party beneficiaries on UCC warranties. This section and related case law
are discussed in Part II, infra. The 2000 annual meeting draft, the most recent draft,
proposes a revised section 2-318 which would offer similar alternatives to the state
legislatures. This proposed section is discussed in Part II, infra.
3. Section 2-318 of the 2000 annual meeting draft is discussed in Part Ill of this article.
If history is a guide to the future, most state legislatures will adopt an official Alternative
which gives a statutory right of suit for breach of warranty only when personal injury or
property damage occurs.
4. There is no question that the common law and equity may be used to supplement
the UCC, as provided by section 1-103, as long as the common law has not been displaced
by UCC provisions.
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under Article 2 with infrequent reference to the evolving common
law of third party beneficiaries. Questions about who can sue
whom under Article 2 have often been cast exclusively in terms of
"privity" or the lack thereof.5 However, since current Article 2 and
the pertinent provisions of its likely successor do not address many
questions about privity, it makes sense to6 resort to the common
law as a supplement when the need arises.
This article is divided into seven parts. Part I is a general history
of third party beneficiary law from its English origins to the
present. Part II is a description of third party rights under
pre-revision (current) Article 2. Part III explores third party rights
under recent revision drafts. Part IV suggests an appropriate blend
of Article 2 and third party beneficiary law in common situations
where horizontal privity is in issue.7 Part V examines remedial
questions raised by situations discussed in Part IV. Part VI suggests
a blend of Article 2 and the common law of third party
8
beneficiaries when vertical privity is problematic. Part VII
discusses particular remedial problems facing third party claimants
making claims against non-privity manufacturers and distributors.
Throughout the article, the blend suggested will be made with
reference to section numbers under current article 2. The relevant
5. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY (7th ed.) offers the following definition for privity of
contract: "The relationship between the parties to a contract allowing them to sue each other
but preventing a third party from doing so." Thus, privity of contract means an immediate
contractual connection, e.g., between employer and employee or seller and buyer in a sale of
goods transaction.
6. See section 1-103. As to the necessity of extensive borrowing from the common law
of contracts to make Article 2 workable, there can be no doubt. See, e.g., sections 2-205
through 2-207 which would make no sense without assuming the common law definition of
offer from Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 24.
7. Horizontal privity raises the question: Who, aside from the final buyer in the
distribution chain, can sue the merchant who sold the goods to the final buyer? Professors
,White and Summers use the following example:
The "horizontal" non-privity plaintiff is not a buyer within the distributive chain but
one who consumes or uses or is affected by the goods. For example, a woman
poisoned by a bottle of beer that her husband purchased from a local grocer is a
horizontal non-privity plaintiff. So, too, is a son who is injured by a new lawnmower
his father bought, and the employee hurt by equipment purchased by her employer
and so on.
WHITE AND SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-2 (4th ed., Practitioner Treatise Series,
1995) ("White and Summers").
8. Vertical privity raises the question: Who, in the distributive chain, aside from the
final seller, can be made a proper party defendant? White and Summers describe the vertical
non-privity plaintiff as follows: "The 'vertical' non-privity plaintiff is a buyer within the
distributive chain who did not buy directly from the defendant. For example, a man who
buys a lathe from the local hardware store and then later sues the manufacturer is a
'vertical' non-privity plaintiff." Id.
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section numbers will probably remain the same under the revision.9
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY LAW FROM 1677 TO
THE PRESENT

A.

English Origins

Judicial recognition of third party rights in English law is usually
traced to Dutton v. Poole,10 though there are occasional citations to
earlier cases." Dutton arose from a family dispute. A father
intended to cut and sell wood to raise a dowry for his daughter.
The eldest son who expected to inherit the wood objected and
promised his father that he would pay his sister a certain sum if
his father would not sell the wood. The sister married, the father
died, and the eldest son who inherited the wood refused payment.
The question on appeal was whether the daughter should be
allowed to recover on the judgment entered by the trial court when
the promise on which she sued was made to her father (promisee)
rather than to her. The court held that suit on a promise was not
restricted to a promisee. The third party intended by the original
parties to benefit from the promise could sue in her own name.1 2 In
twentieth century terminology, the daughter (sister) was recognized
as a donee beneficiary. Simply stated, the principle was that an
intended donee of an enforceable promise had a legally recognized
right to enforce the promise. Of course, the case by its facts was
limited to an intra-familial promise.
The principle was reaffirmed a century later in Martyn v. Hind 3
wherein Lord Mansfield expressed surprise that any doubt should
have arisen about the correctness of Dutton v. Poole, the case
having been fully argued and carefully decided. Yet, if we fast
forward to the mid-nineteenth century, we see the principle of
Dutton v. Poole breezily repudiated in the oft-cited case of Tweddle
v. Atkinson. 4 Tweddle v. Atkinson involved a bride's father's
promise to pay his prospective son-in-law a certain sum, the
promise having been made to the prospective groom's father, in
9. See Part M, infra. The drafting committee has decided to stay with the current
numbering system.
10. 2 Lev. 210 (KB. 1677).
11. L.P. Simpson, Promises Without Consideration and Third Party Beneficiary
Contracts in American and English Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 835, 84849 (1966).
12. It is commonly stated that women at this stage of history lost their legal capacity
upon marriage and that the husband had all property and contract rights.
13. 98 Eng. Rep. 1174 (KB. 1776).
14. 1 B. & S. 393 (Q.B. 1861).
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return for his promise of a sum certain for the couple to be
married. The Queen's Bench unanimously decided that the
son-in-law had no cause of action on the promise made to his
father by his father-in-law because, "the consideration must move
from the party entitled to sue upon the contract."1 5 As a result, the
development of what is later called "classical contract law" erected
a barrier to the further development of third party beneficiary
contract law in England. 16 It was axioinatic: If a person furnished
consideration, that person could sue on a promise given in return
for the consideration; conversely, a person giving no consideration
for a promise had no standing to sue. This view was deemed to
have a solid moral underpinning. In the words of Judge Crompton
from the Tweddle case, "It would be a monstrous proposition to say
that a person was a party for the purpose of suing upon it for his
own advantage, and not a party to it for the purpose of being
sued."'7 Thus, the wisdom of the seventeenth century judiciary
became the victim of classical contract theory and the altered
moral perspective of the nineteenth century.
B.

Third Party Beneficiary Law in
Massachusetts

the Commonwealth of

The rise and sudden disappearance of third party rights in
England was replayed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
albeit in an abbreviated time span. The first case of significance
was Felton v. Dickinson,'8 decided in 1813. Felton, as a boy of
fourteen, was put into the service of Dickinson who promised
Felton's father that he would support the boy until age twenty-one,
and at that time would either pay him $200 or grant him a parcel of
land in Vermont - whichever the young man elected. When Felton
turned twenty-one, and Dickinson refused to pay him $200 on his
election as promised, Felton sued on the promise made to his
father. He won a judgment at the trial court. The Supreme Judicial
Court sustained this judgment on the basis of Dutton v. Poole and
its progeny. Thus, by 1813 an intended third party beneficiary had a
right to sue in the courts of Massachusetts. Case reports establish
that third party rights were recognized for more than forty years. 9
15. Twedde, 1 B. & S. at 398.
16. The rights of third parties on contracts went underground, becoming part of the
law of trusts. Where one doctrine failed, another filled the void.
17. Tweddle, 1 B. & S. at 398.
18. 10 Mass. 287 (1813).
19. See, e.g., Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Tyng. 400 (1821); Hall v. Marston, 17 Tyng. 574 (1822);
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Then, in MeUen v. Whipple, 0 decided in 1854, the development of
third party rights on contracts stopped abruptly.
Mellen v. Whipple was a simple case arising from a mortgage
assumption. Whipple purchased an interest in a lot and promised,
as part of his consideration, to pay off an obligation secured by a
mortgage to which his interest was subject. In a suit brought by the
holder of the note and mortgage, Whipple argued that he could not
be sued by a stranger to his assumption agreement. Of course,
Whipple had made his promise of payment to his seller, not to the
holder of the note or his predecessors. Whipple's argument
prevailed at the trial court. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained
the denial of recovery saying, "There must be privity of contract
between the plaintiff and defendant, in order to render the
defendant liable to an action, by the plaintiff on the contract."21 In
harmony with the judicial view expressed in England in Tweddle v.
Adkinson, the court stated, "[the] general rule is and always has
been, that a plaintiff, in an action on a simple contract, must be the
person from whom the consideration of the contract actually
moved, and that a stranger to the consideration cannot sue on the
contract." 22 As on the Queen's Bench, the axioms of an emerging
Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Met. 381 (1841); Brewer v. Dyer, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 337 (1851). In
Brewer v. Dyer, the plaintiff, Brewer, leased a building to Parmelee. Id. Parmelee contracted
with Dyer, allowing the latter use of the building in return for Dyer's promise to pay Brewer
the rent Parmelee owed. Id. Under this arrangement, Brewer billed Parmelee, the latter
billed Dyer, and Dyer paid Brewer until he abandoned the building. Id. In an opinion
affirming Brewer's right to sue Dyer, the Supreme Judicial Court used language strongly
affirming third party rights:
[Wihen one person, for a valuable consideration engages with another, by simple
contract, to do some act for the benefit of a third, the latter, who would enjoy the
benefit of the act, may maintain an action for breach of such engagement ....
[In
the case at bar, the agreement made between Parmelee and Dyer, is in express terms
to pay the rent to Brewer, the plaintiff, and he is the party to be benefited thereby. It
is made upon a valuable consideration as between Parmelee and defendant; being the
surrender of the shop by the former, and its occupation by the latter. To make the
defendant liable, no consideration need move as between him and the present
plaintiff. Nor is it any objection to plaintiff's right to recover, that Parmelee might also
have a remedy on the contract, in case the plaintiff should not elect to adopt it. It
does not operate to extinguish Parmelee's liability. The plaintiff, if he so elects, can
seek his remedy on the agreement, or may rely on the original undertaking of his
lessee; in which latter case, Parmelee could enforce the contract against the
defendant. These principles are all well established in the adjudged cases, and it is
unnecessary to enlarge upon them.
Id.at 340-41 (citations omitted).
20. 67 Mass. 317, 1 Gray 317 (1854).
21. Id. at 321.
22. Of course, Mellon preceded Tweddle v. Adkinson by seven years; consequently, if
there was trans-Atlantic influence, it flowed from Massachusetts to England rather than the
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classical contract law sharply curtailed the development of third
party beneficiary law in Massachusetts.
Mellen v. Whipple notwithstanding, cases recognizing rights of
third parties benefited by contracts did not wholly disappear in
Massachusetts. Rather, the courts carved out and developed ever
23
more complex exceptions over the 125 years following Mellen.
Finally, in 1979, recognizing that the exceptions were swallowing
the rule, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed course and overruled
Mellen in Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc.,24 a case
wherein the plaintiff law firm was allowed to recover fees from a
corporate promisor who promised a director in a settlement
agreement to pay his legal fees directly. This brought
Massachusetts back into the mainstream. During the Mellen era,
every other American jurisdiction had recognized third party rights
on contracts either through case law or by statute.
C. New York: Where the Modern Law of Third Party
Beneficiaries Took Root and Matured - Sort of
Because the Mellen decision in 1854 caused the law favoring
third party beneficiaries in Massachusetts to develop through
exceptions to the general rule barring recovery, the mainstream of
doctrinal evolution occurred elsewhere. It was New York's fate to
be the state where the modem law of third party beneficiaries was
25
given its firmest anchor. The leading case is Lawrence v. Fox
wherein Fox promised Holly (promisee) that he would repay
Holly's debt to Lawrence.2 6 A majority of the New York Court of
Appeals (6-2 decision) agreed that Lawrence had a case against
Fox. 27 The court thereby created what has subsequently been
reverse.
23. The development of exceptions capable of swallowing the rule was carefully
explained in two student authored law review articles. See Contractsfor the Benefit of Third
Persons in Massachusetts, 28 B.U. L REV. 465 (1948); The Third Party Beneficiary Rule in
Massachusetts, 8 SuFFoLK U. L REv. 130 (1973). Each student author sought to explain the
subtleties of the many exceptions to the Mellen rule against the recognition of third party
rights on contracts. Both articles are a wealth of information on Massachusetts's history in
this area of the law.
24. 378 Mass. 535 (1979).
25. 20 N.Y 268 (1859).
26. In fact, the promisee was not Holly, but somebody named Hawley, probably
Merwin Spencer Hawley, a well-to-do Buffalo businessman who lent money to Fox for
gambling purposes. Anthony J. Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third
PartyBeneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L REv. 1109-23 (1985) ("Waters"). The article is masterfully
written and contains a rich and detailed history of the case.
27. Aside from the two dissenting opinions, it should be noted that two judges voting
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known as the category of creditor beneficiaries. Allowing third
28
party recovery on a contract was not wholly. new in New York.
Neither was the opinion in Lawrence v. Fox especially enlightening,
and its holding was soon restricted. 29 However, the opinion did
greatly impress Samuel Williston and casebook editors who
followed him. Consequently, it was adopted for casebooks and has
appeared in Contracts casebooks up to the present, often featured
as a leading case. Lawrence v. Fox gradually became, in the minds
of legions of lawyers, the paradigmatic American case allowing
30
third party recovery on a contract.
The next high point in New York case law was Ransom v.
Seaver,31 decided in 1918. The promisor (Judge Beman) promised
his dying wife that he would provide for a favored niece in his will.
He died without having done so, and the niece sued the executors
of Judge Beman's estate. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the niece's right of recovery. The court thereby recreated the
category recognized in Dutton v. Poole and other cases in
seventeenth century England, often referred to as donee
beneficiaries. Therefore, in a span of about sixty years, the New
York courts worked their way to a two-fold classification of
recognized third party beneficiaries who were allowed direct
actions against promisors for breach of promises not made to them
nor in return for their consideration, but rather intended for their
benefit.
D.

The Venerable Scholars: Williston and Corbin

The development of twentieth century law pertaining to third
party beneficiaries seems, in hindsight, very improbable had it not
been for the labors of the two great scholars, Professors Samuel
Williston and Arthur Corbin. Professor Williston's first article on the
subject appeared in 1902 in the HarvardLaw Review. 32 Today, this
with the majority only did so because they believed Lawrence's recovery against Fox was
justifiable on agency principles.
28. See, e.g., Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825), affd without
opinion, 9 Cow. 639, 640 (N.Y 1827).
29. See, e.g., Gansey v. Rodgers, 47 N.Y 233 (1872); Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y 280
(1877). These cases and others are discussed by Melvin A. Eisenberg in, Third Party
Beneficiaries, 92 CoLut L REv. 1358 (1992) ("Eisenberg"). This article will be discussed in
greater detail in Part I.G and again in Parts IV and VI.
30. See Hoeflich & Perelmuter, The Anatomy of a Leading Case: Lawrence v. Fox in
the Courts, the Casebooks, and the Commentaries, 21 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 721 (1988).
31. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y 1918).
32. Samuel Williston, Contractsfor the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HAv. L REV. 101
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article provides an excellent vantage point from which to assess
the state of the law at the turn of the last century. In general,
Williston was cautious of third party rights, at least initially, and
thought that enforcement should be sparingly allowed in equity
only when justice required. Professor Williston recognized that the
great majority of states allowed third party suits.3 His main
criticism was that two recurring situations, those wherein the
promisee sought indirectly to discharge an obligation, and those
wherein the promisee simply wanted to make a gift, were usually
lumped together indiscriminately in judicial opinions. He thought
that, for analytical purposes, these two typical situations ought to
be clearly distinguished, a point which he stressed in his treatise
published in 1920.m
Arthur Corbin entered the fray with an article in the Yale Law
Journal in 191835 and provided thereby a readable summary of the
current state of the law as well as sharp criticism of the
Massachusetts rule.36 He strongly favored the recognition of third
party rights and stridently opposed the view that privity between
the claimant and promisor should be necessary for promissory
liability. His disapproval of scholars who refused to recognize any
third party contract rights for doctrinal reasons is evident in his
introductory paragraphs, "To many students and practitioners of the
common law privity of contract became a fetish. As such, it
operated to deprive many a claimant of a remedy in cases where
according to the mores of the time the claim was just."37 As to the
rationale for recognition, he stated, "The reasons for recognizing
rights in the contract beneficiary are substantially the same as
those underlying the rights of a cestui que trust. By so doing the
intention of the parties is carried out and the beneficiary's just
expectations are fulfilled."31
(1902).
33. Exceptions at that time were Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and possibly Pennsylvania. However, Connecticut,
Michigan, Vermont, and Virginia allowed suits in equity. Id. at 780-81.
34.

1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 357-61 (1921). There

were two subsequent editions and a fourth is in progress. Williston's insistence on separately
viewing these two categories of beneficiaries later put him at odds with Corbin's insistence
on a single principle for separating beneficiaries that should be judicially recognized, and
those that should not be. Id.
35. Arthur L Corbin, Contractsfor the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE U. 1008
(1918).
36. Id. at 1008.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1009.
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Professor Corbin clarified and expanded upon his views in five
more law review articles. 3 9 His views were in part aimed at the
forthcoming Restatement of the Law of Contracts by the American
Law Institute, a project he strongly favored as a means of bringing
more clarity and uniformity to the law, the lack of which he
lamented. 40 Professor Williston served as Reporter for the work on
the Restatement, and Professor Corbin worked as his associate.
E.

The First Restatement of the Law of Contracts

Recognition of third party rights on contracts was enshrined in
the Restatement of Contracts (1932). Section 133 explicitly
recognized three classifications of beneficiaries: The donee
beneficiary, the creditor beneficiary, and the incidental beneficiary.
The donee beneficiary category was so broad that it included not
only true donees but a residual category subsequently referred to
41
as "constructive donees."
Subsection (a) of section 133 categorized a third party as a
donee beneficiary if:
it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the
accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee
in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance
thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon
him a right against the promisor to some performance neither
due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to
the beneficiary.
39. See Arthur L. Corbin, Contractsfor the Benefit of Third Persons in Connecticut, 31
YALE U. 489 (1922); Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, 77 U.
PA L REV. 1 (1928); Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors'Surety Bonds, 38
YALE U. 1 (1928); Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAw Q. REV. 12
(1930); Corbin, Contractsfor the Benefit of Third Persons in the Federal Courts, 39 YALE U.
601 (1930).
40. Arthur L. Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors'Surety Bonds, 38
YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1928). Corbin stated that:
It may seem unfortunate that the law of a great industrial democracy must be built up
by such a slow, uncertain, and costly process; but the limitations of the human mind
and experience appear to make it inevitable. It will be a vitally serious reproach to
the science of jurisprudence, however, if the law cannot now be so stated as to avoid
another century of conflict over the same issues.
Id. Professor Corbin lived to make a unique contribution to the Second Restatement of
Contracts in the 1960s. See Waters, supra note 26, at 1369-72.
41. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 29. In my view, this is the best modern law review
article on the subject. The latter four parts of this article are largely based upon my
interpretation of the Eisenberg article.
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Here is the long shadow of Dutton v. Poole, the early
Massachusetts cases, and Seaver v. Ransom 42 broadened by the
disjunctive: The promisee must have either the purpose of
conferring a gift or simply the purpose of conferring upon the third
party a right against the pronisor to some performance not owing
by the promisee to the third party. In either case, the focus was
upon the promisee's purpose.
Subsection (b) of section 133 categorized a third party as a
creditor beneficiary if:
no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and
performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed
or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary against the
promisee, or a right of the beneficiary against the promisee
which has been barred by the statute of limitations or by a
discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of
the Statute of Frauds.
Here is the plurality decision of Lawrence v. Fox3 broadened
somewhat to include satisfaction of supposed or asserted
obligations as well as obligations owed by the promisee to the
beneficiary. Further, subsection (b) was self evidently a means by
which a promisor could be bound to perform even if the
beneficiary's case against the promisee were barred by positive law.
Finally, subsection (c) of section 133 provided that a person who
will benefit by the performance of a contract is "an incidental
beneficiary if neither the facts stated in clause (a) nor those stated
in clause (b) exist." Henceforth, in jurisdictions adopting the
Restatement approach, a person claiming third party rights needed
to fit the claim into either subsection (a) or (b); otherwise, the case
would be lost as incidental beneficiaries had no enforceable rights.
The categories defined by section 133 were subsequently viewed
by some critics as problematic, especially subsection (a) with its
two-pronged definition of donee beneficiaries. 4 Already in 1938, a
perceptive critic writing for the CaliforniaLaw Review contended
that the Restatement categories were too narrow. 45 Criticism
42. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1377.
45. See Note, Contracts: Third Party Beneficiaries: Cal. Civ. Code Section 1559, 26
CAL. L REV. 627 (1938). The note pointed out that, although section 1559 of the California
Civil Code statutorily granted third party rights, the California courts were using the
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continued through the 1940s and 1950s, with critics sometimes
calling for a revision.4 6 In the 1960s, the American Law Institute
initiated the revision process with Professor Robert Braucher 47 as
Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. At this point,
Professor Corbin, now in his eighties, pressed for his view that a
single test dividing intended from incidental beneficiaries should be
adopted.
In retrospect, whatever its deficiencies, section 133 of the
Restatement First and its related sections performed an enormous
service for contract law. The widespread hesitancy about allowing
third party suits on contracts characteristic of the latter half of the
nineteenth century disappeared, except in Massachusetts. 48
Allowing third parties to sue on contracts in some cases became a
firmly rooted principle of American contract law. The stream that
had risen and fallen in England and Massachusetts rose again with
force and authenticity and eventually gained universal acceptance
in the wake of the Restatement First. The recurring question was:
In what type of case is allowing a third party beneficiary suit
appropriate?
F

The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts

The Restatement Second covers third party beneficiaries in
49
sections 302 through 315. It is the First Restatement "Corbinized"
Restatement categories to determine which claimants qualified; thus, the meaning of the Civil
Code was fleshed out by section 133. The author of the note focused upon payment bonds
and argued that claimants under payment bonds technically did not fit into either section
133(a) or (b).
46. See, e.g., Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Proposal, 57 COLUM. L REV.
406 (1957).
47. Later, Justice Braucher was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Justice Braucher was succeeded by Professor Allan Farnsworth who served
as Reporter through the completion of the Restatement (Second) Contracts.
48. See Part I.B of this article and Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378
Mass. 535 (1979), where Massachusetts rejoined the mainstream, recognizing that exceptions
were eviscerating the rule.
49. See Waters, supra note 26, commenting on the Restatement (Second) at 1171:
The chapter on third party beneficiaries seems to be among the greatest of these
innovations. With respect to this chapter, at least, the Second Restatement really is
the First Restatement "Corbinized." What "Corbinization" entailed may be simply told:
The relatively restrictive "donee beneficiary" and "creditor beneficiary" categories
were abolished in favor of the broad "intended beneficiary" formulation. The stated
reason for the change was that the "creditor" and "donee" categories were applied
differently in different states, some recognizing an enforceable right in only one
category, some in the other. Furthermore, courts in numerous cases had allowed
recovery by third parties who were neither creditors nor donees, often purporting to
apply the Restatement categories, and in so doing they had distended those
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although the categorizations of former section 133 reappear with
slight alterations in section 302(1)(a) and (b). Nominally, the
categories are reduced to two: Intended beneficiaries and incidental
beneficiaries. The stress on intent is great, arguably more so than
in section 133 of Restatement First.
Section 302(1) declares:
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is
appropriate to effectuate the intentions of the parties and
either: (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
Subsection (a) is akin to section 133(b) of the First Restatement,
but it is significantly narrower. To fit, the promisee must owe the
beneficiary a binding obligation to pay money, meaning a supposed
or asserted obligation will not do. A nonmonetary obligation will
not suffice. Subsection (a) is Lawrence v. Fox 5° revived, assuming
that Holly truly owed Lawrence a debt which Fox agreed to pay.
Subsection (b) is akin to section 133(a) of the First Restatement
with true donees submerged in a diluted general donative intent
requirement. Thus, this subsection is broader than the holding in
Ransom v. Seaver but arguably somewhat narrower than section
133(a). Section 302 was the culmination of a concerted attempt to
capture a general principle for guidance in allowing third party
suits on contracts. Section 302, with a single, overarching test for
dividing incidental from intended (recognized) beneficiaries, was a
posthumous victory for Professor Corbin. 51 Regrettably, section 302
has not always served as a very reliable guide. The meaning of its
classifications to the point that the law required restating.
Id.
50. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
51. Anthony Waters stated that:
Arthur Linton Corbin had more influence on the sustained development of this rule
than anyone before him or since. It was at least an abiding interest, perhaps an
obsession, through the latter half of his life. As we have seen, his scholarship in this
area was meticulous, if not always accurate. Evidently, for him, the end justified the
means, and that end was formally accomplished when the American Law Institute
gave its blessing to the "intended beneficiary" formulation. When Corbin died in 1967,
that ultimate victory was within sight, his extraordinary campaign at an end.
Waters, supra note 26.
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"intent" requirement is often the main point disputed in litigation.52
The interpretive problems raised by section 302 derive from its
use of "intention" as the fundamental principle for drawing a line

between beneficiaries who have rights and those who do not.
Subsection (1) requires that the factfmder divine the "intention of
the parties." Subsection (1)(b) further requires the factfmder to
determine whether the promisee "intends to give. . . the benefit of
the promised performance" to the beneficiary. This double use of
intent, coupled with the inherent ambiguity of the term "intent,"
has perplexed courts and stimulated commentators since the
Restatement Second's adoption. Especially penetrating articles have
been written by Harry Prince for the Boston Law Review,5 Jean
Powers for the Utah Law Review,4 Melvin Eisenberg for the
Columbia Law Review, 55 and by Orna Paglin for the New England
Law Review. 56 While these scholars share many insights, there is no

consensus about an analytical framework in which case law should
develop in light of section 302. It is not surprising that the cases
citing section 302 appear inconsistent.5 7

Sorting through the differing viewpoints in the secondary
literature is a daunting task, not to mention consideration of the
case law. In light of the complexity, any judgment about the best
path for case law to take in light of section 302 is necessarily
somewhat subjective. It is my view, however, that the best path for
the evolution of the law of third party beneficiaries is that charted
by Professor Eisenberg in his 1992 Columbia Law Review article
where he sets forth and elucidates what he calls simply, "the third

party beneficiary principle."5 8 This principle is descriptive in the
sense that it captures the results of the better reasoned cases. It is
52. A recent example is Grigerik v. Sharpe, 721 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1998). The main issue
on appeal was whether the factfimder should look only at the promisee's intent or look to
both the intent of the promisor and the promisee for indications of intent to benefit the third
party.
53. Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule Under
Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts, 25 B.C. L REv. 919 (1984).
54. Jean F. Powers, Expanded Liability and Intent Requirement in Third Party
Beneficiary Contracts, UTAH L REV. 67 (1993).
55. Eisenberg, supra note 29.
56. Orna S. Paglin, Criteriafor the Recognition of Third Party Beneficiaries' Rights,
24 NEW ENG. L REV. 63 (1989).
57. This unevenness in the case law is especially apparent in cases arising from
construction sites. See the case law discussed in Part VID of this article and the discussion
therein about owners having the rights of third party beneficiaries under prime-subcontractor
contracts.
58. Eisenberg, supra note 29.
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prescriptive in that it points to an analytical method capable of
moving us beyond the ambiguities inherent in section 302 with its
intense focus upon intent. I believe Professor Eisenberg's approach
is theoretically sound as well as practical. Moreover, insights from
59
other scholars can readily be blended with this approach.
G. Rethinking Section 302: A Plausible Future for Third Party
Beneficiary Law
Professor Eisenberg states the third party beneficiary principle as
follows:
A third-party beneficiary should have the power to enforce a
contract if, but only if: () allowing the beneficiary to enforce
the contract is a necessary or important means of effectuating
the parties' performance objectives, as manifested in the
contract read in the light of surrounding circumstances; or (II)
allowing the beneficiary to enforce the contract is supported
by reasons of policy or morality independent of contract law
and would not conflict with the contracting parties'
performance objectives. 6°
The third party beneficiary principle is self evidently a principle
with two branches. The first branch is predicated upon the
propriety of effecting the contracting parties' performance
objectives. The directive to ascertain performance objectives is
reminiscent of the Restatement First with its stress upon purpose.
In any event, the directive to ascertain performance objectives
propels us away from attempts to peer into the minds of the
contracting parties. Neither is the inquirer limited to the contract,
itself, but is, in addition, directed to discern the objectives in light
of the circumstances surrounding the contract. The second branch
is predicated upon the desirability of effecting moral or policy
objectives through third party enforcement so long as enforcement
does not conflict with the contracting parties' objectives.
The first branch does not directly contradict Restatement Second
section 302 but points beyond it to avoid getting bogged down in
disputes about who intended to benefit whom. 61 With refreshing
59. For example, the article authored by Professor Harry Prince contains an exhaustive
analysis of case law that shows many pitfalls of which courts should be cognizant. Many of
Professor Prince's conclusions can be used to support Professor Eisenberg's approach.
60. Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1385.
61. See, e.g., Grigerik v. Sharpe, 721 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1998).
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candor, Professor Eisenberg suggests that many, perhaps most,
promisors do not really care about benefiting or actually intend to
benefit either the promisee or a third party; rather, promisors
usually intend to better their own positions and make contracts to
do so. He states:
[I]n one sense, it is never an objective of a promisor to
perform, but only to obtain what is promised to her if she
agrees to and does perform. Such a characterization of the
promisor's objectives, however, would be too narrow, because
the promisor can attain what she has promised only by joining
in the enterprise designed to fulfill various objectives, some
shared, some dearer to the heart of the promisor, some dearer
to the heart of the promisee. Accordingly, by the contracting
parties' performance objectives, I mean those objectives of the
enterprise embodied in the contract, read in the light of
surrounding circumstances, that the promisor either knew or
62
should have known at the time the contract was made.
In light of this language, it may be helpful to think in terms of
objectively discernible "enterprise objectives" in trying to apply the
first branch of the third party beneficiary principle. A lawyer or
judge ought to gain a little distance from the contract in question
and as an objective, informed, third person, try to detect the
enterprise objectives manifested in the contract and its context.
The question following should not be whether the contract creates
a right in a third person or class, but rather "whether empowering
the third party to enforce the contract is a necessary or important
means of effectuating the contracting parties' performance
[enterprise] objectives."6 The law of third party beneficiaries would
64
be "largely conceived as remedial, rather than substantive."
Accordingly, this first branch would not necessarily be more or less
expansive than case law currently resting upon section 302. Rather,
the analytical pathway for deciding whether third parties should be
empowered to sue would be different. Professor Eisenberg suggests
that a lawyer or judge applying the first branch of the third party
beneficiary principle can consider what the parties would have
agreed upon if third party enforcement had been discussed.
Consistent with this suggestion, Professor Eisenberg states:
62.
63.
64.

Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1385.
Id. at 1386.
Id.
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To put the matter simply, the question is whether it is likely
that the promisee would have made the contract on the price
terms he accepted if the contract had explicitly stated that the
third party would be allowed to bring suit, and whether the
promisor would have made the contract on the price terms
she accepted if the contract had explicitly stated that the third
65
party would not be allowed to bring suit.
The second branch of the third party beneficiary principle would
in some cases be more expansive than the text of section 302
because its boundaries would ultimately depend upon judicial
determinations of morality and policy. However, Professor
Eisenberg identifies substantial support for the second branch in
comment d to section 302 wherein it is provided that:
[Clonsiderations of procedural convenience and other factors
not strictly dependent on the manifested intention of the
parties may affect the question whether ... recognition of a
right in the beneficiary is appropriate. In some cases, an
overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute,
requires recognition of such a right without regard to the
66
intentions of the parties.
The original parties' discernible enterprise objectives would not
act as a brake upon allowing third party beneficiary standing for
reasons of policy unless that standing conflicted with discernible
performance objectives. The second branch overtly vests in the
judges considerable power to implement moral and policy
judgments through third party beneficiary law so long as they do
not trample upon private parties' discernible objectives. Professor
Eisenberg set forth th two branches as disjunctives. Either branch
could support third party beneficiary standing. However, in my
view, the second branch might often serve in conjunction with the
fiust when discernible objectives tend to overlap with public
policies or commonly accepted moral principles.
My purpose in trying to summarize the Eisenberg approach is
this: Later in this article, I will attempt to apply Professor
Eisenberg's "third party beneficiary principle" to cases involving
contracts for sales of goods. I will thereby suggest a method for
blending the common law (and what the common law could
become) with Article 2, current or revised, to reach paradigmatic
65.
66.

Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1389, quoting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 302, cmt. d. (1977).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39: 111

situations not adequately covered under Article 2. A preliminary
task is to explain how current Article 2 and the 2000 annual
meeting draft fail to cover the subject thereby leaving space
available for importation of the common law.

II. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES AND OTHER NON-PRIVIY CLAIMANTS
UNDER ARTICLE

A.

An Introduction to
Article 2

2

Warranties and Beneficiaries Under

In fashioning Article 2, the drafters confronted questions about
third party rights, mainly in connection with warranties.
Consequently, Article 2's treatment of third party beneficiaries must
be investigated in the context of Code-based warranties because,
except in connection with warranties, Article 2 has no third party
beneficiary provisions.6 7 Section 2-313 covers express warranties
made by representations of fact, promises, descriptions, samples, or
models, which relate to the goods and go to the basis of the
bargain.6
Section 2-314 imposes an implied warranty of
merchantability upon sales by merchants engaged in selling goods
of the kind. This is an exceedingly flexible warranty that most
importantly means goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used."69 Section 2-315 provides for an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when a buyer
reasonably relies upon the seller's skill or knowledge to furnish or
select suitable goods for a particular purpose of which the seller
knew or had reason to know.70 These sections pertain to buyers
and sellers in privit . Third party rights are not explicitly
recognized. Indeed, the texts of each of these three sections can be
strained a little to bear extensions of these warranties beyond
immediate buyers, 71 but nothing in these sections requires
extension to third parties.
The extension of warranties to third parties under Article 2 is
governed by section 2-318's Alternatives, A through C, which are
67. Section 2-210 has rules on delegations and assignments, and delegations tend to
create third party beneficiaries, but nothing in section 2-210 recognizes third party
beneficiary rights. Other third party rights are touched upon in Article 2, e.g., section 2-403
with its rules on entrustment and voidable title. However, under Article 2, third party
beneficiaries are only explicitly recognized as such in connection with warranties.
68. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995).
69. See § 2-314 (1995).
70. See § 2-315 (1995).
71. See the case law discussed in Part 1.C.
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progressively more expansive in coverage of persons and allowable
claims. Whenever any legislature adopts an alternative from official
section 2-318, it makes a partial codification of third party
beneficiary law. Despite the simplicity of the text offered for each
alternative, the case law under these alternatives is not uniform
from. state to state. This non-uniformity, as well as policy concerns,
has generated a rich secondary literature bearing upon the meaning
of section 2-318's alternatives. 71 Relying upon the secondary
literature and citations to key cases, I will briefly summarize the
coverage of each alternative under section 2-318 with a single
objective: To demonstrate that in all jurisdictions there is some
room for supplementation from the common law of third party
beneficiaries, although some jurisdictions require supplementation
more than others.
B.

Third Party Beneficiaries Under Section 2-318's Alternatives
Alternative A under section 2-318 provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

Alternative A, albeit with slight variations, is the law in a majority
of jurisdictions, thirty by a recent count, if we include the District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. 73 The requirement that a
72. See William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Claims Instituted by Non-Privity
Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318
(Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L REV. 1215 (1993) ("Stallworth I"); William L. Stallworth, An
Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That
Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternatives B & C), 27 AKRON L
REv. 197 (1993) ("Stallworth I"); Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing Line Between Warranty
and Tort Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2
DEPAuL Bus. LJ. 295 (1990); David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C.,
61 IND. LJ. 593 (1986); William K. Jones, Products Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The
Ascendancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L REv. 731 (1990); and Richard E. Speidel,
Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More into the Void,
67 B.U. L REv. 9 (1987). I have relied especially upon Professor Stallworth's articles for my
analysis of section 2-318's Alternatives. See also White and Summers, supra note 7, § 11-2-7;
RONALD A ANDERSON, 3A-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:1-82 (3rd ed. 1995).
73. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, 1A U.L.A. 558 (1989) & Supp. 2000, at 163. An
adoption of Alternative A, however, can be deceptive. For example, Mississippi has
Alternative A in Miss. Code Ann. section 75-2-318, but Miss. Code Ann. section 11-7-20
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claimant be "injured in person" makes it apparent that Alternative
A is a product liability statute allowing actions by natural persons
beyond the final buyer based upon a breach of warranty, most
commonly breach of the warranty of merchantability. Using the
word "nonpurchaser" to denote someone beyond the final buyer in
the distribution chain, Professor William Stallworth has listed four
factors that determine the reach of Alternative A, "First, the
nonpurchaser must be a natural person. Second, the nonpurchaser
must be in the purchaser's family or household or a houseguest of
the purchaser. Third, the nonpurchaser must have sustained
personal injury. Fourth, the defendant must be a direct seller." 4
What the drafters did, therefore, was to give the states a
standard provision that would allow Code-based personal injury
actions to a narrow class of persons beyond the final buyer in the
distributive chain. The issue addressed is.
commonly described as
an issue of horizontal privity.75 By and large, the courts have
implemented the statute as it stands, ruling that a lack of privity
defense fails when the foregoing four factors are present.76 A
minority of courts in Alternative A jurisdictions have allowed
claims for personal injuries by natural persons not within the scope
of this alternative on the grounds that the statute defines a
minimum class of rightful claimants leaving the courts free to
expand the class to buyer's employees or even bystanders. 77 A
minority of courts in Alternative A jurisdictions have also reached
beyond the text and have allowed suits for personal injury without
provides that: "In all causes of action for personal injuries or property damage or economic
loss brought on account of negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, including
actions brought under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, privity shall not be a
requirement to maintain said action." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (1999). Therefore a lawyer
working with section 2-318's alternatives must always consider the case law and related
statutory law in the jurisdiction in question.
74. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 1242.
75. See supra note 5.
76. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 1243.
77. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 1256-61. Some courts have made an inference about
their powers to extend the claimant class on the basis of official comment 3 to section 2-318
which states:
The first Alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this form is
neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether
the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain.
In my view, this comment is clearly aimed at issues of vertical privity; hence, judicial
extension of the class of allowable horizontal claimants in personal injury cases in
jurisdictions adopting Alternative A is questionable.
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vertical privity on the grounds that Alternative A does not address
this question, leaving the courts free to create law bearing upon
vertical privity. 78 However, it is nearly universally true that courts in
states adopting Alternative A will not allow third party claims claims made by persons beyond the final buyer - when the claims
7
are based upon economic loss in the absence of personal injury. 9
Therefore, in Alternative A jurisdictions, there is a vacuum
concerning cases of economic loss suffered by persons beyond the
final buyer. At this point, the common law of third party
beneficiaries can sometimes rightly enter. For example, persons
who take goods from the final buyer in the distributive chain either
by gift or bargain (e.g., sale from consumer to consumer) may
suffer an economic loss due to defective goods and may be proper
claimants under third party beneficiary law.
Alternative B provides, "A seller's warranty whether express or
implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section." In principle, Alternative B extends
Alternative A to a broader class. By a recent count, ten
jurisdictions have adopted Alternative B, occasionally with a slight
variation from the official text.80 Claimants must be natural persons
who suffer personal injuries attributable to a breach of warranty to
qualify for protection. Instead of a tightly drawn limitation aimed at
protecting persons in the buyer's home, the scope turns upon the
foreseeability of use, consumption, or simply effect. Professor
Stallworth lists three key factors for judging whether or not
claimants are within the scope of Alternative B, "First, the plaintiff
must be a natural person. Second, the plaintiff must have sustained
personal injury as a result of the breach of warranty. Third, the
individual must be someone 'who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods.' "81
Since being a natural person and suffering -a personal injury are
not mysterious qualifications, the relevant scope question becomes:
Who, in the judgment of a reasonable person, would use, consume,
78. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 1264-65. This is legitimate on the basis of Comment
3 to section 2-318. See supra note 73.
79. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 1261-63. However, the case law is not necessarily
reflective of what courts would do with a well presented case based upon the common law
of third party beneficiaries.
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, 1A U.L.A. 558-59 & Supp. 2000, at 163.
81. Stallworth 11, supra note 72, at 204.
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or be affected by these goods? This alternative is susceptible to a
very broad interpretation that will allow many suits for personal
injury. The class of persons which could foreseeably be affected by
most goods is exceedingly broad. According to Professor
Stallworth, "[11n Alternative B jurisdictions, the foreseeability
requirement rarely if ever precludes the right to sue for breach of
warranty because the courts are willing to 'stretch' to find that the
plaintiff is foreseeable." 2 Only in a rare case will the foreseeability
requirement result in a claim being lost.83 Alternative B differs from
A in that Alternative B's sweeping language arguably abolishes the
requirement of vertical privity. Some cases so hold. 4 Under this
interpretation, bystanders and pedestrians injured, for example, by
a defective vehicle, may rightly recover against a manufacturer (not
only a dealer), assuming the defect amounts to a breach of
warranty. Therefore, as to persons who can make claims, the scope
is broad. However, as to kinds of claims, the scope is narrow.
Alternative B leaves the same vacuum in the economic loss area as
does Alternative A.
Alternative C provides in pertinent part:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or
be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section with respect to injury to the person of an
individual to whom the warranty extends.
By a recent count, five jurisdictions have enacted Alternative C as
officially promulgated, but approximately a dozen jurisdictions have
statutory provisions which capture its breadth.8 The main
82. Stallworth II,supra note 77, at 211 (citing Townsend v. Ed Fine Oldsmobile, 536
A.2d 615 (Del. 1987)); Nacci v. Volkswagen of America, 325 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
83. For an example, se.e Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 450 N.E.2d 581 (Mass.
1983).
84. See the cases cited in Stallworth II, supra note 72, at 201.
85. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (c), IA UL.A- 559-60 & 2000 Supp., at 163. The
Massachusetts's variation is an example of a non-uniform statute which is sindlar to
Alternative C of section 2-318. It states in relevant part:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer, seller or supplier of goods for breach of warranty,
express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not' purchase the
goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller
or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 318 (West 1999).
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difference from Alternatives A and B is the absence of the words
"in person" after "injury" meaning that compensable injuries need
not be personal injuries nor need the claimants be natural persons.
In terms of foreseeability, the class of potential claimants is the
same as in Alternative B. Thus, Alternative C eliminates privity as a
defense so long as the loss complained of was foreseeable. Courts
in jurisdictions that have enacted Alternative C have generally
construed it so that any privity defense fails if the plaintiff was a
natural or legal person who foreseeably could be affected by the
goods. Most important, property damage and economic loss are
encompassed by the language of Alternative C, as the courts have
construed it. Professor Stallworth, in the course of his study,
concluded, "Alternative C is more generous than either of the other
versions of section 2-318 because Alternative C does not require
personal injury. Thus, nonprivity plaintiffs who have sustained only
property damage or economic loss have standing to sue under
Alternative C." 8
There is reason to suspect that the judicial construction noted by
87
Professor Stallworth may have outrun the drafters' intent.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, Alternative C's only limitations
are foreseeability and a judicially imposed limitation to direct as
opposed to consequential economic losses. 88 This common
preclusion of consequential economic losses where Alternative C is
enacted leaves a small space for the importation of the common
law of third party beneficiaries. Moreover, as the text plainly states,
sellers can exclude or limit the operation of Alternative C except as
to personal injuries to an individual to whom the warranty extends.
As will be evident in Part III, the probable replacement for section
2-318's Alternative C would also allow sellers to avoid contractually
any liability for economic loss.
From a historical perspective, there has been a tendency for
86. Stallworth I, supra note 72, at 203. Professor Stallworth later cites Hydra-Mac, Inc.
v. Onan Corp., 430 N.W.2d 846 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 450 N.W.2d
913 (Minn. 1990); Cundy v. Int'l Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1984); and
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 1976) as illustrations of losses

recoverable under Alternative C. The Milbank cases involved property damages but the
others only economic losses.
87. Alternative C does not expressly authorize recovery for direct or consequential
economic loss apart from property damage or personal injury. Indeed, the notes of the
Permanent Editorial Board suggest that the Code drafters may have intended Alternative C
merely to extend as far as section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, which abolished the
privity requirement only in cases of personal injury and property damage. See White and
Summers, supra note 7, § 11-5 (citing Perm. Ed. Bd. UCC Report No. 3 at 14 (1966)).
88. White and Summers, supra note 7, § 11-6.
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roughly forty years to expand third party coverage under section
2-318. The draft of Article 2 promulgated in 1952 had only the text
now appearing as Alternative A. In response to a fear of
nonuniform variations, Alternatives B and C were promulgated a
decade later. Given the proliferation of nonuniform alternatives,
and the lack of uniformity where an official alternative has been
adopted, the choice made in 1962 must, at best, be regarded as a
marginal success. Needless to say, any lawyer with a case that
might fit into section 2-318 must research the particular
jurisdiction's statutory law and case law. An overview of the whole
may be misleading for any one jurisdiction. One thing, however, is
clear: In a majority of jurisdictions, section 2-318 offers no basis for
judicial relief to nonprivity plaintiffs who seek to recover for
economic losses apart from personal injury. This justifies careful
consideration of non-Code law as a supplemental basis for relief in
appropriate cases, especially because the 2000 annual meeting
draft, if promulgated, will perpetuate similar limitations.
C. Abolishing Lack of Vertical Privity as a Defense Without
Resort to Section 2-318: Judicial Extension of Express
Warranties
As indicated earlier, nothing in section 2-318 or its comments
expressly precludes courts from abolishing lack of vertical privity
as a defense.89 Since the Code's widespread adoption in the 1960s,
courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions have extended seller's
liabilities for, express statements beyond immediate buyers,
particularly in cases arising from advertisements and product
representations shipped to the ultimate buyers with, or affixed to,
the goods sold through a normal distributive chain, even where
Alternative A has been adopted. Judicial action has followed
commonly held expectations. Every reader of this article knows
first hand that manufacturers, distributors, and retailers make many
representations about goods in an attempt to induce members of
the general public to buy them. Some representations are mere
commendations or puffery; others qualify as factual statements
about or descriptions of the goods or promises about how the
goods will perform 0 Millions of such representations are made
through the media. Millions more are written on containers or in
89. In fact, given the broadly worded language of Alternatives B and C, it is arguable
that they do abolish vertical privity as a defense.
90. These are requisites for express warranties. See U.C.C. § 2-313.
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manuals or brochures packaged with goods and delivered to
buyers. Every middle class American participating in the
mainstream economy is a recipient of representations about goods.
Whether to meet public expectations or for deeper policy reasons,
courts have frequently allowed claims on express warranties for
economic loss by so called remote buyers, without resort to section
2-318 and without any secure statutory footing in Article 2,
although official comment 2 to section 2-313 has given the courts a
textual toe-hold for liberality.91
As summarized by White and Summers:
When the non-privity plaintiffs suit is [based] upon the
defendant's express representations made to the particular
plaintiff in advertising or otherwise, courts generally hold that
the plaintiff need not be in privity with the defendant. Usually
courts characterize these cases as express warranty cases
though in some jurisdictions they are classed as
misrepresentation cases. The misrepresentation may come
through.the defendant's advertising, through labels attached to
the product, or through brochures and literature about the
product. The plaintiff must be a party whom the defendant
could expect to act upon the representation and must rely on
it. Of course, any plaintiff must also state other elements of its
cause of action. 92
Other scholars agree with this characterization of the trend of
the case law and lend their support. For example, Professor
William Hawkland's treatise states:
[I]t should be noted that the privity rules have been applied
less restrictively to express as opposed to implied warranties.
For example, the advertising of a remote manufacturer
designed to induce a customer to buy certain goods has been
held to create an express warranty that the goods are as
advertised, even though the consumer did not buy the goods
directly from the manufacturer but from a dealer who, himself,
may have been several steps removed from the manufacturer
in the distribution chain. Such cases, independent of Section
91. Comment 2 to section 2-313 states in relevant part: Although this section is limited
in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a
contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.
92. See White and Summers, supra note 7, § 11-7.
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2-318, are supported by Section 2-313, because Comment 2
states that this section is not to be regarded as disturbing case
law which recognizes that warranties need not be confined to
93
the direct parties to the contract.
Therefore, in most jurisdictions, a judicial gloss on section 2-313
eliminates lack of vertical privity as a defense in cases arising from
sellers' representations, which run to downstream, remote buyers
thereby grafting avenues for buyers' relief against remote sellers
(manufacturers and distributors) onto the text of Article 2 without
reference to section 2-318. At least one eminent scholar has argued
that these warranties are not covered by section 2-313; first,
because the basis of the bargain requirement is seldom met; and
second, because there is no sale, i.e., transfer of title from the
warrantor to the plaintiff buyer.9 4 Nonetheless, many courts have
treated such warranties as if they were governed by section 2-313. I
subscribe to the view set forth by Professor Donald Clifford, "Many
courts simply [have] had the good sense to deal with remote-seller
express warranties as if Article 2 applied . . . ."9 Courts have not
developed any consistent theory as an underpinning for these
warranties. 96 Rather, courts have allowed suits by remote buyers
based upon express representations about goods because it has
seemed reasonable and just - what is generally expected without articulating any specific theory of contract. Generally, the
obligations recognized are not conceived of as third party
obligations, but rather as direct obligations running from the
warranting seller to the complainant downstream. In these cases,
common law third party beneficiary theory has played no role
extending the coverage of section 2-313.
Courts have appealed to reason and justice, making policy-based
extensions of sellers' liabilities. An interesting example is the
seminal case of Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
93.

See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-313:9 at 578.

("Hawkland"); accord WILLIAM H. HENNING & GEORGE I. WAIACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1193-94 (Rev. ed. 1992).

94. See, e.g., Curtis R. Reitz, Manufacturers' Warrantiesof Consumer Goods, 75 WASH.
U. LQ. 357 (1997).
95. Donald F. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase,
Two Relationships, 75 WASH. U. LQ. 413, 421 (1997).
96. Id. at '426-27. Professor Clifford suggests, inter alia, that the cases could be
analyzed as unilateral contracts with the ultimate buyers' acts of purchase and payment from
retailers constituting acceptances of offers contained in upstream sellers' representations.
However, courts generally impose the warranty obligations once privity is removed as a
barrier without specific consideration of contractual issues.
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decided in 1962. 91 The defendant's product did not prevent fabric
shrinkage as promised in advertisements and labels. The remote
business buyer won a case for economic loss based upon breach of
an express warranty. Justifying. its decision in light of long-held
privity requirements, the Court of Appeals of New York observed:
Manufacturers
make extensive use of newspapers,
periodicals and other media to call attention, in glowing terms,
to the qualities and virtues of their products, and this
advertising is directed at the ultimate consumer or at some
manufacturer or supplier who is not in privity with them.
Equally sanguine representations on packages .and labels
frequently accompany the article throughout its journey to the
ultimate consumer and, as intended, are relied upon by remote
purchasers. Under these circumstances, it is highly unrealistic
to limit a purchaser's protection to warranties made directly to
him by his immediate seller. The protection he really needs is
against the manufacturer whose published representations
caused him to make the purchase.
The policy of protecting the public from injury, physical or
pecuniary, resulting from misrepresentations outweighs
allegiance to an old and outmoded technical rule of law
which, if observed, might be productive of great injustice. The
manufacturer places his product upon the market and, by
advertising and labeling it, represents its quality to the public
in such a way as to induce reliance upon his
representations . . . . Having invited and solicited the use, the
manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility,
when the expected use leads to injury and loss, by claiming
that he made no contract directly with the user.98
Unquestionably, the judicial extension of section 3-313 for policy
reasons reduces the need *for the importation of third party
beneficiary law.9 9 But consider: There are many recurring situations
where representations made only to an immediate buyer are made
for the benefit of a downstream buyer. These fact patterns will not
fit within the most liberal judicial extensions of section 2-313. At
this point, there is space for the importation of third party
beneficiary law.
97. 181 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y 1962).
98. Id. at 402-03.
99. Of course, tort law (misrepresentation) can do much the sime job to the extent
jurisdictions allow it to supplement the Code.
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D. Abolishing Lack of Vertical Privity as a Defense Apart from
Section 2-318: Judicial Extension of the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Courts have been less generous in extending the implied
warranty of merchantability than they have been in extending the
reach of express representations. 100 However, in a minority of
jurisdictions, the courts have allowed suits for direct economic loss
(apart from personal irjury or property damage) on the basis of the
implied warranty of merchantability codified in section 2-314.101 An
oft-cited and interesting example is Morrow v. New Moon Homes,
Inc.'°2 wherein the Supreme Court of Alaska allowed the buyers to
bypass the insolvent dealer and to recover direct economic loss
against the manufacturer of a defective mobile home on the basis
of implied warranties.10 3 Alaska had adopted Alternative A of
section 2-318, the most limiting Alternative. 01 4 The court stated
explicitly that section 2-318, Alternative A, had nothing to say about
vertical privity, hence, the court was free to fashion its own privity
rule when a suit was brought by the buyer at the end of the
distributive chain against a remote manufacturer.01 5 Then, for policy
reasons, the court cut a new path explained in the following
language:
The fear that if the implied warranty action is extended to
direct economic loss, manufacturers will be subjected to
liability for damages of unknown or unlimited scope would
seem unfounded. The manufacturer may possibly delimit the
scope of his potential liability by use of a disclaimer in
compliance with AS 45.05.100 [2-316] or by resort to the
100. White and Summers, supra note 7, at 592-97; Henning & Wallach, supra note 93,
11.11[1][a]. Both commentators recognize that courts are split on allowing either direct or
consequential economic damages in the absence of vertical privity when the claim made is
based upon an implied warranty instead of an express warranty. Id. There seems to be a
shared assumption that none of section 2-318's Alternatives necessarily resolve this issue.
This implies doubt that Alternative C is really intended to allow suits for direct or
consequential economic loss alone.
101. Id.
102. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
103. Id. at 295-96. The plaintiffs sought to recover under sections 2-314
(merchantability) and 2-315 (fitness for a particular purpose). The Supreme Court of Alaska
acknowledged that recovery under section 2-315 would be improbable because to create the
warranty, the seller must know of the particular purpose. Id. at 291. The value of the opinion
arises from its breaking down of the privity defense for suits based upon section 2-314.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Id. In this case, Alternative A had nothing to add about horizontal privity, either,
because the claim was based upon economic loss alone.
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limitations authorized in AS 45.05.230 [2-719]. These statutory
rights not only preclude extending the theory of strict liability
in tort... but also make highly appropriate this extension of
the theory of implied warranties .... We therefore hold that a
manufacturer can be held liable for direct economic loss
attributable to a breach of his implied warranties, without
regard to privity of contract between the manufacturer and the
106
ultimate purchaser.
10 7
A more recent example is Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed
recovery of direct economic loss by a motorcycle buyer against the
manufacturer, again bypassing an insolvent dealer. 08 The court
relied in part upon the policy implicit in Massachusetts's
non-uniform disclaimer section that renders ineffective any
purported disclaimers in consumer sales.1 9 The court also placed
some reliance upon Massachusetts's non-uniform version of section
2-318 which resembles, but expands upon, Alternative C." 0 Both
Morrow and Jacobs were consumer cases that reflected a minority
view. The majority of states will not allow the buyer, whether a
consumer or business buyer, to sue upsteam against a remote seller
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability when the
buyer has suffered economic loss alone, whether direct or
consequential. Where such suits are permitted, consequential
economic losses are generally precluded."' Therefore, with respect
to implied warranty claims, there is a space where the law of third
party beneficiaries can rightly be imported if the requisites for third
party beneficiary standing are proved because the subject matter is
not expressly covered by Article 2 and case law has left the law
uneven from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

E.

Summary
The law bearing upon who can sue whom for economic loss

106. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 291-92.
107. 649 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1995).
108. Id. The court also allowed treble damages and attorney's fees on the basis of a
state consumer protection statute. Id.
109. Id. at 762. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West 1999).
110. Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 762. Massachusetts's version of section 2-318, in relevant
part, tracks Alternative C of the Official Code but is limited to tort-type warranty cases, i.e.,
cases arising from personal injury or wrongful death or property damage. Id. See Bay State
Spray & Provincetown Steamship, Inc. v. CaterpillarTractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350 (1989).
111. White and Summers, supra note 7, at 595-97.
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based upon breach of express or implied warranties under Article 2
is complex and uneven from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Statutory
Alternatives in section 2-318 of the official code have made the law
diverse rather than uniform. Approximately a dozen jurisdictions
have not been content with these Alternatives and have fashioned
non-uniform statutory language. Case law arising under each of the
three official Alternatives is less than consistent. Quite apart from
section 2-318, courts in a great majority of jurisdictions have
developed
rules extending express
warranties made by
manufacturers and distributors to non-privity buyers, thereby
eroding the defense of vertical privity. In a minority of jurisdictions,
courts have allowed buyers to claim against vertical non-privity
sellers for recovery of economic loss when the suit is based upon
the implied warranty of merchantability. The case law under
sections 2-313, 2-314, and 2-318 has been largely driven by policy
concerns. It has not developed with any consistent reference to the
common law of third party beneficiaries."2
This is the messy context in which the drafting committee has
long sought to fashion an acceptable revision of Article 2's
treatment of third parties. Nobody familiar with the statutes, the
cases, and the commentaries would surmise that making an
acceptable revision of third party rights is an easy task. Apparently
the task has proved terribly difficult, as the next section will
demonstrate. Perhaps solutions to problems bearing upon third
party rights lie outside the charged process of making a tightly
drawn uniform state statute.
III. THE ARTICLE 2
A.

REVISION PROCESS AND THE RECENT DRAFTS

July 1999: DerailingMeaningful Revision

Professor Linda Rusch has written an informative law review
article bearing upon the pressures involved in the drafting process,
including the events of July 1999.1 3 This article is a helpful
112. This does not mean that the relevancy of the common law of third party
beneficiaries is never recognized in the sales context. On the contrary, scholars from time to
time allude to the possible use of third party beneficiary law as a supplement to Article 2.
See, e.g., MARION W. BENFIELD, JR. AND WIUIAM D. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES

297 (3rd ed. 1992). In a note the editors state, "If a particular buyer has not relied upon the
representation, it may not be proper to impose liability unless the intent of the original
contracting parties was clearly to make the remote buyer a third party beneficiary of the
contract between the seller maldng the representation and his immediate buyer." Id.
113. Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspectiveof Revised Article 2: The Never Ending
Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L REv. 1683 (1999).
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resource for understanding the revision process. Suffice it to say
that the culmination of a decade of work was approved by the
American Law Institute in May 1999, and submitted for
consideration at the July meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in Denver,
Colorado. Before any vote was taken, the NCCUSL leadership
withdrew the draft, due to vocal opposition from business
advocates coupled with an apprehension about poor prospects for
uniform enactment. The Reporter, Professor Richard Speidel, and
the Associate Reporter, Professor Linda Rusch, resigned from their
respective positions. Professor Henry Gabriel was thereafter
appointed as Reporter." 4 Professor William Henning was appointed
5
chairperson of the drafting committee."
The committee has subsequently considered three drafts: A
December 1999 draft, a March 2000 draft, and a draft for the July/
August 2000 NCCUSL meeting - the 2000 annual meeting draft. I
will examine these drafts to ferret out the provisions bearing upon
third party rights, concentrating mainly on the 2000 annual meeting
draft. However, to put these drafts into an historical context, it is
important to understand selected parts of the July 1999 draft.
Although it is now an historical artifact, it was a high water mark
for those who wished to make a serious effort to tackle problems
involving third party rights under Article 2 contracts for sale. It
embodied several proposals bearing upon third party claims and
can rightly be consulted as a source for reflective work in the
future. In fact, it appears that the drafters did not wholly repudiate
the substance of the July 1999 draft, but made a careful, tactical
6
retreat on sensitive points."
B.

Third Party Rights Under the July 1999 Draft
In the July 1999 draft, warranties of quality were placed into

114. Id. at 1686. Professor Henry Gabriel is a law professor at Loyola University School
of Law in New Orleans, Louisiana. See supra note 1.
115. Professor William Henning is a law professor at the University of
Missouri-Columbia School of Law. See supra note 1.
116. William C. Smith, Selling Contracts Revisions, Again, 85 ABA J. 26. Professor
Henning, drafting committee chairman, clarified his position in the December 1999 issue of
the American Bar Journal. His views were summarized as follows: "To deal with fears that
new text will prompt new lawsuits, Henning plans to retain Article 2's current numbering
system, and return, whenever appropriate, to the original language. However, the drafting
committee will not be 'starting from scratch,' he claims. 'We will be capturing most of the
changes and clarifications of the prior revision.' " Id.
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three sections of a new Part 4.117 Part 4 was, for the most part, a
straight-forward recodification of the warranty sections from
current Article 2 with slight changes of a clarifying rather than an
innovating nature. The changes of consequence were in new
sections 2-408 and 2409, each of which extended warranties
beyond immediate buyers. Subsection 2-408(b) sought to codify
case law relating to the pass-through warranties, i.e., an express
warranty packaged with the goods. 118 The proposal would have
foisted fresh legal obligations upon nobody, but would have given
statutory legal force to express pass-through representations that
reasonable remote purchasers would believe and probably rely
upon. 119 Subsection 2-408(c) sought to codify the case law on
representations made through the media to the buying public. 120
117. Rusch, supra note 113, at 1698-99,
118. Id. at 1702. Subsection 2408(b) stated in pertinent part:
If a seller makes a representation or remedial promise.in a record packaged with or
accompanying the goods and the seller reasonably expects the record to be, and the
record is, furnished to the remote buyer ... the following rules apply: (1) The seller
has an obligation to the remote buyer . . . that the goods will conform to the
representation or that it will perform any remedial promise unless: (A) a reasonable
person in the position of the remote buyer . . . would not believe that the
representation created an obligation; or ... the representation is merely of the value
of the goods or is an affirmation purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods.
Id. at 1699 n.40.
119. Id. at 1701. It is true that proposed section 2408(b)(2) extended rights beyond the
final buyer in the following language:
The seller's obligation to the remote buyer or remote lessee created under paragraph
(1) also extends to: (A) any member of the family or household unit or any invitee of
the remote consumer buyer or remote consumer lessee; and.., a transferee from the
remote consumer buyer or remote consumer lessee and any subsequent transferee,
but, for purposes of this paragraph, the seller may limit its obligation to the remote
consumer buyer or remote consumer lessee or may limit extension to a particular
person or transferee or a class of transferees, if the limitation is furnished to the
remote consumer buyer or remote consumer lessee at the time of the sale or with the
record which makes the representation, whichever is later.
Id. This does not seem to have been a very dangerous or even necessary section. First, it
overlaps with proposed section 2-409(a). Second, the seller had enormous limiting power.
120. Id. Proposed section 2-408(c) provided:
If a seller makes a representation in a medium for communication to the public, such
as advertising, the seller has an obligation to the remote buyer or remote lessee that
the goods will conform to the representation and that the seller will perform any
accompanying remedial promise if. (1) the remote buyer purchased or the remote
lessee leased the goods from a person in the normal chain of distribution with
knowledge of the representation and with the expectation that the goods will conform
to the representation; ... a reasonable person in the position of the remote buyer or
the remote lessee with knowledge of the representation would expect the goods to
conform to the representation; and ... the representation is not merely of the value
of the goods or is not an affirmation purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
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This subsection would have made representations through the
media legally enforceable obligations if the representations were
such that a reasonable person would rely upon them as importing a
legal obligation. 1 ' Thus, proposed subsections 2-408(b) and (c)
were attempts to make Article 2 consistent with case law that had
moved in the direction anticipated by official comment 2 to section
2-313 of current Article 2.122
Proposed section 2409 of the July 1999 draft (a substitute for
section 2-318) was innovative. In a sense, section 2-409 would have
turned current section 2-318 on its head, using subsection (a) for
economic loss claims on consumer contracts. Section 2-409(a)
provided:
In a consumer contract, a seller's express or implied warranty
or a remedial promise made to an immediate consumer buyer
extends to any member of the family or household of the
immediate consumer buyer or an invitee to the household of
the immediate consumer buyer or a transferee from the
immediate consumer buyer who may reasonably be expected
to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who suffers
damage other than injury to the person resulting from a
breach of warranty or a remedial promise. The seller may not
disclaim, modify, or limit damages arising under this section
unless the seller has a substantial interest in having a warranty
or remedial promise extend only to the immediate consumer
buyer.12
If this proposal had been adopted, rights under warranties,
express and implied, would have extended to members of the
buyer's household and invitees to the buyer's home and to other
foreseeable transferees for injuries other than injuries to the
person. It would have had special applicability to gifts given to
children, family members, guests, and more distant recipients. For
example, if a consumer buyer gave away a bicycle as a holiday gift
to a member of the household or to a guest or to a grandchild
living at a distance, the recipient could have made a claim against
the retail merchant if the bicycle was defective. This subsection
commendation of the goods.
Id. at 1699.
121. Id at 1699 n.40.
122. See supra Part II.C of this article.
123. U.C.C. § 2-409 (a) (July 1999 Draft) (emphasis added). See also Rusch, supra note
113, at 1701 n.48.
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would have corresponded to a liberal reading of Alternative C and
non-uniform variations thereof in descriptions of loss suffered, but
the class of claimants probably would have been smaller. The
comments to proposed section 2-409 were explicit on a related
point: The implied warranty of merchantability would not have
extended to third parties apart from section 2-409(a).1 24 Thus, this
proposal addressed a narrow problem about horizontal privity in
economic loss cases arising from consumer contracts. Section
2-409(a) had nothing to do with eliminating lack of vertical privity
as a defense. Neither remote consumers nor commercial buyers
would have had claims against a manufacturer or non-privity
distributor based upon section 2-409(a). Their claims could only
have been predicated upon the express pass-through warranties or
media-communicated warranties from the non-privity warrantors. It
is difficult to understand why business interests would have
opposed the third party provisions of section 2-409(a). Consumers
would have had greater basis to complain since the text did not
address issues of vertical privity for implied warranties at all. 125 It
would have been of no assistance to commercial buyers.
Section 2-409(b) contained Alternatives A and B: Alternative A
followed current section 2-318 (Alternative A) allowing actions for
personal injury to the buyer, members of the buyer's household, or
guests in the buyer's home; 126 and Alternative B followed current
section 2-318 (Alternative B) allowing actions- for personal injuries
to any natural person who might reasonably be expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods. 127 Viewed as a whole, the
124. U.C.C.§ 2-409 (Proposed Official Draft, July 1999). According to proposed
comment 2 to section 2409:
There is no extension of warranties under this subsection when the immediate buyer
is not a consumer. Express warranties, however, may be made to remote buyers and
others under Section 2-408 or one of the Alternatives in subsection (b). The implied
warranty of merchantability is not extended by Article 2 in commercial cases but may
be extended under other state law.
Id.
125. I am assuming that proposed sections 2-313A and 2-313B count as sections
addressing the issue of vertical privity for express warranties even though the relevant word
is now representation.
126. Id. at § 2-409 (b). Proposed section 2-409 (b), July 1999, Alternative A stated:
A seller's warranty, whether express or implied extends to any individual who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty in the family or household of the
immediate buyer or who is a guest in the immediate buyer's home if it is reasonable
for the seller to expect that the individual may use, consume, or be affected by the
goods. A seller may not disclaim or limit the operation of this section.
Id.
127. Id. at § 2-409 (b). Proposed section 2-409(b), July 1999, Alternative B stated, "A
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proposed extensions of warranties under section 2-409 were more
restrictive than the Alternatives put to the states in the early 1960s
when Alternatives B and C to section 2-318 were developed,
assuming Alternative C is rightly construed as pertaining to some
economic losses for both consumer and commercial buyers apart
from property damage or personal injury. The big difference that
approval of section 2-409 would have wrought was this: Proposed
section 2-409(a), with its breakdown of horizontal privity in limited
cases of economic loss, was not an alternative but rather an
integral part of the warranty scheme intended for universal
enactment. In a sense, this would have been an improvement on
current section 2-318 because it would have achieved greater
uniformity and a consequent reduction in confusion about who can
sue whom for breach of warranty resulting in only economic loss
to consumers. Yet, it avoided the related questions about vertical
privity in relation to consumer and commercial buyers.
In my view, a better part of proposed section 2-409 was included
in subsection (c) with its explicit link to non-Code law. Proposed
section 2-409(c) stated:
This article does not diminish the rights and remedies of any
third party beneficiary or assignee under the law of contracts
or of persons to which goods are transferred by operation of
law and does not displace any other law that extends a
warranty or remedial promise to or for the benefit of any third
person.
This dovetailed with a comment to proposed section 2-503(b) on
the subject of delegation. 128 The comment provided in relevant part:
"[I]f the third person accepts the delegation, an enforceable
promise is made to both the delegator and the person entitled
seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any individual who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not disclaim or limit the operation of this section."
128. Id. at 2-503 (b). Proposed section 2-503(b) recaptured the law of current section
2-210 in the following language:
(1) A party may delegate to another person its duty to perform a contract for sale
unless the other party to the original contract has a substantial interest in having the
original promisor perform, or control the performance required by the contract. A
delegation of performance does not relieve the delegating party of any duty to
perform or any liability for breach of contract. (2) Acceptance of a delegation of
duties by an assignee constitutes a promise by the assignee to perform those duties.
The promise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other party to the original
contract.
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under the contract to perform [sic] those duties. . . in short, as to
the person entitled under the contract a third party beneficiary
129
contract is created."
It is doubtful that the textual reference to third party beneficiary
law and the reference in the proposed comment to section 503(b)
were intended to change the law. Rather, these references were
probably intended to make explicit what is available through
section 1-103, the open door to the common law. These linkages,
however, captured in a few short phrases one main point of this
article: That Article 2 is incomplete without selective importation of
the common law of third party beneficiaries. It is unfortunate that
textual cross-references were deleted in later drafts.130 In summary,
the July 1999 draft was a very tame document as far as third party
rights are concerned. It did do at least two things of particular
benefit for non-privity claimants: (i) it gave rights to a specific class
of horizontal non-privity claimants for economic losses, and (ii) it
recognized in its text and proposed comments the continuing
viability of the common law of third party beneficiaries.
C. The Drafts of December 1999 and March 2000131
The December 1999 draft was circulated with a memorandum
from Professor Henning wherein he invited interested observers to
submit written critiques for the drafting committee's consideration.
The December draft's provisions concerning third party rights
contained a significant carry-over from the July draft on the
extension of express warranties. To blend pass-through warranties
and warranties created through the media into the current
numbering system, sections 2-313A and 2-313B were-created.
Section 2-313A would have codified pass-through warranties
renamed as merely "obligations." Section 2-313B would have
codified the law on "obligations" undertaken by representations
through the media. These sections replaced section 2408 of the
129. U.C.C. § 2-503, cmt. 3 (Proposed Official Draft, July 1999).
130. See supra Part III.D. A meaningful reference has reappeared in the 2000 annual
meeting draft.
131. There was also a November 1999 draft. Professor Henry Gabriel called it an
interim draft and circulated it with this caveat: "This draft has not been considered by the
drafting committee. It is the Reporters Interim Draft, circulated for comment prior to the
consideration of the Drafting Committee. The Reporters Notes appended to the various
sections are just that - notes." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Article 2-Sales, Preliminary
Note (Proposed Official Draft, November 1999). This draft requires no comment except to
note that it reverted to the current Article 2 numbering system.
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July 1999 draft. Because provisions in the March 2000 draft and the
2000 annual meeting draft are substantively very similar, I will
neither set forth nor comment upon these new sections here
except to say that these sections did not create third party
beneficiary rights. Instead, they were designed to recognize rights
running directly from the representing sellers to the recipients of
the representations. As to explicit third party beneficiary
provisions, nothing remained of the proposed section 2-409 which
would have replaced section 2-318. Rather, there was a new section
2-318 with Alternatives A through C, quite similar to the current
Alternatives, adjusted to recognize the obligations created by new
sections 2-313A and 2-313B.
The December draft did contain a group of significant deletions
from the July 1999 draft. The linkages to the common law of third
party beneficiaries were missing. Section 2-409(c) with its textual
recognition of the availability of the common law of third party
beneficiaries was gone. Section 2-503, on delegation, was replaced
by a new section 2-210, but the reference to third party beneficiary
law in the proposed comments was gone. This was probably not
intended as a change in the law for, unless displaced, the common
law is available through section 1-103. However, a negative
inference could have been drawn; namely, that third party
beneficiary law would be displaced.
The March 2000 draft was, in the main, a continuation and
refinement of the December draft. As in the December draft,
section 2-313A codified the best of the case law on pass-through
"obligations" and section 2-313B again captured the law on
obligations to remote buyers created through sellers' media
representations. Again, explicit references to the law of third party
beneficiaries were missing. On this foundation, the draft for the
2000 annual meeting of the NCCUSL was put forward for debate.
Its key provisions are important for third party claimants.
D.

The 2000 Annual Meeting Draft

Let us start with section 2-313A that is captioned, "Obligation to
Remote Purchaser Created by Record Packaged with or
Accompanying Goods." Subsection (a) has three definitions.
"Goods" are defined for this section as "new goods and goods sold
or leased as new goods unless the transaction or purchase does not
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occur in the normal chain of distribution."1 32 "Immediate buyer" is
defined as, "a buyer that enters into contract with the seller."133
"Remote purchaser" means, "a person that buys or leases goods
from an immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of
distribution."'14 According to the introductory words, these
definitions are only for the construction of this new section.
The statutory substantive rules follow in subsection (b) that
states:
If a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates
to the goods, or provides a description that relates to the
goods, or makes a remedial promise, in a record packaged
with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably
expects the record to be, and the record is, furnished to the
remote purchaser, the seller has an obligation to the remote
purchaser that: (1) the goods will conform to the affirmation
of fact, promise, or description unless a reasonable person in
the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that
the affirmation of fact, promise, or description created an
obligation, and (2) the seller will perform the remedial
promise.
Preliminary Comment 1 states in pertinent part, "No direct contract
exists between the seller and remote purchaser, and thus the
seller's obligation under this section is not referred to as an
'express warranty.' " True, there is no contract for sale, but if the
obligation does not arise from a promise or representation, what is
its source? Perhaps we should consider it a statutorily imposed
obligation analogous to the obligations of issuers of negotiable
instruments under Article 3.135 However conceived, the obligations
imposed correspond to earlier case law. The policy underlying
section 2-313A should not be controversial among fair-minded
observers. Because section 2-313A creates or recognizes direct
seller - remote purchaser obligations, third party beneficiary
36
analysis plays no role.
132. Id. at § 2-313A (a)(1).
133. Id. at § 2-313A (a)(2).
134. Id. at § 2-313A (a)(3).
135. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-412-15 (2000). All citations to current Article 3 in this article
are citations to the Official Text - 2000, promulgated by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws unless otherwise specified.
136. However, situations will remain where third party beneficiary law should flow in;
namely, whenever a record which counts under section 2-313A passes only part way down
the distributive chain but manifests an intent of the seller and the immediate party that a
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The case law respecting communications to the buying public
through the media is codified in proposed section 2-313B. After
reiterating the definitions of section 2-313A(a) with one slight
alteration, 137 subsection (b) sets forth the following:
If a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates
to the goods, or provides a description that relates to the
goods, or makes a remedial promise in advertising or a similar
communication to the public and the remote purchaser enters
into a transaction of purchase with knowledge of and with the
expectation that the goods will conform to the affirmation of
fact, promise, or description, or that the seller will perform the
remedial promise, the seller has an obligation to the remote
purchaser that: (1) the goods will conform to the affirmation
of fact, promise, or description unless a reasonable person in
the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that
the affirmation of fact, promise, or description created an
obligation; and (2) an obligation to the remote purchaser that
the seller will perform the remedial promise.
As with proposed section 2-313A, the language speaks of
"obligations," not warranties. According to the Preliminary
Comment, cmt. 1: "In the paradigm situation, a manufacturer will
engage in an advertising campaign directed towards all or part of
the market for its product and will make statements that if made to
an immediate buyer would amount to an express warranty or
remedial promise under Section 2-313." To be a proper claimant
under this section, a person would need to hear or read or
otherwise have knowledge of the statement at the time of purchase
and, "must also have an expectation that the goods will conform or
that the seller will comply."138 As with proposed section 2-313A,
2-313B is a clear codification of accepted rules fashioned through
case law. 3 9 There is no obvious contractual basis for enforcement,
apart from the assumption that legislative action will make these
downstream buyer should have the benefit thereof or creates a situation where the
objectives of the original buyer and seller require third party enforcement.
137. U.C.C. § 2-313 B (Proposed Official Draft, March 2000). Section 2-313B(a)(1)
defines "Goods" as follows: " 'Goods' means new goods and goods sold or leased as new
goods in a transaction of purchase that occurs in the normal chain of distribution." Id. Why
there is a difference from the definition in section 2-313A(a)(1) is not apparent from the
comments.
138. Id. at § 2-313B, cmt. 3.
139. See Part B.C.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39: 111

obligations enforceable. 14 0 There is no reference to the law of third
party beneficiaries and rightly so, for the paradigm does not involve
a promise made to a promisee for the benefit of a third person.
The law would simply impose direct obligations where
communications through the media reasonably create expectations
of one sort or another at the bottom of the distribution chain
thereby extinguishing want of vertical privity as a viable defense.
In sum, sections 2-313A and 2-313B recognize sets of direct
obligations running from sellers to remote purchasers, long
recognized by case law. For purposes of this article, these sections
operate to do one important thing for buyers' cases: They
extinguish want of vertical privity as a defense in some cases
thereby diminishing to a limited extent the area where third party
beneficiary law might otherwise flow in.141 These sections do the
job intended for proposed section 2-408 of the July 1999 draft.
As in current Article 2, third party beneficiary principles appear
in proposed section 2-318 of the 2000 annual meeting draft.
Subsection (a) has two definitions. "Immediate buyer means a
buyer that enters into a contract with the seller."42 "Remote
purchaser means a person that buys or leases goods from an
immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of
distribution." 14 These definitions are identical to those contained in
proposed sections 2-313A and 2-313B, and simply set the stage for
the rules to follow.
Subsection (b) presents Alternatives A through C which in
principle would constitute only slight modifications of current law.
Each Alternative is hereinafter quoted and commented upon.
ALTERNATIVE A *
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an
immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an immediate
buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any natural person who is
in the family or household of such immediate buyer or such
remote purchaser or who is a guest in the home of either if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
140. Commentators have proposed contract models. See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 95,
at 421.
141. Naturally, the requisites for third party suits would need to be established. The
mere recognition of a vacuum does not imply that third party beneficiary law would fill it.
142. U.C.C. § 2-318 (a)(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 2000 Annual Meeting Draft).
143. Id. at § 2-318 (a)(2).
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be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty, remedial promise or obligation. A
seller may not exclude or limit the obligation of this section.
With adjustments for proposed sections 2-313A and 2-313B and
the recognition of remedial promises, this statutory proposal
corresponds to current Alternative A. The preliminary comments
are enlightening. Preliminary comment 3 states:
As applied to warranties and remedial promises arising under
Sections 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315, the purpose of this section is
to give certain beneficiaries the benefit of the warranties and
remedial promises which the immediate buyer received in the
contract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from
any technical rules as to "privity." It seeks to accomplish this
purpose without any derogation of any right or remedy arising
under the law of torts. Implicit in this section is that any
beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action for breach
of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to him.
Obligations and remedial promises under Sections 2-313A and
2-313B arise initially in a non-privity context but are extended
under this section to the same extent as warranties and
remedial promises running to a buyer in privity.
Alternative A creates a fairly narrow class of third party
beneficiaries for personal injury suits. It thus addresses a question
of horizontal. privity. Personal injury lawyers could combine
warranty law with strict liability and negligence in suits against the
last seller in the distribution chain as well as against non-privity
sellers who undertake the extended obligations described above.
Comment 3144 makes it clear that Alternative A does not address
the issue of vertical privity. It states:
The first Alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within
its provisions the family, household, and guests of the
immediate buyer or remote purchaser. Beyond this, the section
in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or
restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties, given to an immediate buyer who resells, extend to
other persons in the distributive chain.
144.
Comment
reference
Comment

U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 4 [3] (2000 Annual Meeting Draft). It appears that Preliminary
4 for section 2-318 was mistakenly mislabeled as a second Comment 3. The
in the text is to the second Proposed Comment 3. 1 will nonetheless refer to it as
4.
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For the states which elect Alternative A, as a majority have
under current Article 2, there will be a significant area for the
importation of third party beneficiary law for economic loss cases,
because except for the connections to sections 2-313A and 2-313B,
the law will remain unchanged in Alternative A states. After the
tactful retreat from the July 1999 draft, the recurring questions
about vertical and horizontal privity in economic loss cases rest
145
once again with the courts.
ALTERNATIVE B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an
immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an immediate
buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or Section 2-313B extends to any natural
person who may reasonably be expected to use, Consume, or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by the
breach of warranty, remedial promise or obligation. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
As under current law, proposed Alternative B is a personal injury
statute with a larger class of potential claimants than under
Alternative A. The language has been adjusted to take account of
the obligations to remote buyers created under sections 2-313A and
2-313B. The test for inclusion is foreseeability: Who may be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by these particular
goods? Preliminary Comment 3 implies that vertical privity will fail
as a defense in those jurisdictions that adopt Alternative B. 146 This
comment states in relevant part, "The second alternative is
designed for States where case law has already developed further
and for those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries." By
itself, this sentence means only that the class of persons beyond
the final buyer allowed to make claims has been expanded;
however, the absence of neutrality language about the liability of
upstream sellers, used in explicating the meaning of Alternative A,
implies a breakdown of vertical privity as a defense.1 47 By virtue of
145. Vertical privity, even more than horizontal privity, will continue to be the business
of the courts. See U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 1 (2000 Annual Meeting Draft).
146. See supra note 144.
147. In explaining the meaning of Alternative A, the second Proposed Comment 3
states, "[Tihe section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to an immediate buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." Thus, under Alternative A, the
matter of vertical privity is left exclusively to the courts. By implication, under Alternative B,
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its limitation to personal injury cases, Alternative B leaves plenty of
room for third party beneficiary law in economic loss and property
damage cases.
ALTERNATIVE C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an
immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an immediate
buyer, or a seller's obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or Section 2-313B extends to any person that
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and that is injured by breach of the warranty,
remedial promise or obligation. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the
person of an individual to whom the warranty, remedial
promise or obligation extends.
Here is the most expansive Alternative, seldom enacted under
current Article 2, with appropriate adjustments for sections 2-313A
and 2-313B. Wherever adopted, this Alternative could have an
impact upon the main question addressed in this article: When do
third parties (non-privity claimants) have a claim for economic loss
against warrantors (obligors) in a contract for sale? As
acknowledged in Part II of this article, most courts considering the
issue have construed current Alternative C to allow claims for
economic loss apart from property damage. 148 Consequently, in light
of case law, Alternative C, if enacted, will probably be construed in
most jurisdictions to allow at least claims for direct economic loss
by persons not in privity with the defendant when the limiting
power impliedly allowed to sellers in the last sentence is not
exercised. However, the power vested in sellers is important. The
preliminary comment on this sentence could not be clearer. It
states:
The last sentence of Alternative C permits a seller to reduce
its obligations to third-party beneficiaries to a level
the statute takes away vertical privity as a defense. This is precisely what Professor
Stallworth discovered in examining the case law under current Alternative B. See Stallworth
1, supra note 72.
148. See White and Summers, supra note 7, § 11-5, where the authors express doubt
that this was the drafters' intent in the early 1960s. Alternative C may well have been
intended for personal injury and property damage cases. Because of the proposed comments
to section 2-318 of the 2000 annual meeting draft, the same question may hover over the law
for years to come.
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commensurate with that imposed on the seller under
Alternative B - that is, to eliminate liability to persons that
are not individuals and to eliminate liability for damages other
than personal injury.'4
Common sense suggests that many sellers will exercise this
limiting power reserved to them in jurisdictions where Alternative
C is adopted - making it the functional equivalent of Alternative
B. Therefore, where Alternative C, or a variation thereof, is enacted
and liberally construed, the need for importing third party
beneficiary law could shrink, but especially in light of the power
reserved for sellers, there will remain fact patterns where resort to
the common law of third party -beneficiaries will be necessary and
appropriate, provided that Alternative C is not interpreted as a
complete displacement of the common law of third party
beneficiaries.
In contrast to the December 1999 and March 2000 drafts, the
2000 annual meeting draft explicitly recognizes the continuing
viability of the common law of third party beneficiaries for some
sales-of-goods cases. The reference is not in the proposed statutory
text, as in the July 1999 draft,' 1° but only in a preliminary comment
to proposed section 2-313A. Preliminary Comment 2 provides:
The party to which an obligation runs under this section
may either buy or lease the goods, and thus the term "remote
purchaser" is used. The term is more limited than "purchaser"
in Article 1, however, and does not include a donee or any
voluntary transferee who is not a buyer or lessee. Moreover,
the remote purchaser must be part of the normal chain of
distribution for the particular product. That chain will by
definition include at least three parties and may well include
more - for example, the manufacturer might first sell to a
wholesaler, that would then resell the goods to a retailer for
sale or lease to the public. A buyer or lessee from the retailer
would qualify as a remote purchaser and could invoke this
section against either the manufacturer or the wholesaler (if
the wholesaler provided a record to the retailer to be
furnished to the ultimate party), but no subsequent transferee,
such as a used-goods buyer or sublessee, could qualify. The
149. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 1 (2000 Annual Meeting Draft).
150. See the discussion of proposed subsection 2409(c) and related comments at notes
120-24, supra, and the accompanying text.
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law governing assignment and third party beneficiary [sic],
including Section 2-318, must be consulted to determine
whether a party other than the remote purchaser can enforce
an obligation created under this section. (emphasis added).
While rather slender, this reference to the common law of third
party beneficiaries corrects a deficiency in the December 1999 and
March 2000 drafts and partially recaptures a strength of the July
1999 draft on an important point: The continuing viability of
non-Code third party beneficiary law. Curiously, there is no parallel
comment following proposed sections 2-313 or 2-313B. This is
partly rectified by Preliminary Comment 2 to section 2-313B, which
notes the parallelism to section 2-313A and advises that, "the
Official Comments to that section should be consulted."
Furthermore, Comment 2 to section 2-313 reiterates the openness
to outside law contained in Comment 2 of current Article 2 albeit
with an altered phraseology. 151 Therefore, quite apart from section
1-103, there are toe-holds in the 2000 annual meeting draft for the
creative importation of the common law of third party
beneficiaries.
E.

Summary

After a long and tortured process, the drafting committee
presented a 2000 annual meeting draft for revised Article 2 which
would leave the recognition of third party rights generally where
the law was in the early 1960s, except in regard to pass-through
warranties and media-communicated warranties that would become
statutory "obligations" running directly to distant, downstream
parties. As to third party claims for economic losses for breach of
warranties, express or implied, proposed section 2-318 would
probably perpetuate current variations among jurisdictions.
Wherever Alternative C is adopted, if it is adopted, some third
party claims for economic losses would be recognized, but the
outer limits of Alternative C liability would remain uncertain,
especially in light of the cryptic comments proposed to date.
Preliminary Comment 3 states, after addressing Alternatives A and
B: "The third alternative goes further, following the trend of
modem decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d, section
151. Comment 2 to proposed section 2-313 in the 2000 annual meeting draft states in
pertinent part: "It is not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined to contracts within the scope of this
Article." Compare Official Comment 2 to current Article 2.
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402A."152 Taken at face value, this would limit Alternative C to
personal injury and property damage cases and would not cover
economic losses apart from personal injury or property damage. In
any event, sellers would retain the power to turn Alternative C into
merely a tort-type products liability statute. In this context, the
explicit reference to the law of third party beneficiaries in
Preliminary Comment 2 to section 2-313A is enlightening and
encouraging. The 2000 annual meeting draft points toward the
necessity of blending the law of sales and the common law of third
party beneficiaries. The question is: In what situations should a
blend be made?
IV.

PARADIGMS THAT RAISE

ISSUES

OF HORIZONTAL PRWVITY: WHEN A

PERSON BEYOND THE FINAL BUYER HAS A CLAIM FOR ECONOMIc LOSSES
ATFrRIBUTABLE TO A SELLER'S BREACH

A.

Introduction

There are at least three recurring fact patterns involving sales of
goods and economic loss in which the common law of third party
beneficiaries can be employed to resolve issues of horizontal
privity. The three situations are: (1) promotions where a seller
promises a prize to a sponsor (promisee) in return for advertising
or similar rights, the prize to be awarded to a third party according
to terms established by the sponsor; (2) sales of goods where the
buyer requests and intends delivery and passage of title to a third
person in order to make a gift; (3) sales of goods where the buyer
for business reasons requests and intends delivery and passage of
title to a third party. No doubt some of these patterns recur more
often than the others. The second pattern probably occurs more
frequently than the other two. With respect to each, there is a
paucity of case law recognizing the relevancy of third party
beneficiary law. Nevertheless, each pattern displays a life situation
in which third party beneficiary law can play a useful role. There
are a few cases worth considering.
With respect to each paradigm, I will proceed as follows: First, I
will set up with reasonable detail a hypothetical case wherein a
third party claim could arise. Second, taking a backward look, I
will make an argument for third party beneficiary recognition on
the basis of precedent, most of which can be read in harmony with
section 302 of the Restatement (Second). Third, taking a forward
152.

The reference is to the second Preliminary Comment numbered 3.
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look, I will try to justify allowing third party beneficiary rights in
the hypothetical situation by testing it against the two-branch third
party beneficiary principle put forth by Professor Eisenberg. 153 I
have drawn the hypothetical situations with an eye on precedent
and on Professor Eisenberg's third party beneficiary principle with
the objective of arguing that in every case, recognizing third party
rights to sue on Article 2 obligations would be appropriate.
Throughout, there are four underlying assumptions: (i) that the
2000 annual meeting draft with its Alternatives for section 2-318
will eventually be promulgated and adopted in most jurisdictions;
(ii) that in jurisdictions adopting Alternatives A or B of section
2-318, a right to sue would not be allowed for the third party in the
hypothetical situation without resort to non-Code law; (iii) that in
jurisdictions which do adopt Alternative C as proposed in the 2000
annual meeting draft, standing to sue as a third party for direct or
consequential economic loss alone will remain controversial; 15 and
(iv) that the most liberal interpretations of Alternative C would
provide no basis for a third party suit apart from breach of
warranty. For example, Alternative C would give a third party no
rights on account of non-delivery or anticipatory repudiation by the
seller. On these assumptions, no matter which official Alternative
any jurisdiction adopts, there will be room for the selective
importation of the common law of third party beneficiaries in
situations analogous to the following hypothetical situations.
Naturally, importation will require that courts accept the argument
that none of the Alternatives offered by official section 2-318 totally
displaces the common law of third party beneficiaries.
B.

Promotions and Prizes
1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Assume that an association of environmentally concerned
citizens ("Association") decides to promote alternatives to the
internal combustion engine. To that end, the Association sponsors a
Bikers' Weekend during which many roads are reserved for cyclists.
The focal point of the weekend is bike races for which prizes are
awarded. SuperBikes, Inc. contracts with the Association for
advertising purposes on the following terms: SuperBikes promises
153. See supra Part I.G.
154. If Alternative C of the 2000 annual meeting draft is not widely enacted, as is the
case with current Alternative C, there will be a nearly universal need for borrowing from the
common law of third party beneficiaries.
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to give twenty new trail bikes valued at $1000 each to bikers
selected by the Association as winners in the bike races in return
for the Association's inclusion of SuperBike's advertisements in its
promotional material and the privilege of setting up advertising
booths at rallying points. Accordingly, the Association represents to
all registrants at the Bikers' Weekend that SuperBikes will give new
trail bikes to the twenty bikers with the best time on the
designated routes. All goes according to plan except that
SuperBikes reneges when a vigilant comptroller decides that the
promotional benefits were far less than $20,000, the value of the
bikes. Quaere: Do the winning bikers have a claim against
SuperBikes, Inc. for non-delivery? Or suppose the bikes are
delivered, but prove to be damaged and, consequently,
unmerchantable. Would the winners have warranty claims against
SuperBikes, Inc. in the absence of any representations passed on to
the bikers by the Association? I contend that the bikers should
have rights to sue as third parties in either the case of non-delivery
or upon receipt of uninerchantable bikes.
2.

Case Law Supporting Intended Third Party Beneficiary
Rights

Case law relevant to the foregoing hypothetical situation is
exceedingly scarce. I have found no reported third party
beneficiary case arising from a promotional game where the
promise sued upon was a promise for the delivery of goods to the
sponsor. Indeed, cases arising from promises of new cars to
winners in promotional games are very common;1 however, the
promise sued upon in reported cases seems always to have been a
promise made by the sponsor to the participants in the game, i.e.,
the Association in the foregoing hypothetical. The sponsor
generally procures the prizes and promises delivery to the winners
according to the rules of the game. 156 Even though sponsors
commonly enter into one or more contracts for procurement of the
prizes, cases (with exceptions, infra) do not show third party suits
on those contracts. Perhaps suppliers who sell goods to sponsors
of promotional games seldom breach. Or perhaps the lack of case
law is attributable to a widespread perception that such claims
would not be viable. The following two cases would give the
155. See Mark B. Wessman, Is Contract the Name of the Game? PromotionalGames as
Test Theory for Contract Theory, 34 ARiz. L REV. 635 (1992) ("Wessman").
156. Id. at 645-54.
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plaintiff's lawyer a toe-hold in a suit by a contest winner against a
non-privity supplier to a game sponsor.
Whitehead v. Burgess, 38 A. 802 (N.J. 1897)
Burgess owned a stallion through which he offered breeding
services for payment of $100. Purcell paid $100 to have his mare
bred with Burgess's stallion. In connection with this transaction,
Burgess promised Purcell that he would pay $750 to the owner of a
foal of Purcell's mare, "if such foal should prove to be the first one
of the get of said stallion that should trot a mile in 2 minutes and
30 seconds." 157 Whitehead alleged that he purchased the foal of
Purcell's mare having knowledge of Burgess's promise to Purcell,
and that this foal, "trotted a mile in less than 2 minutes and 30
seconds, and was the first one of the get of said stallion to make
the said time." 1'8 When Burgess refused to pay the $750 as
promised, Whitehead sued him. Burgess demurred on three
grounds, one of which was lack of privity.159 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey decided that the case was not subject to dismissal for
want of privity.160
The court's acknowledgment of Whitehead's third party
beneficiary status and his entitlement to sue thereon could not be
clearer.
The law in this state is that an action may be maintained on a
promise made by the defendant to a third person for the
benefit of the plaintiff without any consideration moving from
the plaintiff to the defendant ....
The fact that the person to
whose benefit the promise may inure is uncertain at the time
it is made, and that it cannot be known until the happening of
a contingency, cannot deprive the person who thereafter
establishes his claim to be the beneficiary of the promise of
161
the right to recover upon it.
This language would have made Professor Williston delighted at
the turn of the last century. It embodies a clear recognition of third
party beneficiary rights, contrary to the views of many courts in the
157. White v. Burgess, 38 A. 802 (N.J. 1897). This is taken from the court's summary of
the plaintiffs allegations.
158. Id. at 802.
159. Id. at 802-03. The other two grounds for demurring were the statute of frauds and
public policy, neither of which were successful. Id.
160. Id at 803. The procedural reason for this case coming before four judges of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey on the demurrer is not clear from the opinion.
161. Id. at 802 (citation omitted).
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decades immediately preceding. 162 Now, consider the hypothetical
situation about SuperBikes, Inc. in light of Whitehead v. Burgess.
Suppose Burgess had promised a saddle, a riding cart, or another
foal from the get of his stallion (any kind of goods) in lieu of the
$750 promise made to Purcell. Are we to infer that the court, which
overruled a demurrer to the claim for $750 predicated upon third
party beneficiary standing, would have sustained a demurrer if the
promise sued upon had been for the delivery of goods? The answer
is self-evident; the court which allowed a suit for money as
promised surely would have allowed a suit on a promise for the
delivery of goods. Unless the goods were unique, damages instead
of specific performance would have been the appropriate remedy.
The hypothetical case is analogous. SuperBikes made a promise
knowing that the Association would advertise it. The bikers, who
entered races with the promise of new trail bikes as a reward for
winning, should be allowed to sue SuperBikes, Inc. either for
non-delivery or for breach of warranty.
1
Finch v. Rhode Island Grocers Assoc., 175 A.2d 177 (R.I. 1961) 63
The case arose from the following events: The Rhode Island
Grocers Association ("Association") was holding a convention to
mark its 50th anniversary and decided to invite the public. To
enhance public interest, the Association made arrangements, "for a
drawing in the nature of a door prize" 1" consisting of two
round-trip tickets to Hawaii. TransOcean Air Lines ("Air Lines")
promised the Association that it would provide the tickets in
exchange for a booth at the convention and specified advertising
rights. The Association performed its part of the bargain and
accordingly awarded two tickets to Finch, the winner of the
drawing.16 5 Before the tickets were used, the Air Line suspended
operations. Finch sued the Association.
The trial court allowed recovery on a third party beneficiary
theory.l6 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed, whimsically
discarding Finch's asserted third party beneficiary standing for her
162. See supra Part UI.D.
163. See Michael P Sullivan, Annotation, Private Contests and Lotteries: Entrants'
Rights and Remedies, 64 A.L.R. 4TH 1021, 1081 (1988).
164. Finch v. Rhode Island Grocers Assoc., 175 A2d 177, 179 (R.I. 1961).
165. Id. According to the opinion: "No consideration was required to participate in the
drawing other than to attend as a spectator and fill out a card which presumably called for
the name and address of the individual participating." Id. at 179.
166. Id. at 180. The trial court thought that Finch should recover against the
Association as a third party beneficiary on the basis of Rhode Island case law. Id. at 181.
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claim against the Association. More importantly, the court explicitly
acknowledged a probable third party claim against the Air Lines.
The court stated:
The plaintiff contends . . . that she is a donee beneficiary
falling within the definition of that term as defined in 2
Williston, Contracts (3d ed.) .... We do not disagree with this
definition but we think it immaterial that plaintiff may be a
donee beneficiary. We hold that such beneficiary may recover
if at all only from that party to the contract whose promise if
enforced inures to her benefit ....
The plaintiff further
argues, however, that if she is a donee beneficiary it has been
held to be immaterial whether the consideration flows from
the promisee or the promisor. She takes this to mean that she
can bring suit against either party. It is sufficient to answer
this contention to point out that consideration flows from both
parties, thus giving rise to the following question: On the
consideration of which party must the beneficiary rely? We
think that the beneficiary must look to the party that promised
167
the benefit.
It is difficult to quarrel with the result or with the court's dicta
about Finch's claim against the Air Lines. It seems apparent that
Finch could have sued the Air Lines on a third party beneficiary
theory. If the Air Lines were defunct, the suit might not have been
economically worthwhile, but the plaintiff would have had the
satisfaction of naming the proper party defendant. Applying the
dicta from Finch to the hypothetical situation posed earlier, the
bike winners' argument for standing to sue SuperBikes, Inc. for
non-delivery is strong. The case is equally strong if SuperBikes
delivered unmerchantable bikes or bikes which did not conform to
any actionable warranties given to the Association. There was, after
all, a bargain between the Association and SuperBikes wherein'ss
both parties objectively manifested a purpose, namely, conferring
the benefit of new trail bikes on twenty self-selected hard riding

bikers. 169
167. Id at 181.
168. The bikers might make out a claim against the Association on a tort theory if
some species of fraud were involved or possibly on a contract theory, but this is beyond the
scope of my inquiry.
169. Given the manifestations of intent evident in the bargain, I contend that the bikers
fit quite easily into Restatement (Second) section 302(1)(b); at least, there is a good
argument for recognizing them as intended beneficiaries on the basis of the text alone.
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The Third Party Beneficiary Principle and the Hypothetical
Situation

If we apply Professor Eisenberg's third party beneficiary principle
to the hypothetical situation involving SuperBikes, assuming either
non-delivery or the delivery of defective, non-conforming bikes,.
third party suits should be allowed the winning bikers. Take the
first branch of the third party, beneficiary principle and ask: Is
allowing the winners to enforce the contract between SuperBikes
and the Association a necessary or important means of effectuating
the original parties' enterprise objectives? Allowing the bikers to
sue SuperBikes is important and probably necessary. Recognizing
third party rights may be important because the Association may
not have the resources necessary, nor an interest in pursuing
litigation for the bikers. Even if the Association's decisionmakers
have the interest and the resources, there is little economic
incentive for a suit against SuperBikes. Litigation would poison
relations with SuperBikes and would yield little for the Association,
except that future participation in its contests might be increased
by good publicity about its good faith efforts to help the prize
winners. Assuming inaction by the Association, recognition of third
party rights is necessary to effectuate the original parties'
performance objectives.
Under the second branch of the third party principle we can ask:
Is allowing enforcement by the winners supported by reasons of
policy or morality independent of contract law? The answer
depends mainly on whether it is in the public interest to employ
the judiciary to promote honesty in games open to the public. In
this light, I believe that the argument for third party rights is
strong. If prize winners in the contest sponsored by an
environmentally concerned group cannot gain the help of the
courts to enforce the obligations undertaken by "SuperBikes,
cynicism and a reluctance to participate in future contests will
ensue. Confidence in future contests and confidence in the courts
will be enhanced if the winners are accorded rights as third party
beneficiaries. Furthermore, this game would qualify in some
jurisdictions as a lottery, subject to state regulation. 17 0 The state's
interest in preventing fraudulent contests will be advanced by third
party enforcement with no costs to the state apart from the usual
170. See Sullivan, supra note 163. The annotation discusses, among other subjects, the
universal state tendency to regulate lotteries. In the hypothetical, allowing bikers standing to
sue enables them to assist in policing the lottery.
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expense of running the judicial branch.
C. Gifts for Friends and Relatives
1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Suppose Lillian decides to give her granddaughter, Jenny, an
expensive painting upon graduation from law school. Deciding
against surprise and in favor of allowing her granddaughter a
choice in the selection, Lillian and Jenny visit galleries together
until they come upon an early American painting that Jenny loves
passionately. A representative of the gallery states that it is
guaranteed to be authentic and further states that this justifies the
high price, $300,000. Lillian arranges for payment. The painting is
timely delivered to Jenny on graduation day. She thereafter proudly
displays it in her office, insures it, and describes it to visitors
according to assurances given in the gallery. Lillian suffers a stroke
within a few months, and goes into a deep coma. About this time,
Jenny decides to have the painting appraised and discovers that it
is a fake whereupon she indignantly demands a refund from the
gallery. The gallery wrongfully defends the authenticity of the
painting and refuses to discuss any refund. Does Jenny have a
cause of action against the gallery as a third party beneficiary? Or
must a guardian be appointed for Lillian to commence litigation?
Or should Jenny be denied any legal or equitable relief on a
contract theory? Precedent points toward allowing Jenny to sue as
a third party beneficiary.
2.

Case Law Supporting Jenny's Right to Sue

Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry, Inc., 548 So.2d 870 (Fl.
Dist. App. Ct. 1989)
According to the allegations, Warren, the plaintiff, was Jay
Andresen's girlfriend. Andresen purchased what was represented to
him as a diamond ring from Monahan Beaches Jewelry
("Monahan"), paying more than $3000. Monahan knew from
conversations with Andresen that the ring was intended for Warren
to whom Andresen gave the ring as a Christmas present. Warren
later had the ring appraised and discovered that it was cut glass or
zirconia, much less valuable than a diamond. She sued 'Monahan on
several theories, including breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under section 2-314. The trial court dismissed her
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suit for failure to state a claim. 7 ' However, the Florida appellate
court decided that Warren's complaint was "sufficient to withstand
[a] motion to dismiss as to all counts."1 72 The reason was that the
pre-contract dealings between Andresen and Monahan clearly
established Warren's standing as an intended third party beneficiary.
The appellate court stated:
As to breach of contract, the law is that a person not [a] party
to a contract may sue for breach of contract where the
parties' dealings clearly express the parties' intent to create a
right primarily and directly benefiting a third party. In the
present case, the precontract dealings between Andresen and
appellee, and the subsequent dealings between appellant and
appellee, clearly establish appellant [Warren] as an intended
third party beneficiary of the contract at issue. The complaint
properly alleges that appellee breached the contract when he
failed to deliver a diamond ring to Andresen. The alleged
breach of contract by appellee deprived appellant of the
benefit of owning a diamond ring, which was the purpose of
the sale. Appellant has a valid cause of action for breach of
contract as an intended third party beneficiary. 173
If the Warren case makes sense, the answer to the hypothetical
situation where Lillian makes a gift of a painting is obvious: Jenny
should be empowered to sue the gallery for a refund or damages.
She would need to prove purchase, payment by her grandmother
Lillian, and breach of warranty to recover. Denying Jenny any
rights as a third party beneficiary would make no sense if Warren
was decided correctly.
Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F2d 28 (2nd Cir. 1990), applying New
York Law
According to the allegations, Frances Lipman decided to buy a
painting for her daughter and son-in-law, Norma and Hobart Rosen,
as an anniversary gift in 1968. Knowing of Lipman's intent, Hobart
Rosen entered into discussions with Ira Spanierman, owner of
Spanierman's Gallery, for the acquisition of a portrait entitled, "The
Misses Wertheimer," which Spanierman represented as the work of
John Singer Sargent. They reached agreement on a price of $15,000.
171. Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry, Inc., 548 So.2d 870 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 872 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 302 and GoodeU v. KT
Enterprises, Ltd., 394 So.2d 1087 (Fla. App. 1 Dist, 1981)).
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Spanierman prepared an invoice addressed to Lipman C/O Rosens
and shipped the painting directly to the Rosens. Hobart Rosen
instructed Lipman to send a check to Spanierman for $15,000,
which she did. The invoice contained express warranties of
authenticity and origin.17 4 In 1987, nearly twenty years after the
acquisition from Spanierman, the Rosens decided to sell the
painting, having received appraisals ranging from $175,000 to
$250,000. However, upon placing the painting with Christie's in New
York for auction, the Rosens were informed for the first time that it
was a fake.
The Rosens sued Spanierman on four theories, including breach
of warranty and common law fraud. 75 Spanierman raised the
Rosens' alleged lack of standing. The Rosens amended to add
Lipman as a party plaintiff. The trial judge nonetheless granted
Spanierman's motion for summary judgment. The trial judge
decided that the warranty claim was barred by the four year statute
of limitations in UCC section 2-725, and that the common law fraud
claim was not viable without a showing of reliance upon the false
representations by Lipman, the purchaser. The Rosens and Lipman
appealed arguing only that the claims above-mentioned, namely,
breach of warranty and common law fraud should not have been
dismissed by summary judgment. Applying New York law, the
second circuit held that the warranty of authenticity did not
explicitly extend to future performance; hence, the four year
statute of limitations in section 2-725(1) had commenced to run on
tender in 1968. Therefore, any claim based upon breach of
warranty was time-barred. The court also held that Lipman had no
standing to sue for fraud, having never relied upon any
representation by Spanierman. However, the court reversed the
summary judgment for Spanierman on the Rosens' fraud claim,
finding evidence in the record sustaining the Rosens' reliance on
176
the false representations of authenticity.
For the present article, the relevant inquiry is: Were the Rosens
recognized as parties having rights under the contract for sale
174. Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990). According to the court's opinion,
the invoice contained the following warranties: "This picture is fully guaranteed by the
undersigned to be an original work by John Singer Sargent." The invoice further stated that
the painting had been "[a]cquired from a member of the Wertheimer family." Id. at 30.
175. Id. The suit was also based upon allegations of negligent misrepresentation and
professional negligence, neither of which needs consideration in this article. Id.
176. Id. at 34. Assumed false for purposes of argument only. Spanierman had contested
the conclusion that the painting was a fake. Id.
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between Spanierman and Lipman. The answer is in the affirmative.
An assumption throughout the opinion is that the sale was within
the scope of Article 2. During the court's extended discussion of
section 2-725 - that wrestling with the question of whether or not
a warranty of authenticity extends explicitly to future performance
the court never expressed any reservations about the
applicability of Article 2 or the Rosens being proper plaintiffs on
the warranty claim. Moreover, finding that the Rosens were entitled
to sue on the fraud claim, though they were not buyers under
Article 2, the court stated:
We understand the district court's reluctance to find
detrimental reliance by the Rosens when the invoice lists Mrs.
Lipman as the purchaser. But to hold that Lipman may not
recover because no representations were made to her and that
the Rosens may not maintain their claim because they
technically were not parties to the sale would unrealistically
isolate the different parts of this transaction . . . . The
weakness of a mechanistic approach to this case becomes
even more apparent when one imagines the different forms
that this transaction might have taken. Lipman might have
given the funds for the purchase directly to the Rosens, and
the Rosens could then have written their own check to
Spanierman. Or the Rosens might have gone ahead with their
plan to purchase the painting and parted with their own
money, and Lipman could then have reimbursed them. In
either of these scenarios Spanierman would have no basis for
asserting that the Rosens did not rely to their detriment on his
purported misrepresentations. To deny the Rosens recovery
simply because they chose to instruct Mrs. Lipman to write a
check directly to Spanierman would be to treat this common
law fraud claim as if it were controlled by the law of
commercial paper. 177
Despite the court's unfortunate, gratuitous remark disparaging
the law of negotiable instruments, it is a justifiable inference that
the Rosens would have been allowed to bring their warranty claims
if the applicable statute of limitations had not run.178 The court
177. Id.
178. Under section 2-313 an express representation of fact or promise must be part of
the "basis of the bargain" to have any legal effect. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995). Despite differing
opinions on the meaning of "basis of the bargain" most courts construe this to mean a
reliance requirement of some sort. It is fair to say that the representation of authenticity
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never used the term "third party beneficiaries" in the opinion.
Nothing indicates that the parties argued the applicability of third
party beneficiary law. The point of the case for this article is
simply this: Without using the language of third party beneficiary
law, the court discussed the warranty claim assuming the Rosens
were proper third party claimants on the sale. Consequently, Rosen
by analogy would justify allowing Jenny, in the hypothetical
situation, a cause of action for breach of warranty. 17 9 Recognition
of Jenny's rights as a third party would best be explained by resort
180
to the common law of third party beneficiaries.
3.

The Third Party Beneficiary Principle and the Hypothetical

Consider again Professor Eisenberg's. explication of the third
party beneficiary principle against the facts of the hypothetical
situation wherein Lillian purchased and paid for the painting
delivered to Jenny. First, we must inquire: Is allowing the third
party to enforce the contract a necessary or important means of
effectuating the original parties' enterprise objectives? Certainly an
objective was the delivery of a painting matching the gallery's
description to Jenny. In this situation, allowing Jenny to enforce
warranty rights is not only important; it is necessary because Lillian
lies in a coma from a stroke. Perhaps a guardian could be
appointed for Lillian to pursue the gallery for Jenny's benefit, but
what sane person would require such a convoluted approach to
enforce express obligations undertaken by the gallery for a price?
Moreover, it is doubtful that any concerned friend or relative would
want Lillian's means reduced to pursue a lawsuit about a painting
'in view of the gravity of her situation. Neither would any heir want
went to the basis of the bargain in which the Rosens were the intended recipients of the
goods because the Rosens relied upon it. In a sense this cuts new ground because normally
a court is looking for a buyer's reliance, e.g., Lipman's in this case.
179. Of course, a suit for fraud should also lie. Article 2 explicitly recognizes suits for
fraud. See U.C.C. § 2-721 (1995). As on other points, the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft is
consistent with section 2-721.
180. The question naturally arises whether in the hypothetical situation resort to the
common law of third party beneficiaries will be required if the 2000 annual meeting draft is
adopted in any jurisdiction. The answer is in the affirmative. Jenny could not make a claim
under section 2-313 because she is not an immediate buyer as a proper claimant must be
under subsections 2-313(a) and (b). She is not an immediate buyer because she cannot
qualify under the Code as a buyer, a person that buys or contracts to buy goods. See U.C.C.
§ 2-102(3) (2000 Annual Meeting Draft). Jenny did not buy or contract to buy the painting;
her grandmother did because she paid the price. For the same reason, Jenny could not
qualify as a remote purchaser under section 2-313A Jenny's only Code-based route to
recovery would be her jurisdiction's choice under section 2-318, which in most cases would
not allow her suit.
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Lillian's estate diminished. Yet, the painting was a part of Lillian's
legacy to Jenny. It takes no fertile imagination to suggest that
Lillian would have wanted Jenny to have enforcement rights.
We can further inquire: Is allowing third party enforcement of the
warranty supported by reasons of policy or morality independent of
contract law which do not conflict with the contracting parties'
performance objectives? Again, an affirmative answer can be given.
There is no point in allowing a public seller of fine art to be
unaccountable for misrepresentations simply because the purchase
was made for immediate and direct delivery as a gift to a third
party rather than the buyer. Representations of authenticity become
express warranties by virtue of statutory law embodying
legislatively agreed upon policies.18 ' Furthermore, the seller's risk is
not increased by recognizing rights in Jenny.
While the first branch of the third party beneficiary principle fits
more exactingly than the second branch, either branch, or both
together, justify a recognition of a right to sue in Jenny. Standing to
sue as a third party beneficiary should probably be allowed even if
all of the representations bearing upon authenticity were made to
Lillian, the buyer under Article 2. In Warren v. Monahan, the
warranties were made to the purchaser, Andresen. Third party
rights were recognized in Warren because Monahan knew that
Andresen was buying the ring for her; hence, a performance
objective was the sale of a diamond ring for Warren. In the
hypothetical situation, the same moral and policy reasons would
pertain if the representations had been made only to Lillian and
relayed to Jenny in connection with the gift. In short, the third.
party beneficiary principle, as set forth by Professor Eisenberg, is
consistent with Warren v. Monahan, and could appropriately be
applied to the facts of Rosen v. Spanierman. In addition, it can
serve as a workable guide for establishing third party beneficiary
standing in this paradigm: Whenever goods are purchased with an
understanding between the seller and the buyer, or an appropriate
disclosure by the buyer to the seller in the context of the sale, that
the goods are being purchased as a gift for a third person, and the
goods are accordingly delivered, directly or indirectly, to the third
person.
Arguably, the principle should be extended to yet a wider class,
namely, recipients of gifts by family or friends even without
181.

See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995).
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disclosure of the buyer's purpose at the time of purchase. 8 2 This
was precisely the class sought to be included as claimants for
breach of express and implied warranties by section 2-409(a) of the
July 1999 draft.' 8 If the warrantor's risk is not increased by this
extension, the extension should probably be made in order to do
justice to the recipients of gifts, especially big-ticket items such as
cars, expensive appliances, furniture and the like. Such an
extension could also have particular applicability to gift certificates.
Without specifying exactly the class to be encompassed, it is plain
that the common law of third party beneficiaries can be employed
to fill a gap left by the rejection of the July 1999 draft when gift
recipients have claims for economic loss. 84 Even in jurisdictions
which adopt Alternative C of proposed section 2-318, non-Code
third party beneficiary law will be essential to empower a claimant,
such as Jenny, in a case of non-delivery because section 2-318
would only apply if delivery were made and a warranty were
breached.
D. Delivery of Goods to a Third Party in a Business Context
1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Suppose A and B form Woodworkers, Inc., each contributing
$10,000 in return for 100 shares of corporate stock. The business
plan is for Woodworkers, Inc. to make replicas of early American
furniture. After a year in business and with bright prospects for
growth, A and B recognize that their corporation needs more
capital. Each agrees to contribute another $10,000 in return for
another 100 shares of stock. At this time, A and B meet C who
agrees to give up his own shop and join them as a stockholder in,
and an employee of, Woodworkers, Inc. In return for 200 shares of
stock, C agrees to contribute a specially built power saw on order
directly from the manufacturer for his own business for the price
of $20,000. C, who has paid the manufacturer in advance,
negotiates for modifications to make the saw suitable for
Woodworkers, Inc. and arranges for delivery and installation at its
shop. The saw is timely delivered and accepted in accordance with
182. The case for third party rights becomes weaker as the seller has less reason to
understand the purpose of the purchase. However, if the seller's risk is not increased,
allowing direct suits is a good policy because it reduces inefficiency in the enforcement of
contracts.
183. See supra Part II.C.
184. This will be especially important in the future in those jurisdictions not adopting
Alternative C.
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section 2-606 by the absence of any timely rejection. Within three
months, the saw malfunctions, reducing production significantly.
The manufacturer cannot make it work properly. We can assume
that a case for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
(section 2-314) and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose (section 2-315) is strong. Moreover, since the saw's
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to Woodworkers, and
a replacement is sorely needed, revocation of acceptance under
section 2-608 and cover under section 2-712 seem appropriate.
Cover -will cost $25,000. Can Woodworkers revoke acceptance
under section 2-608, sue for a refund under section 2-711, seek
cover costs under section 2-712, and demand consequential
damages under section 2-715(2)? Or must C sue for these remedies,
promising to remit anything he recovers to the Woodworkers? Case
law points toward allowing these remedies for Woodworkers, Inc.
even in the absence of an assignment of the contract for sale.
2. Precedent Supporting an Intended Beneficiary Claim
Goodell v. 1K.T. Enterprises, Ltd., 394 So.2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) 85
John Goodell ("Buyer") entered into a contract with K.T.
Enterprises ("K.T.") for the purchase of a belt conveyor system. The
agreement provided that K.T. would deliver this unit to Better
Baked Foods, Inc. ("Better Baked") and install it according to the
latter's direction. K.T.'s president knew that the conveyor was
intended for Better Baked's pizza freezing business. Design details
were negotiated between Better Baked and K.T. The conveyor was
delivered directly to Better Baked and installed. The contract was
never assigned to Better Baked. Goodell remained the buyer, took
title to the conveyor system, and paid a deposit. Goodell was
corporate counsel, a stockholder, and a member of the Board of
Directors; he probably kept title to the belt conveyor system as
18 6
security for a loan he had made to Better Baked.
The conveyor system was defective, and K.T.'s remedial efforts
were ineffective. Goodell notified K.T. that if his deposit were not
returned by a stated date, he would sue for a refund, cover costs,
185. 394 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. App. I Dist. 1981). Only one reported case in the business
context has been found that supports a third party beneficiary claim. However, the gift cases
in Part IV.C should be useful by analogy.
186. Id. at 1088 n.2. The opinion stated that: "Goodell owns some of Better Baked's
stock, is on the Board of Directors, and is the company attorney. Apparently, he took title to
the unit as security for a loan to Better Baked for expansion." Id.
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and enumerated losses in the nature of consequential damages. K.T.
made no refund. Goodell purchased a substitute conveyor system
paying in excess of $12,000 above the original contract price. Better
Baked lost profits. Goodell and Better Baked jointly commenced
suit. The trial judge found that K.T. was in breach and that Goodell
had timely "rescinded." Consequently, the trial judge ordered the
return of Goodell's deposit with interest. The trial judge, however,
denied Goodell's claim for cover costs and rejected Better Baked's
claim for consequential damages incurred as an alleged third party
beneficiary of the Goodell-K.T. contract.
Plaintiffs appealed. The Florida appellate court first held that
Goodell was entitled to cover costs, predicating this damage upon a
87
timely rejection or revocation of acceptance and cancellation.
More importantly for our purposes, the court held that Better
Baked had a claim for its losses (consequential damages) as an
intended third party beneficiary.
In the court's language:
We also find that appellee is liable to Better Baked as a
third party beneficiary. As shown in the facts above, the
precontract dealings of the parties, the contract itself, and the
subsequent dealings between the parties show that the clear
intent and purpose of the contract was to directly and
substantially benefit Better Baked ....
Although we hold that the unrefuted evidence shows Better
Baked is entitled to sue appellee for damages as a third party
beneficiary, we decline to rule as to the amount of damages, if
any, which should be awarded. The evidence in this respect is
infused with factual determinations which should properly be
made by the trial court.'88
Viewing the hypothetical situation in light of Goodell v. KT
Enterprises Ltd., it is reasonable to conclude that Woodworkers,
Inc. should have the rights of a third party beneficiary. The
hypothetical situation is distinguishable from Goodell in that C in
the hypothetical did not retain any interest in the saw but, rather,
took 200 shares of stock in return for granting his interest to
Woodworkers. This should strengthen a third party claim. On the
187. Id. at 1089. The court did not decide whether Goodells actions were a rejection
under section 2-602 or a revocation of acceptance under section 2-608. Either section could
have been employed on the facts. Either action would have entitled Goodell to refund and
cover damages under section 2-711(1).
188. Id. at 1089 (citations omitted).
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other hand, the manufacturer knew nothing of Woodworkers, Inc.
until modifications were made at C's request. This tends to weaken
the third party claim. On balance, however, Goodell suggests that
Woodworkers, Inc., rather than C, should reject or -revoke
acceptance, demand a refund, and claim cover damages as well as
incidental and consequential damages. The rights of a buyer under
Article 2 should vest in Woodworkers, Inc. as a third party
beneficiary if we reason analogically from Goodell v. KT
Enterprises.
3. The Third Party Beneficiary Principle and the Hypothetical
First, we should ask in accord with the first branch of the third
party beneficiary principle: Is allowing Woodworkers to enforce the
contract a necessary or important means of effectuating the
contracting parties' objectives as manifested in the contract and
surrounding circumstances? A third party suit could be important,
or necessary, to effect the parties' modified enterprise objectives.
The original parties' objectives were modified to require delivery of
a conforming saw to Woodworkers, Inc., not to C, even though C
did not assign his contract rights to Woodworkers, Inc.'8 9 Much as
if C had gifted the saw to Woodworkers, Inc. the latter took title on
delivery. Woodworkers, Inc. now has a direct economic interest in
enforcing warranty and related rights against the manufacturer. As
with donors in gift cases, C, as the promisee, has only an indirect
interest in enforcing promises made by the manufacturer. As a
stockholder, C is economically interested and might rightly
represent the interests of Woodworkers, Inc., but the corporation
would likely need to advance costs. Even if C were high-minded
and advanced costs for the suit, it makes no sense to require C to
launch a suit and then be reimbursed by Woodworkers, Inc. for
expenses and costs, with an award, if any, going to the corporation.
Moreover, C might die or sell his stock to another. Should C's
successor be expected to sue for Woodworkers, Inc.? What if the
successor refused? It is important as a practical matter for
Woodworkers, Inc., the corporate owner, to be given third party
beneficiary rights; and depending on what C decides to do,
recognizing such rights may be essential for a resolution of issues
189. Obviously, the transaction could have taken the form of an assignment. See
section 2-210 of current Article 2 and proposed section 2-210 of the 2000 annual meeting
draft. However, as in GoodeU v. KT Enterprises, Ltd., there was no assignment or
delegation, just delivery to a third party designated by the promisee (buyer).
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arising from the manufacturing defects. 190
E. Summary
I have examined three hypothetical situations in which someone
other than a buyer took delivery of goods. 191 In each situation, the
original contracting parties knew before the time of delivery that
the goods were intended for the third person, not the buyer, i.e.,
the person who paid the price. The recipients of the goods were
beyond the final buyer in the distribution chain. None of the
recipients of the goods would have legal rights under either section
2-313A or section 2-313B of the 2000 annual meeting draft or case
law underlying those sections. What the situations have in common
is a problem of horizontal privity. If the 2000 annual meeting draft
is enacted, and a jurisdiction adopts either Alternative A or B to
section 2-318, the third party claimants in the three hypothetical
situations must resort to non-Code law or have their claims denied.
If any jurisdiction adopts Alternative C to proposed section
2-318(b), these situations might be covered, in which case lack of
privity should not bar relief, assuming a reasonably liberal
interpretation that allows suits for economic loss apart from
personal injury or property damage. However, under the 2000
annual meeting draft, sellers will be empowered to exclude the
operation of Alternative C except in cases of personal injury. If
history is a guide, few jurisdictions will adopt Alternative C.
Yet, in each hypothetical situation set forth above, some
precedent as well as cutting edge third party beneficiary theory
represented by the work of Professor Eisenberg, point toward
allowing a third party claim. To avoid injustice and to enhance
Code jurisprudence, the courts should carefully blend revised
Article 2's law of sales, especially its law of warranties, with the
common law of third party beneficiaries in like situations. This
view is in accord with Preliminary Comment 2 to section 2-313A of
the 2000 annual meeting draft wherein it states in relevant part,
"The law governing assignment and third-party beneficiary [sic],
190. I have not discussed the second prong of Professor Eisenberg's third party
beneficiary principle because no obvious public policy undergirds Woodworkers claim,
except perhaps a policy favoring efficient resolution of disputes without unnecessary parties.
191. Buyer is defined as a person that buys or contracts to buy goods. U.C.C. § 2-102
(3) (2000 Annual Meeting Draft). Sale is defined as the passing of title to goods from the
seller to the buyer for a price. U.C.C. § 2-102 (36) (2000 Annual Meeting Draft). The
definitions used in the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft are identical to those utilized in the
current code.
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including section 2-318, must be consulted to determine whether a
party other than the remote purchaser can enforce an obligation
created under this section." The reference to the law of third party
beneficiaries, including section 2-318, implies a role for the
common law of third party beneficiaries. Situations calling for the
blend may come up rarely. A good blend in many jurisdictions may
take decades to accomplish, but along the way, in certain fringe
cases, blending will be important for the parties and for the
wholeness and integrity of sales law.

V.

REFLECTIONS ON REMEDIES FOR THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS IN THE
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IN PART IV (WHERE THE CLAIMANTS ARE
BEYOND THE FINAL BUYERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION CHAIN)

During the discussion of possible third party claims in Part IV, I
alluded frequently to remedies which might be available. Here I
want to reflect more specifically on remedies and try to answer the
following questions: If the winners are allowed to sue SuperBikes,
and Jenny is allowed to sue the gallery, and Woodworkers, Inc. is
allowed to sue the manufacturer, what remedies, if any, should
they be afforded under Article 2? Assuming their rights to sue are
based upon standing as common law third party beneficiaries,
should all of Article 2's remedies be available? In my view, each
claimant recognized as a third party beneficiary under the common
law should have the benefit of the full panoply of Article 2 buyers'
remedies, including rejection and revocation of acceptance.
Otherwise, such claimants cannot fully enforce the original parties'
objectives, nor can considerations of policy be rightly implemented
because the third party claimants will fall short of gaining
recoupment of their lost expectancies.
Consider non-delivery, varying the original hypothetical situations
as necessary. In the event of non-delivery, available remedies
should include specific performance under section 2-716(1) if the
goods are unique or other circumstances strongly favor delivery of
specific goods. 92 The bikers would probably not have very strong
claims for specific enforcement because trail bikes can be
purchased on the market without undue difficulty. On the other
hand, if the gallery failed to deliver a painting to Jenny (instead of
delivering a fake), her claim for specific performance would be
strong because one painting would not normally be an adequate
192. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1) (1995). Specific performance may be decreed when the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances. Id.
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substitute for another. Woodworkers, Inc.'s claim for the specially
built saw would lie within the boundaries set by the other cases; if
a substitute were difficult or inordinately expensive to obtain,
specific performance should be allowed. In every instance, the
propriety of specific performance assumes payment was made by
the buyer.
If non-conforming goods were delivered, and accepted, the third
parties in each case should be entitled to damages. The guiding
star for computing damages should be the exl5ectancy objective
stated in section 1-106(1) of current Article 2. The expectancy
objective can ordinarily be met by applying the specific directives
of section 2-714 which have not been modified by the 2000 annual
meeting draft. Thus, for breach of any warranty, express or
implied, the third party claimant should be entitled to the
difference between the value the goods would have had as
warranted and the actual value of the non-conforming goods which
amounts to loss of bargain damages. 193 This would be helpful to the
bikers if they received defective but repairable bikes, and to
Woodworkers, Inc. if the saw wefe repairable. If Jenny received a
virtually worthless painting, the formula would be a roundabout
way of gaining a refund.
Finally, the third party beneficiaries should have the rights of
rejection under section 2-601194 and revocation of acceptance under
section 2-608' 95 with the accompanying right of refund under
section 2-711.196 Of course, in the case of either rejection or
revocation of acceptance, title to the defective goods would revert
to the seller under section 2-401(4).197 As is discussed in Part VII,
applying rejection and revocation of acceptance against non-privity
193. Section 2-714 (2) states: "The measure of damage for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and
the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show damages of a different amount."
194. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1995). Section 2-601 states, in relevant part, "[If the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the
"
whole ....
195. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1) (1995). Section 2-608 (1) states: "The buyer may revoke his
acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value
to him if he has accepted it (a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would
be cured; or (b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances."
196. U.C.C. § 2-711 (1) (1995). See section 2-711(1), which allows recovery (refund) of
so much of the price as has been paid.
197. U.C.C. § 2-401 (4) (1995). Section 2401(4) states: "A rejection or other refusal by
the buyer to receive or retain goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of
acceptance revests title to goods in the seller." Id.
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sellers has been controversial. But, the controversy has surrounded
cases where vertical privity is lacking. In each of the hypothetical
situations explored in Part IV, rejection and revocation of
acceptance should work without complication. In each situation,
while three parties were involved, there was only one bargain, one
sale for one price. That simple fact should negate arguments
commonly made against using rejection and revocation of
acceptance; namely, that the rejecting or revoking buyer has paid a
price greater than' that received by the non-privity seller.
The successful rejecting or revoking third party beneficiary
should likewise be entitled to the additional costs of cover
pursuant to section 2-712198 or, alternatively, contract-market
damages computed under section 2-713.199 Obligations of notice and
care of the rejected goods, e.g., sections 2-602 through 2-607,
should properly fall upon the third party who rejects or revokes
acceptance. If the 2000 Annual Meeting Draft is adopted, third
party beneficiaries should be entitled to the same array of remedies
discussed above.
The remedies afforded the 'third party beneficiaries in the
foregoing situations should parallel the remedies available to any
aggrieved buyer similarly situated. If this is not allowed, the
standing or rights or empowerment conferred upon third parties
will be hollow. The cases do not show any particular procedural or
administrative problems that would in any way preclude the use of
the full range of Code remedies. Therefore, blending the law of
sales and the common law of third party beneficiaries requires a
blend of Article 2 remedies with the rights established under third
party beneficiary law.
VI.

CONTRACTS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED THROUGH AN
INTERMEDIARY: ISSUES OF VERTICAL PRIVITY

A. Introduction
Part VI of this article is about three kinds of contracts: (1)
198. U.C.C. § 2-712 (2) (1995). Section 2-712(2) states: "The buyer may recover from
the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price
together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715),
but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach." .Id.
199. U.C.C. § 2-713 (1) (1995). Section 2-713(1) states in relevant part: "[T] measure of
damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market
price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with
any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715) less
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach." Id.
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contracts which require that a seller procure goods from a remote
(non-privity) supplier to meet the special needs of a buyer; (2)
contracts for the procurement of component parts for
incorporation into goods then sold to a downstream buyer; and (3)
contracts whereby a prime contractor procures goods under a
contract of sale for incorporation into a construction project in
accord with the owner's plans and specifications. 2°° These
situations all raise issues of vertical privity. Case law arising from
the three paradigmatic situations is very uneven. Any doctrinal
summary accurately reflecting reality must of necessity be
disjointed. As in situations involving horizontal privity, there is case
law showing a role for the common law of third party beneficiaries.
I have constructed the hypothetical situations and selected the
following cases to support my viewpoint; namely, that the law of
sales should be blended with the law of third party beneficiaries.
Contracts Whereby Goods Are Procuredfrom a Remote Seller
Through a Dealer When the Remote Seller Knows About and
Purports to Satisfy the Final Buyer's Needs

B.

1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Suppose Earl, a farmer plagued by drought, finds that he has
riparian rights which allow pumping water sufficient to irrigate his
tillable land. Earl contacts a local dealer for Great Western
Irrigation, Inc., ("Great Western"), a manufacturer of irrigation
equipment. Due to the size of Earl's operation, Great Western sends
a field representative to assist in assessing his requirements.
Together, the dealer and Great Western's representative evaluate
Earl's soil and the expected rainfall in order to assess Earl's
irrigation needs for the crops he intends to grow. Stating that Great
Western can design a system appropriate for Earl's fields, the
dealer writes up an offer for sale and installation of a pivot system
for $400,000. Earl accepts, promising to pay the price to the dealer
according to an agreed-upon schedule. The dealer will earn a five
per cent commission ($20,000) on the sale plus a fee for installation
under Great Western's direction. The dealer makes no express
warranties, unless the statement above about Great Western's
capability qualifies. 01' Great Western's written, express warranties
200. Essentially the same issues can arise when a subcontractor procures goods from a
supplier, designating them for incorporation into a construction project.
201. Under section 2-313 the dealer's representation that Great Western would design
an appropriate system available for $400,000 might qualify as an actionable warranty.
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passed on to Earl concern only the dimensions and qualities of
component parts. Assume the dealer conspicuously disclaims all
implied warranties under section 2-316, and that Great Western
20 2
makes no disclaimers of implied warranties.
The components are all shipped directly to Earl in early May. The
dealer receives an invoice for $380,000. Under the supervision of a
Great Western representative, the dealer completes installation in a
timely manner. Because the system functions well in June and July,
Earl makes his final payment to the dealer who in turn makes final
payment to Great Western in July. In August, a mere seventy days
after installation, as heat becomes especially intense, the system
fails. The system simply lacks the capacity to deliver the quantity
of water required for Earl's crops. Worse yet, pipes begin to leak,
and numerous minor malfunctions occur, decreasing the already
insufficient water supply. With field help from a Great Western
technician, Earl keeps the pivots operating day and night as best he
can, but his crops are severely stressed due to insufficient
moisture, eventually yielding far less than would have been the
case if water had been plentiful. It is clear that major parts of the
system will need to be replaced, many minor repairs are needed on
other parts, and an upgrade of the intake system will be required to
enhance the system's capacity.
Great Western and the dealer are suddenly unavailable when Earl
phones. Earl consults with another irrigation company only to
discover that for a mere $100,000 he can replace defective
components, make minor repairs to others, and upgrade the intake
to meet his requirements. He will need to borrow the money.
Sorely pressed financially, Earl contacts a lawyer who recommends
suit against the dealer for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability (section 2-314) and the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose (section 2-315). The lawyer hopes to
invalidate the dealers disclaimer under section 2-302. However, Earl
is reluctant to sue the dealer. They are members of the same
church, and Earl knows that the dealer has insufficient assets to
respond to a large judgment. In any event, the dealer is popular
locally and is likely to garner considerable sympathy from a local
jury. Earl's lawyer admits that the disclaimer would probably
survive judicial scrutiny. The question then becomes: Does Earl
202. On disclaiming implied warranties, section 2-316 (2) states in relevant part: "[T]o
exclude the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous."
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have an action against Great Western for direct and consequential
economic losses predicated upon breach of implied warranties? Or
is Earl stuck with a claim against the dealer, his immediate seller,
that at best would yield an uncollectible judgment? There is case
20 3
law favorable to Earl.
2.

Precedents Showing the Final Buyer as an Intended
Beneficiary of an Upstream Supply Contract

Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 422 P2d 496 (Wash.
1967)
Kadiak Fisheries Company ("Kadiak") decided to re-power a
salmon fishing boat to adapt it for crab fishing. Kadiak's
representative discussed this project with Alaska Pacific Supply
Company ("Alaska Pacific") that communicated Kadiak's needs to
Murphy Diesel Company ("Murphy Diesel"), an out-of-state supplier.
Two sales contracts were thereafter made. By the terms of these
contracts, Murphy Diesel sold a diesel engine to Alaska Pacific, and
Alaska Pacific sold the engine to Kadiak. Representatives of all
three parties assisted in installing the engine in Kadiak's fishing
boat. Numerous problems followed relating to excessive exhaust
and lubricating oil temperatures. Eventually a fire broke out and
destroyed part of the boat and some cargo. Kadiak also suffered
lost profits while the boat was out of service.
Kadiak sued both Alaska Pacific and Murphy Diesel for breach of
implied warranties. A jury exonerated Alaska Pacific, but allowed
recovery against Murphy Diesel. The trial judge dismissed Alaska
Pacific, leaving the non-privity antagonists, Murphy Diesel and
Kadiak, the only parties remaining in the suit on appeal. One of
Murphy Diesel's main arguments against the judgment for Kadiak
was lack of privity. Kadiak in response argued that either Alaska
Pacific had acted as its agent for purchasing the engine, or as
Murphy Diesel's agent for selling it, or that Kadiak had rights
against Murphy Diesel as a third party beneficiary. For purposes of
argument, the Supreme Court of Washington assumed that Alaska
Pacific was neither Murphy Diesel's agent nor Kadiak's agent;
hence, the court assumed no contractual privity on the basis of
203. The hypothetical situation was not created as a construction project. The
assumption underlying the hypothetical is that the irrigation equipment remains goods and
does not become incorporated into the real estate. If this were a construction project, the
cases and arguments in Part V.D would be pertinent. For an analogous case where Article 2
was applied, see Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266 (S.D. 1982).
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agency law. Therefore, the issue was squarely presented: Did the
non-privity buyer have a direct action against the remote supplier
for breach of implied warranties? The Supreme Court of
Washington upheld the judgment in favor of Kadiak stating that,
"the evidence conclusively established Kadiak as the third party
beneficiary of the sale of the motor in question by Murphy
Diesel."204
The court's explanatory language is instructive:
Murphy Diesel knew the identity, the purpose, and
requirements of Alaska Pacific's customer Kadiak. It
engineered and constructed the motor to meet certain
specifications . . . . Although it invoiced the motor through
Alaska Pacific, it shipped the motor direct to Kadiak. Some
communications were carried on directly between Kadiak and
the factory before and after shipment. An official of the
company, the regional sales representative, and a factory
service man visited the Jaguar [boat] on various occasions
before and during installation of the motor, and the service
man participated in adjustments and corrections for the final
trial run . . . . Under these circumstances, it is beyond
dispute that Alaska Pacific's purchase of the motor from
Murphy Diesel was upon the consideration that a
merchantable motor, fit and suitable for the marine purposes
of Kadiak, would be supplied. Kadiak thus became the
beneficiary of the contract, with Alaska Pacific as the conduit
through which the duty of ordinary care and the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness flowed.20 5
Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408
N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. 1980)20
Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. ("Frank's")
manufactured motorcycle front fork tubes, a component part of a
motorcycle that connects the front wheel to the frame. For its
fabrication process, Frank's contracted to buy steel tubing from
C.A. Roberts Co. ("Roberts"). Roberts in turn ordered the steel
from Leland's Tube Company ("Leland's") and requested direct
204. Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 422 P.2d 496, 503 (Wash. 1967) (citing
Jeffrey v. Hanson, 239 E2d 346 (Wash. 1952)).
205. Id. at 503-04 (citation omitted).
206. The Illinois court cited and relied upon Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel
Co., 422 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1967).
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shipment to Frank's. Leland's delivered accordingly. When Frank's
began to use the steel for making front fork tubes, it discovered
that the steel was pitted, corroded, and had cracks making it unfit
for the high-stress purpose for which it had been ordered, and
consequently useless to Frank's.2 7 Frank's revoked acceptance
under section 2-608 by notice to Roberts. When Roberts failed to
respond, Frank's sold the steel tubing for scrap, and covered,
paying a higher-than-contract price for substitute steel tubing.
Frank's sued both Roberts and Leland's for breach of implied
warranties claiming the purchase price, cover damages, and
incidental damages. The trial judge granted summary judgment
motions for both defendants, in Leland's case due to Frank's lack of
privity.
An Illinois appellate court reversed and remanded on the grounds
that the facts made Frank's an intended third party beneficiary of
the Roberts - Leland's contract for sale. In relevant part, the court
stated:
Leland . . . contends that it cannot be held liable to the
plaintiff because it is not in privity with it. It is true that
absent a situation falling within the scope of sec. 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code . . . privity only extends to the
parties to the sale and implied warranties are not applicable
between the buyer and a remote manufacturer. This is not
true, however... where, as here, the manufacturer knew the
identity, purpose, and requirements of the dealer's customer
and manufactured or delivered the goods specifically to meet
Here Leland was clearly aware that
those requirements ....
the order from Roberts was on behalf of plaintiff [Frank's] and
it shipped the goods not to Roberts but directly to the
208
plaintiff.
Compare these cases to the hypothetical situation. Both Kadiak
and Frank's Maintenance and Engineering, Inc. support Earl's
claim to third party beneficiary rights. As in the precedents, the
remote supplier (Great Western) was advised of buyer's particular
requirements and impliedly or expressly represented that its
product would meet those requirements. In Kadiak, the buyer
207. Frank's Maintenance and Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 405 (111.
App. 1980). It was also welded instead of seamless contrary to the terms of the Frank's Roberts contract, so there was probably a breach of an express warranty under section
2-313.
208. Id. at 412.
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suffered property damage as well as lost profits, so Kadiak's claim
for third party recognition might appear stronger than Earl's claim
in the hypothetical situation. However, Earl suffered direct harm to
a growing crop (physical injury of a sort) which resulted in lost
profits, so his claim is not materially different from Kadiak's claim.
In any event, Frank's, which cited Kadiak, established third party
standing for a party suffering only economic loss, namely, cover
costs and incidental damages, along with a claim for return of the
price. Thus, the precedents point toward allowance of Earl's claim
as a third party beneficiary. As is evident in the language quoted
from Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, section 2-318 was not
deemed controlling; it did not limit or preclude a claim arising from
the common law of third party beneficiaries.
The hypothetical situation and the two precedents discussed
above may be analyzed from another perspective; namely, that the
facts of each reveal a delegation of a contractual obligation. The
dealers may be said to have delegated their obligations to supply
goods appropriate to the buyers' disclosed needs by inviting their
sellers to participate in ascertaining and defining those needs, and
making direct delivery, or both. In each case, the dealer made a
contract with the final buyer and then procured goods to meet that
buyer's needs. In this sense, the cases and the hypothetical are
similar to the facts of Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co. 209 where MonArk
agreed to build a houseboat and subsequently delegated its
obligations to AlumaShip through a corporate reorganization.
AlumaShip assumed MonArk's obligations, but MonArk remained
liable as a surety (secondary obligor) in the absence of a
novation. 10 Tarter sued MonArk for breach 6f warranty and
prevailed. However, Tarter could have sued AlumaShip, a party
now liable to him as the primary obligor; in that case, he would
have been suing as a third party beneficiary on the contract of
delegation. Likewise, in the hypothetical situation, it is defensible
to treat the dealer as a delegating party and Great Western as the
delegate, thereby making Earl a third party beneficiary. This is
precisely what the proposed comment to section 2-503 of the July
1999 draft expressly provided - a delegation would create third
party beneficiary rights.211 An obvious analogy is the sale of real
209. 430 F Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
210. Id. The facts failed to establish a novation thus leaving MonArk liable for
deficiences in AlumaShip's construction. Id.
211. Proposed section 2-503 of the July 1999 draft would have codified certain
principles pertaining to assignment and delegation. Proposed Comment 3 stated in relevant
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estate where the buyer assumes seller's payment obligations,
thereby making the holder of a note and mortgage a third party
beneficiary of the buyer's promise to assume seller's payment
obligations. So also when a seller plainly delegates an obligation to
procure suitable goods, a third party beneficiary contract is
created.
The courts will need to be aware of a danger, however, in the
use of third party beneficiary doctrine in cases of upstream
procurement. The danger is that in every retail sale, the buyer
might contend that he or she was a beneficiary of an upstream
supply contract, thereby instantly filling the marketplace with
millions of such beneficiaries rendering section 2-318 and perhaps
sections 2-313A and 2-313B superfluous. A necessary limitation is
implied in the prior fact patterns. Third party beneficiary standing
should supplement rights granted by Article 2 when the remote
seller either participates in ascertaining, or at minimum is made
aware of, a final buyer's particular needs, and undertakes to satisfy
those needs by fabricating, selecting or procuring appropriate
goods. Likewise, finding a true delegation should establish third
party beneficiary status. There need not be facts sufficient to make
out a warranty claim under section 2-315; but facts leaning in that
direction, or a true delegation, must be evident for third party
standing to be appropriate.
3. The Hypothetical and the Third Party Beneficiary Principle
Let us consider the first branch of the third party beneficiary
principle, ascertaining objectively the parties' enterprise objectives.
Great Western and the dealer undertook to furnish and install a
system capable of meeting Earl's irrigation needs. Otherwise, there
would have been no reason for soil tests and related inquiries
leading to an assessment upon which the irrigation system was
recommended. Allowing Earl to enforce warranty obligations
imposed by law upon Great Western is important to implement the
parties' enterprise objectives. Allowing Earl a direct suit may be
essential for implementing those objectives since the dealer has
every incentive not to press Great Western very hard for a
resolution of Earl's problems as this might jeopardize his
part: "[Ihf the third person accepts the delegation, an enforceable promise is made to both
the delegator and the person entitled under the contract to perform those duties . . .. [I]n
short, as to the person entitled under the contract a third party beneficiary contract is
created." U.C.C. § 2-503 cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft, July 1999).
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dealership. If a case against the dealer were not viable on account
of a disclaimer, or if a substantial judgment against the dealer
would be uncollectible, an action directly against Great Western is
necessary to accomplish justice, i.e., satisfaction of Earl's
expectation interest.2 2 Earl is representative of many, many buyers
who have had the misfortune of buying faulty goods from an
immediate seller who either successfully disclaims all warranties or
becomes insolvent, and is then met with a lack of privity defense
on making a claim against an upstream warrantor.
The second branch of the third party beneficiary principle (policy
and morality) tug in favor of empowering Earl to enforce
warranties against Great Western. If the intermediary (dealer)
cannot be held responsible for Earl's losses due to his power to
disclaim warranties or due to his limited assets, and suit against
Great Western is not allowed, then the legislatively imposed
warranties (imposed for reasons of policy) become virtually
worthless. Assuming no valid disclaimer, Earl's fate as a farmer
should not be contingent upon the financial fortunes of the dealer
alone. Both branches of the third party beneficiary principle point
toward favoring Earl. As stated earlier in discussing precedent,
allowing Earl third party rights against Great Western does not
mean that every equipment buyer should have a direct action
against every upstream supplier for breach of implied warranties.
Finding third party standing under the evolving common law will
be situation specific, taking into account enterprise objectives and
public policy concerns.
C.

Cases Where Components Are Incorporated into Goods for
Sale to a Downstream Buyer
1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Assume that a ferryman contracts with Atlantic Shipbuilders, Inc.
("Shipbuilders") for the construction and delivery of a new
ferryboat for operation from a port city to an island nearby.213 In
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (a) (1977) and U.C.C. § 1-106 (1)
which set forth the expectation interest as the primary remedial goal of the Code and the
common law of contracts.
213. The hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of Bay State-Spray &
Provincetown Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co, 404 Mass. 103 (1989) combined
with the facts of Chestnut Hill Dev. Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 635 F Supp. 927 (D.C. D.
Mass. 1987). While the hypothetical situation may initially appear similar to Murphy Diesel, it
sets up a distinctly different legal question. Note that in Murphy Diesel, the boat owner
bought the engine through a dealer for installation into its pre-owned boat; Kadiak did not

2000

Blending the Law of Sales

order to meet current and anticipated federal and state laws
respecting accessibility for the physically challenged, the contract
includes an elevator capable of moving passengers in wheelchairs
from one deck to another. Shipbuilders negotiates with Liftbuilders
for America, Inc. ("Liftbuilders") for the design, construction, and
incorporation of an elevator, disclosing the specific purpose and
setting forth particular requirements. During negotiations,
Liftbuilders sends a representative to ride the ferryboat, to view the
passenger traffic as the ferryboat cruises and docks, and to assess
generally the needs of the persons who would use the elevator.
Thereafter, Shipbuilders and Liftbuilders sign a detailed supply
contract. The supply contract contains express warranties running
to Shipbuilders and a promise to remedy any problems occurring
with the elevator during the first three years of operation. The
agreed price is $300,000. The ferryman is fully aware of the
elevator specifications in his contract with Shipbuilders, and is
advised generally of the warranties and service obligations in the
supply contract.
The ferryboat is completed and put into service with the elevator
incorporated into it. Shipbuilders pays Liftbuilders the $300,000
price, and ferryman completely pays Shipbuilders. Within one year,
the elevator begins to malfunction, slipping and scaring people
greatly. Liftbuilders sends a representative who makes adjustments
- none of which eliminate the problems. Finally, one hot summer
day, the elevator becomes stuck between decks for more than an
hour with several occupants trapped inside. Public authorities
launch an investigation. Bad publicity follows and the ferryman
decides to suspend operations while extensive repairs are made.
Since Liftbuilder's representative demonstrates no competency in
fixing the elevator, the ferryman hires a third party to make
satisfactory repairs at a cost of $30,000. Downtime results in lost
profits of $30,000. At this opportune moment, Shipbuilder files for
bankruptcy. Naturally, ferryman wants to recover repair costs and
lost profits from someone. On demand, Shipbuilder's lawyer
produces the written supply contract containing Liftbuilder's
express warranties and the promise of remedial work for three
years from commencement of service of its elevators, if any
complaint is made to Shipbuilders. Investigation reveals that the
buy the boat with a faulty component part. The hypothetical situation and the precedents
discussed in Part VLC deal with the purchase and sale of a finished good wherein one
component part proves defective.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39: 111

express warranties of quality were violated because key
components were of lesser quality than specified. Moreover, the
implied warranty of merchantability (section 2-314) and the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (section 2-315) were
not effectively disclaimed by Liftbuilders in accordance with
section 2-316.
As a result, assuming a design or manufacturing defect in the
elevator, the question arises: Does the ferryman have a claim
against Liftbuilders for direct damages (repair costs) and
consequential damages (lost profits) for breach of the express and
implied warranties and the broken remedial promise? Or is the
ferryman stuck with fighting for whatever can be had, if anything,
from Shipbuilder's bankruptcy estate? Although there are doctrinal
wrinkles in the relevant opinions, there is case law pointing toward
recovery by the ferryman against Liftbuilders, some of it based
upon common law third party beneficiary principles. In the two
following cases, the respective courts addressed the issue of
vertical privity in components parts cases from very different
perspectives. In the first, a third party beneficiary analysis was
employed. In the second, the court said nothing about third party
beneficiary law but for reasons of policy came to a similar
conclusion through straight-forward abrogation of the vertical
privity requirement. After analyzing the cases, I will contend that
using non-Code third party beneficiary law can lead to more
defensible results than simply depending upon policy concerns to
override traditional privity rules.
Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726
(Ill. App. 1966)
The buyer ("Rhodes") needed aerosol cans for marketing a lotion
called "Perform." Rhodes negotiated with G. Barr, Inc. ("Barr") for
the acquisition of appropriate cans and distribution of Perform to
retailers. 214 Barr advised Rhodes that it had developed a propellant
suitable for use with Perform, but Barr soon advised that Perform
caused unlined cans "to rust and corrode, resulting in discoloration
and adulteration of the Perform solution."215 Barr further
represented that Continental Can Company ("Continental") made
214. Rhodes Pharm. Co. v. Continental Can Co., 219 N.E.2d 726, 728 (111.App. 1966).
The exact nature of the contractual obligations assumed by Barr is not clear from the
reported opinion. It is clear, however, that Barr made a procurement contract to obtain cans
for Perform and that the cans were a major component of the final product sold. Id.
215. Id. at 728.
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cans with rust-proof lining, and that Barr's laboratory tests had
proved conclusively that the discoloration and adulteration could
be eliminated with use of these cans.2 16 On the strength of these
representations, Rhodes's agents met with Continental .Can's
representatives, agreed upon the design of the cans, and authorized
Barr to package and distribute Perform in the rust-proof cans
which Barr purchased from Continental. By virtue of Perform's
composition, the cans were a significant component of the final
product sold through retailers to the public.
Barr marketed Perform in the cans from Continental for about
two years without complaint. Meanwhile, Pittsburgh Railways
Company ("Pittsburgh") purchased Barr's assets and assumed its
contractual obligations to Rhodes. During this time period,
Pittsburgh advised Rhodes that Continental Can was modifying the
can design to improve its appearance by putting the linings making
the seal on the inside. Within two months, Rhodes began receiving
complaints that the Perform cans were leaking, causing not only
loss of Perform but damage to other products on the shelves in
drug stores and other outlets. According to Rhodes's allegations, it
was compelled for business reasons to refund substantial sums,
had to destroy great quantities of Perform in cans, and suffered
great economic losses because customers not only stopped buying
Perform but its other products as well. Rhodes gave notice to
Pittsburgh whose representatives concluded that the inside linings
27
were probably destroying the rust-proofing.
Rhodes sued, directing one count solely against Continental Cans
based partly upon breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability 218 and the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. 219 The trial court granted Continental's motion
to dismiss because the complaint failed to state grounds for any
direct contractual relationship between Rhodes and Continental
216. Id. There was a further representation that shelf life would be no less than three
years. Id. The court characterized this representation and the others listed in the text as
express warranties under section 2-313. Id.
217. Id. at 729.
218. The court noted:
Defendant Continental warranted by implication that the aerosol cans manufactured
by it and delivered to defendant Pittsburgh Railways Company would be reasonably
fit, useful and merchantable by plaintiff. Defendant Continental further warranted by
implication that the aerosol cans would pass without objection in the trade; and that
the cans would be fit for the ordinary purpose for which the cans would be used ....
Id. at 726. These allegations match the minimum requirements of the warranty of
merchantability under section 2-314.
219. Rhodes, 219 N.E.2d at 729.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39: 111

Can, and in the view of the court there was no legal basis to
extend warranties from Continental Can to Rhodes. 220 The Illinois
appellate court reversed, agreeing with Rhodes's argument that it
was a third party beneficiary of the Continental-Pittsburgh contract
for the sale of the cans. Since Illinois had adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code about two years after the contrict for sale had
been made,221 Article 2 was not the governing law for the case. The
court, therefore, made its decision on non-Code law, but deemed
its decision compatible with the polices implicit in Article 2.
The court's language is very instructive:
While plaintiff has not included in his complaint . . . the
contract between Continental and Pittsburgh, this does not
affect the validity of plaintiff's theory. We think these
allegations, if proved, are sufficient to make plaintiff a
beneficiary of implied warranties extended to Pittsburgh by
Continental. It was for plaintiffs use that the cans were
manufactured, and it was for plaintiff's purpose, known to
Continental, that the cans were impliedly warranted to be fit.
In these circumstances, the reliance by plaintiff was more than
incidental.
We hold, therefore, that the implied warranty of fitness
imposed by law on a manufacturer may be enforced directly
against the manufacturer by a third party user where . . . the
manufacturer (1) was aware of the purpose to which the
product was to be put, and (2) knew of the third party user's
reliance that the product would be fit for the purpose
222
intended.
Although the quoted language seems especially compatible with
U.C.C. section 2-315, the appellate court allowed Rhodes's claim for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (2-314) to
succeed as well. Noteworthy is the two-fold requirement: The
remote seller's awareness of purpose, and the third party's reliance.
The latter point seems especially compatible with section 302,
Restatement Second, comment d.223 Thus, by an historical accident,
220. See id at 728-30.
221. Illinois adopted the Code in 1962. According to the opinion, the Continental-Barr
contract to which Pittsburgh succeeded was entered into in 1960.
222. Rhodes, 219 N.E.2d at 732 (citation omitted).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d (1977). The comment states, "if
the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to
confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary."
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namely, the fact that Article 2 was not in effect, the common law
of third party beneficiaries was imported (without the necessity of
considering section 2-318) into the law of sales. This importation
saved the case for Rhodes and serves as an illustration of an
unusual use of third party beneficiary law: To allow the remote
buyer an action against a breaching component parts supplier.
Patty Precision Products Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co.,
22 4
846 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir., 1988), applying Oklahoma law
Patty Precision Products Company ("Patty Precision") was
awarded a contract by the United States for the manufacture of
bomb racks. Patty Precision negotiated with Brown & Sharpe about
the requirements of a machining center needed in the production of
the bomb racks. Brown & Sharpe recommended General Electric
Controls on the basis of prior experience. Patty Precision agreed.
Eventually, Patty Precision ordered the machining center from
Marsuco, Inc.; Marsuco contracted with Brown & Sharpe; and
Brown & Sharpe contracted with General Electric for controls
(components) of the machining center. In its contract with Brown
& Sharpe, General Electric limited its liability to costs of repair or
replacement of controls determined to be defective. This limitation
was not passed on to Patty Precision. Neither did General Electric
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. General Electric's
employees knew the purpose for which the controls were
fabricated, and they participated in the installation and start-up of
machines run by General Electric controls at Patty Precision's
plant.
After numerous problems with the machining center, Patty
Precision sued, inter alia, Brown & Sharpe and General Electric
for breach of Warranties. The claim against General Electric was
based upon an alleged breach of General Electric's implied
warranty of merchantability on the controls. Over Patty Precision's
objection, the jury was allowed to hear evidence of the disclaimer
language (language limiting liability) from the Brown &
Sharpe-General Electric contract. 22 5 Answering special
interrogatories, the jury found for Patty Precision against Brown &
Sharpe, but against Patty Precision in favor of General Electric.
Patty Precision moved for a new trial claiming error in admitting
224. Patty Precision Prod. Co. v. Brown and Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 E2d 1260 (10th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 846 E2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1988).
225. The language was, more precisely, a limitation of damages as allowed by section
2-719(1).
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evidence of the limitation-of-liability language from the Brown &
Sharpe-General Electric contract. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal the parties agreed that one main issue had to be
addressed; namely, "whether General Electric's disclaimer applies
to Patty Precision."22 For this article, the underlying principle is
very important, to wit: That in the absence of an effective
disclaimer, the implied warranty of merchantability ran from
General Electric to Patty Precision on the facts of this case.
On this underlying principle, that Patty Precision could sue the
non-privity component parts supplier, General Electric, for breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability after having incurred
economic losses, the court cited the 1979 Oklahoma case, Old
Albany Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills, 227 which had eliminated

vertical privity as a defense against a claim for breach of warranty.
In addition, the court quoted extensively from another case, Elden
v. Simmons, 228 as follows:
[W]e note that the requirement of vertical privity as a
prerequisite to suit on an implied or express warranty, both
under the Uniform Commercial Code and outside the Code, is,
given today's market structure, an antiquated notion. A
manufactured product placed in the chain of distribution may
literally pass through dozens of hands before it reaches the
ultimate consumer. When the product is found to be defective,
it makes little sense to allow the ultimate consumer redress
against his immediate vendors only. If such were the case, the
consumer's immediate vendor, if he were to have the full
benefit of his bargain, would have to, in turn, sue his
immediate vendor, who would, in turn, have to sue his vendor
and so on up the chain until the party ultimately responsible
for placing a defective product in the market is reached. It
defies common sense to require such an endless chain of
litigation in order to hold the party at fault responsible.2 9
Policy considerations sustained the cause of action against the
non-privity component parts seller. According to the court, "market
structure" in the current economy makes privity barriers
antiquated. Furthermore, as to General Electric's disclaimer, the
226. Patty, 846 F2d at 1252.
227. 604 P2d 849 (Okla. 1979).
228. 631 P2d 739. (Okla. 1981).
229. Patty, 846 F2d at 1253-54 (quoting Elden v. Simmons, 631 R2d at 742 in its earlier
opinion at 742 F2d at 1263).
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evidence showed that it extended only to Brown & Sharpe and was
never expressed in writing to Patty Precision.230 Patty Precision
presented evidence to prove that this disclaimer was not disclosed
to it prior to its purchase of the Brown & Sharpe machines. On this
record, the court held, "that General Electric's disclaimer to Brown
& Sharpe, undisclosed to Patty Precision, was irrelevant and that
the district court erred in admitting it into evidence and instructing
on it."23' Therefore, Patty Precision had the benefit of the implied
warranty of merchantability unadulterated by the disclaimer, and
the case was remanded for a new trial. There was a dissent. 232 It is
evident that the privity issue was resolved for policy reasons in
light of Oklahoma precedent without any resort to non-Code third
party beneficiary law.
Consider the two reported cases in relation to the hypothetical
situation. Both precedents support allowing the ferryman a claim
against Liftbuilders for breach of implied warranties, express
warranties, and the promise of remedial work. In Rhodes,2 the
Illinois appellate court spoke the language of third party beneficiary
law in allowing an action for damages when the cans, as modified,
were defective. In Patty Precision, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, spoke only about the
elimination of privity for policy reasons. Yet, each court discerned
and commented upon the significance of pre-contract and
post-contract communications wherein particular needs were made
known, and the remote seller sought to satisfy those needs in the
fabrication of a component to be incorporated by another party
into the final product. In Rhodes, the Continental Can Company
sought to build a can fit for Perform. In Patty Precision, General
Electric sought to build controls suitable for a machining center.
True, the can was not a component part in the same way as the
controls were in Patty Precision, but in each case the upstream
supplier furnished a component of the final product sold
downstream and that part proved defective giving rise to damage
claims.
230. Under section 2-316, the implied warranty of merchantability would need to be
disclaimed in a conspicuous writing. Likewise, according to prevailing authorities, limiting
language under section 2-719(1) must be conspicuous.
231. Patty, 846 F2d at 1254.
232. In dissent, Judge Logan focused upon an apparent unfairness in imposing a
warranty and not recognizing the limitations which the seller had negotiated surrounding the
warranty. Id. at 1258 (Logan, J., dissenting).
233. See supra nn.217-23.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:111

Thus, if the ferryman were to sue Liftbuilders for breach of
warranties, express or implied, or for breach of its remedial
promise, both cases would be persuasive authority for allowing the
suit in the absence of vertical privity. Using a third party
beneficiary analysis is preferable to a wholesale abolition of the
privity requirement because there may be many situations in which
suit against a third party component supplier should not be
allowed. Patty Precision might have been such a case because
General Electric was held to have made a warranty to a remote
buyer from which its own disclaimer (limitation of damages) was
judicially detached, a detachment of questionable fairness in the
circumstances. 234

2.

The Hypothetical and the Third Party Beneficiary Principle

Consider the hypothetical situation with the ferryman in light of
the first branch of the third party beneficiary principle. Is it
necessary or important for implementing the contracting parties'
objectives that the ferryman be empowered to enforce the express
and implied warranties and the remedial promise against
Liftbuilders? The answer is surely in the affirmative. A bankruptcy
trustee would have no incentive to enforce Shipbuilders rights
against Liftbuilder unless a victory would increase the bankruptcy
estate. Enforcement may be essential as a means of enabling the
ferryman to comply with significant federal and state laws, unless
the entire economic burden of doing so is to be placed upon the
ferryman as the aggrieved party. Had the parties initially bargained
about enforcement rights, it should not have made any difference
in price since Liftbuilder knew precisely the needs of the ultimate
buyer. Neither does it seem that Shipbuilder would have had any
motivation to ask for more money from the ferryman in the initial
bargaining if the parties had assumed that the ferryman would have
a direct right of enforcement against Liftbuilder. Realistically
viewed, the hypothetical situation. calls for third party
234. The Oklahoma legislature must have thought that the result was unfair because it
amended its version of section 2-318 (Alternative A) by adding the following two paragraphs:
(2) This section does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a
warranty to or for the benefit of a buyer to other persons ....
(3) [An exclusion,
modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any with respect to rights and
remedies, effective against the buyer is also effective against any beneficiary
designated under this section.
OKiA STAT. ANN. tit. 86 § 83 (West 1988). This action by the legislature is, a fortiori,
interesting for the purposes of this article because it first recognized the viability of third
party rights in sales contracts but then limited a promisor's liability to the terms of its initial
promise, express or implied. This seems fair.
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empowerment in order for the objectives of the original parties to
be implemented efficiently and fairly.
The second branch of the third party beneficiary principle points
in the same direction inasmuch as it allows enforcement of
warranties imposed by the legislature without trampling upon the
parties' manifested intent. There is no disclaimer in the
hypothetical situation; therefore, the question of whether a
disclaimer in the contract between the promisor and promisee
should bind a third party not aware of the disclaimer need not be
reached. However, if questions were posed concerning whether an
implied warranty should extend to a third party and whether a
negotiated limitation of damages for breach should be judicially
detached from such an extension, the analysis would be different
under a third party beneficiary theory than under the Patty
Precision analysis. Under the third party beneficiary theory, third
party claims would not rise higher than the terms of the promise to
the promisee, meaning that the Patty Precision case would
probably have been decided differently. For this reason, the third
party beneficiary approach in Rhodes is preferable to the
across-the-board elimination of vertical privity evidenced by Patty
Precision because the analysis requires (i) that the original parties'
objectives be ascertained, and (ii) that the court decide whether or
not empowering the third party is essential or important for
implementing the original parties objectives, and (iii) that the court
consider public policy and moral concerns.
Applying a third party beneficiary analysis to cases brought by
remote buyers against component parts sellers should not mean an
unlimited expansion of liabilities for such sellers. The third party
beneficiary principle would in many cases bar liability against
component parts suppliers, in the absence of unusual factors
showing the suppliers awareness of, and implied or express
promise to fulfill, downstream needs. Of course, in an unusual
case, public policy might justify allowing a suit against a
component parts supplier.
Using a third party beneficiary analysis to determine whether or
not suit should be allowed against a non-privity component parts
supplier might prove superior to the line-drawing in recent
litigation wherein such suits have been barred for reasons of policy.
For example, in Hininger v. Case Corp. buyers sued their dealer,
the manufacturer ("Case"), and the wheel supplier ("Can-Am") in
federal court for economic losses attributable to faulty drive
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wheels.23 5 The plaintiffs settled with the dealer and manufacturer
but continued litigation against the remote component parts
supplier, Can-Am, for breach of warranty and negligence. A jury
found Can-Am liable on both theories. The trial judge granted
Can-Am's motion for a judgment n.o.v. on the warranty claim,
leaving the verdict resting only upon negligence. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, held that
the economic loss doctrine precluded suit in tort.2 36 On plaintiffs
cross-appeal, the issue was whether or- not the, trial judge had
rightly granted defendants motion for a judgment n.o.v. on the
warranty claim. The court decided that the motion had been rightly
granted because the district judge had correctly decided that for
reasons of policy a component parts manufacturer should not be
subject to suit by a non-privity buyer.
The court noted:
Can a purchaser go upstream from the manufacturer of the
finished product and assert an implied warranty claim for
economic loss against .a manufacturer of a component part?
Although we find no Texas authorities directly addressing this
question, we believe that the experienced Texas district judge
in this case properly distinguished between the manufacturer
of the finished product and the component part manufacturer.
She reasoned that the Hiningers [buyers] bargained for a
complete and functional Case combine, not wheels and axles
and all the myriad components that make up the combine.
Thus, the district court concluded that the Hiningers had no
expectation that Can-Am or any of the other manufacturers of
unbranded components would resolve any problem they might
37
experience with the combines.
As a result, the line drawn by the trial judge was sustained.
However, the last sentence of the foregoing quotation provides a
possible opening for an exception to the rule. Suppose the buyers
had relied upon brand-name components? Suppose the drive
wheels had been specially manufactured for the six combines
purchased by these buyers? In either case, the court might have
drawn the line differently. The court also noted, a footnote, that,
"Mrs. Hininger [buyer] does not contend that she and her husband
235.
236.
237.

23 F3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 125-27.
Id. at 128.
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had any contact with Can-Am, that Can-Ams name was on the
wheels, or that Can-Am advertised its product to the public
23
at-large." 8
Again, the clear inference is that some factors might have altered
the result, meaning that under different circumstances a claim
against a non-privity component parts supplier might be viable
under Texas law. The factors enumerated are consistent with the
third party beneficiary analysis as applied to the hypothetical
situation. Moreover, use of the third party beneficiary analysis
advanced by Professor Eisenberg would give the court a framework
for making decisions about the liability of component parts
manufacturers rather than relying only on policy arguments.
Because the text of Article 2 does not resolve the problem, at least
in cases of implied warranties, and the text of revised Article 2 will
probably not specifically address the issue, use of the common law
of third party beneficiaries could prove very helpful for resolving
difficult cases concerning component parts suppliers and
downstream economic loss.
D.

Cases Arising from Construction and Repair Contracts Where
the Contractor Procures Goods from a Supplier for
Incorporationinto the Project
1.

The Hypothetical Situation

Suppose a city on the Atlantic seaboard creates a non-profit
corporation to own and operate a hospital. The hospital
corporation ("hospital") contracts with an American subsidiary of a
European firm ("prime contractor") for construction of a hospital
to help meet the needs of a swelling urban population lacking
adequate health insurance coverage. The construction contract
includes
an
ultra-modern,
efficient,
heating/ventilation/
air-conditioning system ("HVAC")
specified by the city's
architectural firm. 239 The general contractor procures the HVAC
components from an American supplier ("Ultrasystems, Inc.") for
$1.6 million and subcontracts with another contractor for their
installation for the price of $400,000, meaning the total cost of the
238. Id. at 128 (citing Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660
(1985)).
239. The seeds for this hypothetical situation, insofar as it involves the supplier, are
found in the fact patterns of Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 445 N.E.2d 19 (Ill.
App. 1982); Pierce Assoc., Inc. v. Nemours Found., 865 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1988); and Freeman
v. I.G. Navarre, 289 P.2d 1015 (Wash. 1955).
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installed system is $2 million. The contract for purchase of the
HVAC components is a contract governed by Article 2. We can
assume that Ultrasystems made this supply contract after study of
the applicable plans and specifications furnished by the hospital's
architects. The service contract for their installation is governed by
the common law of contracts. Assume simply that this arrangement
is less expensive than subcontracting with an HVAC firm that in
turn procures the components from a supplier. The general
contractor is required to furnish and does furnish a performance
bond. The installation of the HVAC components is rightly made,
and the system works reasonably well for more than one year.
Then, the system malfunctions, and eventually fails, due to
defective components that deteriorated in an unacceptably short
time. The hospital administrators demand help, but the contractor
is unresponsive. In fact, while the American subsidiary, the prime
contractor, is legally intact, it has ceased all operations and has
virtually no assets because the parent corporation has siphoned off
its subsidiary's resources for construction projects in other
countries. The time for suit on the performance bond has run.
Ultrasystems is close at hand and solvent, but declines to provide
any remedial help, wrongly denying that its components were
faulty. The hospital desperately needs a new system.
The hospital pays $2 million to have a new HVAC system
installed by another contractor who of necessity removes the faulty
components. Ultrasystems refuses to retrieve the components, so
the hospital in good faith sells them as salvage for $100,000.
Assume no pass-through warranties were made to the hospital by
Ultrasystems, but that Ultrasystems made warranties of quality,
express and implied, to the prime contractor. Quaere: Can the
hospital make out a viable claim for breach of express or implied
warranties against Ultrasystems for the costs of replacing the HVAC
system less salvage or for any lesser damage? Or must the hospital
be content to pursue the general contractor who now has negligible
assets? Or must it try a longshot against the foreign parent
corporation seeking to pierce the veil? There is precedent favoring
common law third party beneficiary standing for the city in a claim
against Ultrasystems.
2.

The Precedents Allowing Owners to Sue as Third Party
Beneficiaries

Case law is conflicting on the question of whether or not an
owner can sue a subcontractor or supplier on a third party
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beneficiary theory. Reading the cases, it is difficult to discern, in
the language of the Restatement (Second), any bright line between
incidental and intended beneficiaries in the construction context.
The opinions 240 are rightly described by Professor Eisenberg as
"picturesque." There is case law approving third party suits by
owners against subcontractors breaching service contracts and
mixed (goods and services) contracts.2 41 There is substantial case
law denying third party claims by owners against subcontractors
and suppliers. 242 The two following cases illustrate third party
beneficiary standing in cases involving mixed contracts (goods and
services commingled). The analysis of potential third party
beneficiary claims should be the same when goods are the
predominant factor in the subcontract making it simply an Article 2
sales contract as opposed to a service contract.
Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co., 45 Cal. Rptr.
448 (Cal. Ct. App., 1978)24
Gilbert Financial Corporation ("Gilbert") contracted with Sheldon
Appel Construction Company ("Appel") for the construction of a
storage building for bank records. Appel subcontracted with
Steelform Contracting Company ("Steelform") for the construction
of the roof and certain structural components. The roof leaked
causing damage to the building and its contents. To solve the
problem, Gilbert ultimately had to dismantle and replace parts of
240. See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1404. ("The bottom line is that the
intent-to-benefit test has left the law in this area unsettled, and the analysis in the cases is
most charitably described as picturesque."). For a good discussion of owners' claims against
non-privity participants in construction projects, see William K. Jones, Economic Losses
Caused by Construction Deficiencies: The Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U.
CIN. L. Rev. 1051, 1083-91 (1991).
241. See, in addition to the cases discussed in the text, the following cases recognizing
owners as third party beneficiaries of prime-subcontractor contracts or at least recognizing
that allegations of third party standing were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss:
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Jardel Co., Inc., 421 F.2d 1048 (3rd Cir., 1969); Keel v. Titan
Construction Corp.; 639 P.2d 1238 (Okla. 1981); Syndoulos Lutheran Church v. AKR.C.
Industries, 662 P.2d 109 (Al. 1983); Jardel Enterprises, Inc. v. Triconsultants, Inc., 770 P.2d
1301 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Lin v. Gatehouse Construction Co., 616 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio App.
8th, Cuyahoga County, 1992).
242. Compare the following cases with those listed in footnote 241, supra, where the
courts disallowed owners' claims against subcontractors or suppliers: Vogel v. Reed Supply
Co., 177 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1970); Federal Mogul Corp. v. Universal Construction Co., 376
So.2d 716 (Ala App. 1979); Manor Junior College v. Kaller's Inc., 507 A.2d 1245 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986); PierceAssocs., Inc. v. Nemours Foundation,865 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1988); Lazovitz,
Inc. v. Saxon Construction, Inc., 911 F.2d 588 (11th Cir., 1990); In re Masonite Corp.
Hardboard Siding Products Liability Litigation, 21 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. La. 1998).
243. 145 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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the roof and other structural components, paying a different
contractor. Gilbert then sued Appel and Steelform. The trial court
decided that negligence claims against Steelform were time-barred
and dismissed Gilbert's implied warranty claims for lack of privity.
On appeal, the California appellate court reversed, finding that the
pleadings stated facts which would make Gilbert a third party
beneficiary of the Steelform-Appel subcontract. 244 It 'is not clear
whether the appellate court considered the subcontract to be
predominantly for goods or services. It is clear from the opinion,
however, that the appellate court allowed Gilbert to sue Steelform
for breach of an implied warranty thereby implying that, at
minimum, the warranty sections of the Code, or analogous common
245
law principles, were part of the Appel-Steelform contract.
Citing several California cases showing a broadening tendency to
recognize intended third party beneficiaries, the court stated:
In the case at bar, the general contractor, Appel, had the
duty under its contract with Gilbert to furnish all the material
and labor necessary to construct the building in question.
Steelform subcontracted with Appel to furnish the materials
and labor necessary for the construction of the roof. Clearly,
Steelform (the promisor) realized it was assuming Appel's (the
promisee) duties for this phase of the construction, and that
Gilbert was the ultimate beneficiary of its performance as the
owner of the building. Under the Hartman 246 and Lucas 24 7 rules,
24
Gilbert would obviously be a creditor beneficiary. 8
In light of the Restatement (Second), it is no longer necessary to
speak in terms of creditor versus donee beneficiaries. Instead, the
inquiry would be whether Gilbert was an intended or incidental
beneficiary. If the Restatement (Second) were applied, Gilbert
would almost certainly be in the intended beneficiary category.
Oliver B. Cannon and Son, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 336 A.2d 211
244. The court perceived third party status in Gilbert as obviating the necessity of
making any judgment about privity per se. According to the court: "Under the facts of this
case we do not need to decide the issue of privity per se. Under the Civil Code section 1559
and the cases interpreting it, we conclude that Gilbert is a third party beneficiary of the
contract between Appel and Steelform and therefore can sue for the breach of the implied
warranty of fitness." Id. at 450.
245. Id. The third party status allowed a claim based upon a Uniform Commercial
Code warranty in the contract between the supplier/subcontractor and the contractor.
246. Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 73 P2d 1163 (Cal. 1937).
247. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
248. Gi/bert, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
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The Barcroft Company ("Barcroft") owned chemical process
tanks situated on its premises. Barcroft contracted with Dorr-Oliver
Incorporated ("Dorr") for specified work on the tanks interiors.
Dorr subcontracted the work of painting the interior tank linings to
Oliver B. Cannon and Son, Inc. (Cannon) which had submitted an
offer stating that it would use a product known as "Glid-Flake" for
the painting. This was probably a service contract with an
incidental inclusion of goods.2 ° While the facts make the prime
contract initially look like something other than a construction
contract, its does fit the paradigm. An improvement was being
made to structures (tanks). The prime contract was simply a repair
contract rather than a contract for new construction, and the task
of painting the linings was subcontracted. Hence, the prime
contract can be conceived of as similar to a contract for repair or
remodeling of a commercial building under which a painting
subcontract would be common.
Cannon provided a shoddy application of the Glid-Flake. Within a
year there were substantial lining failures. 251 An independent testing
agent determined that Glid-Flake was acceptable for the job, and
that Cannon's poor workmanship in applying Glid-Flake had caused
the failures. In a multi-party suit, the trial judge found Cannon
liable for defective workmanship and determined that Cannon was
liable to Barcroft, the latter being a third party beneficiary of the
Dorr-Cannon contract. Cannon appealed, arguing that it owed no
legal obligation to Barcroft. The Supreme Court of Delaware
sustained the trial court, agreeing that Barcroft was a third party
beneficiary of the Dorr-Cannon contract.2" 2 In doing so, the court
reviewed many specific provisions of the Dorr-Cannon contract that
seemed to create obligations running from Cannon to Barcroft. For
example, there were remedial provisions showing that Cannon
assumed an obligation for post-application repair costs. By way of
a summary, the court stated:
249. 336 A2d 211.
250. While the court does not make an analysis of the goods versus services
components, there is no reason to think that the Gild-Flake, itself, was the predominant
factor.
251. Substantial being about twenty per cent of the surface area, the categorization of
the breach as partial or total is not essential.
252. Cannon, 336 A.2d at 211. "Our reading of the subcontract convinces us that
Barcroft is, and was intended to be a third-party-creditor-beneficiary of the contract. We so
hold." Id.
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We think the contract manifests the requisite intent that
Cannon's proper performance of the subcontract would, to
that extent, discharge Dorr's duty to Barcroft.
We note the substantial similarity of the terms between the
Cannon-Dorr agreement and the Hirsch-Robbins
subcontract ....
25 Both contracts define 'owner' so as to
apprise the promisor that the owner is the ultimate intended
beneficiary of the subcontract.5 3
The court assumed that there was no breach of warranty on the
Glid-Flake, but rather a breach of contract on its application.
However, if the workmanship had been satisfactory and the
Glid-Flake had been defective or unsuitable for the job in breach of
an Article 2 warranty, express or implied, the same analysis would
have allowed the owner an action against the subcontractor/
supplier. Consider, also, that had there been an independent
supplier that chose a defective coating and sold it to Dorr, knowing
of its intended use for lining the tanks, and Dorr's own employees
had made the application, such supplier likewise would have been
liable to Barcroft for breach of warranty under the principles
enunciated by the court.
The application of these precedents, .by analogy, to the
hypothetical hospital situation provides rays of hope for the
hospital's case against the supplier of the defective heating system
components. Indeed, the hospital could sue the prime contractor
for breach due to the failure of the heating system, but collection
would prove difficult and costly, and perhaps impossible because
the contractor shut down U.S. operations and the time has passed
for suit on the prime contractor's performance bond. In any event,
if the contractor were sued, the contractor's lawyer would
forthwith need to bring in the supplier whose components caused
the heating system to fail. In this context, the foregoing precedents
support a strong argument for a direct action by the owner against
the supplier. True, the precedents involve the provision of services,
as well as goods, but the analysis leading to third party
empowerment did not turn in either case upon whether the
subcontract was predominantly for goods or services. Hence, these
precedents point toward blending the Code and the common law of
third party beneficiaries in the construction context.
253. The reference is to a subcontract in Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Jardel, 421 F.2d
1048 (3rd Cir. 1970).
254. Cannon, 336 A-2d at 215.
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There is another case that strongly supports the same
conclusion; however, the claim was made by a subcontractor
against its remote supplier. The case is Crest Container Corp. v.
R.H. Bishop Co.215 The owner, Crest Corporation, entered into a
construction contract with Northeast Construction Managers
("Northeast"). Northeast entered into a subcontract with R.H.
Bishop Company ("Bishop") for the plumbing, heating, and air
conditioning. The heating system did not work properly due to
faulty heating coils and eventually had to be replaced, a cost for
which Bishop was liable. Bishop had ordered the defective parts
for the heating system from Clover Distributing who, in turn, had
ordered them from Fedders-Climatrol ("Climatrol"). Thus, Bishop,
as subcontractor, was not in vertical privity with the heating coils
supplier, Climatrol, from which it sought recovery in a third party
suit based upon breach of Article 2 warranties. The trial judge
granted a directed verdict. in favor of Climatrol. On appeal, one
argument that Climatrol used to sustain the directed verdict in its
favor was its lack of vertical privity with Bishop.
The Illinois appellate court reversed the trial court for
erroneously granting a directed verdict, holding that Bishop was a
beneficiary of Climatrol's warranties:
Privity requires that the party suing has some contractual
relationship with the one sued. Although the supreme court
has done away with the requirement in cases involving
personal injury in tort, it has not expressly done so in cases
involving purely economic loss. In this case, Bishop purchased
the coils from Clover, a company independent of Climatrol,
and is therefore not in privity with Climatrol. In spite of this
general rule, we believe the exception stated by the first
district is applicable here. The court held that privity is not
required when the remote manufacturer knows the identity,
purpose and requirements of the dealer's customer and
manufactured or delivered the goods specially to meet those
requirements. Bishop's specifications were sent to Climatrol. In
fact, Climatrol selected the proper coil based on information
supplied by Bishop. Climatrol knew the coils must be able to
handle 30 pounds of pressure. The coils were custom made
for the job and were delivered directly to the jobsite.
Fedders-Climatrol argues that Frank's Maintenance is not
255.

445 N.E.2d 19 (1ll. App. 1982).
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authority here because the court relied on a case, Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., that abrogated the
privity requirement on a third party beneficiary theory.
However, Rhodes made it clear that when the party pleaded
that it relied on the manufacturer's expertise to select the
product, that was sufficient to make the party a beneficiary of
the warranties.

256

As a buyer with a complaint against a non-privity seller, Bishop's
position is analogous to the owner's (hospital's) position in the last
hypothetical. In this factual setting, third party standing was
allowed against a non-privity supplier of goods whose contract was
governed by Article 2. Moreover, the court recognized Frank's
Maintenance as authority even though it arose from a procurement
of goods outside of the construction context. And the court
recognized Rhodes Pharmacal, which arose from procurement of
component parts (containers), as authority also. As a result, the
court discerned a principle underlying the three paradigmatic
situations discussed in Part VI: Whether the case involves
procurement of the good as a whole, or procurement of a
component part for fabrication or packaging of another good, or
procurement of goods for incorporation into a construction project,
a third party beneficiary claim may be appropriate, depending upon
the particular facts of the case.
3. The Third Party Beneficiary Principle and the Hypothetical
Situation
Is it necessary or important for implementing the original
contracting parties' objectives that the hospital have a direct action
against the contractor's supplier? Looking at this situation with a
reasonable degree of objectivity, the answer is in the affirmative
despite the contractor's after-the-fact indifference. The joint
objective was a functioning hospital. Loosely analogizing to section
2-314 of the Code, the owner (hospital) needed facilities fit for
ordinary purposes. Ordinary purposes in a hospital include keeping
the room temperatures suitable for sick persons. Meeting that
objective requires enforcement of the HVAC component supplier's
obligations. As to the second branch of the third party beneficiary
principle, moral and social concerns strongly pull in favor of
enforcement. Otherwise, a major public hospital must bear the cost
256.

Crest, 445 N.E.2d at 25 (citations omitted).
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of the supplier's default which in turn drives up health care costs.
Therefore, the case for empowering the owner as a third party
beneficiary is strong.
A word of caution is in order, however, if the question of
empowering owners against refnote suppliers is put generally. The
question of whether or not owners generally should be empowered
as third party beneficiaries of non-privity suppliers' contracts with
contractors (or with subcontractors) is a delicate question not
susceptible to a universally satisfactory answer derived from
Professor Eisenberg's explication of the third party beneficiary
principle. A positive answer for all cases would err by being overly
inclusive. A negative answer would preclude some meritorious
claims. In the normal course, the answer should often be negative.
Although upstream suppliers contracting with general contractors
and subcontractors commonly know the purpose and destination of
their supplies, especially when they are delivered directly to a job
site, it seems an unjustified leap to assume automatically that every
owner is a third party beneficiary of every upstream supply
contract. The owner contracts with one prime contractor for
multiple reasons: One is to buy the coordination and administrative
work necessary for the building project with the materials and
skills required. When the owner makes that contract, it should in
the normal course bargain for any and all warranties it wants from
the contractor with the exception of pass-through warranties on
appliances or components that retain their identity when the
construction is completed. The contractor usually is, and should be,
free to shift fungible supplies from one job to another, just as
workers are moved from job to job, unless certain supplies have
been paid for by the owner. Consequently, in the garden variety
case, empowering an owner to sue a non-privity supplier is neither
necessary nor desirable to implement contractual or policy
objectives.
On the other hand, an owner sometimes specifies particular
components.
Components
sometimes
must
be
specially
manufactured for an owner's needs. In such situations, the owner
can rightly contend that the enterprise objectives manifested by the
supplier and its promisee (contractor or subcontractor) can best be
achieved by empowering the owner to sue the supplier if the goods
are defective. Hence, the first branch of the third party beneficiary
principle will favor some owners. Moreover, when a job is done
and the owner and the contractor have finished making payments
upstream, things can go wrong due to defects in goods
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incorporated into a project. At this point, if the contractor is not
amenable to suit, or if suit or collection would be unduly
expensive, there is a case for allowing a direct action by the owner
against a supplier by invoking the third party beneficiary principle,
especially its second branch. In language where the term
"subcontractor" is functionally equivalent to my use of "supplier" in
the hypothetical situation, Professor Eisenberg would allow third
party suits. He states in relevant part:
[W]hen the defect in the subcontractor's work is discovered
only after the owner has paid the full contract price and the
prime contractor has become insolvent, the second branch of
the principle is applicable. As a matter of corrective justice, as
between the owner and the subcontractor, the cost of
repairing the defective performance should be placed on the
subcontractor. Were it not for the adventitious insolvency of
the prime contractor, that is exactly where the cost would
have been placed, because the owner would have sued the
prime contractor, the prime contractor would have sued .the
subcontractor, and the owner would have been made whole at
the subcontractor's ultimate expense.5 7
In sum, third party beneficiary rights should not affix to an
owner whenever and wherever the contractor makes a contract for
services or supplies required for a building project. Rather, a third
party suit should be allowed (i) when the facts show something
more than the upstream purchase of fungible goods; for example,
trusses, carpet, chandeliers, or whatever, chosen or fabricated
especially for the owner; or (ii) when the owner in an equitable
sense needs the rights of a third party beneficiary to gain its
expectation without undue delay, inconvenience, or cost. Case law
in this area needs to grow up from situation sense, Karl Llewellyn's
cardinal judicial virtue.2 5
Sometimes there is fundamental fairness in letting the owner
have a direct action against a non-privity supplier. It is interesting
to compare recent case law allowing a subcontractor an action
against an owner under restitution theory. In a 1997 case,
Commerce Partnership 8098 Ltd. Partnership v. Equity
Contracting Co., 25 9 a Florida appellate court considered the claim
257.
258.

259.

Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 1405.
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
695 So.2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

TRADMON 121-32 (1960).
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of a stucco subcontractor against an owner when the subcontractor
had failed to perfect a mechanic's lien but had arguably enriched
the owner. The court held that a restitution claim against the owner
would be allowed only (i) if the owner had not paid its contractor
for the work, and (ii) the subcontractor had exhausted its efforts to
collect from the contractor. By analogy, it would seem fair that an
owner should be allowed a claim against a non-privity supplier or
subcontractor as a third party beneficiary if (i) the owner has paid
for goods or services which prove defective, and (ii) efforts to
collect from the contractor have been exhausted or will prove
unduly costly, time-consuming, or inconvenient. There is also case
law, albeit sparse, where a subcontractor has been allowed to sue
an owner as a third party beneficiary of the owner-prime
construction contract. 260 Hence, there seems to be a growing
judicial recognition that justice sometimes demands the creation of
rights and remedies between non-privity parties on the construction
site. In the construction and repair cases, where owners are
aggrieved due to defective goods, judges will need to be
particularly thoughtful and careful about blending the law of sales
and the common law of third party beneficiaries.
VII. REFLECTIONS ON THE USE OF REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF
ACCEPTANCE OR FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT REMEDIES AGAINST SELLERS

NOT IN VERTICAL PRIVITY WITH CLAIMANTS

In Part V, I made arguments for allowing the full array of Code
remedies for third party beneficiaries beyond the final buyer in the
normal distribution chain. 261 Those arguments, for the most part,
pertain to the hypothetical situations discussed in Part VI, and will
not be repeated here. However, the situations discussed in Part VI
raise with clarity an issue peculiar to fact patterns where vertical
privity is lacking: Can the goods-oriented remedies of rejection
(section 2-602) and revocation of acceptance (section 2-608) be
employed against non-privity sellers, such as manufacturers and
distributors, assuming sale to the final buyer went through a dealer
or construction contractor? In-Part VII, I will briefly explore the
main difficulties with using rejection and revocation of acceptance
260. See Midwest Dredging Co. v. McaAninch Corp., 424 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa. 1988); Port
Chester Elec. Constr. Corp., 357 N.E.2d 983 (N.Y. 1976).
261. The hypothetical situations addressed in Part V involved questions of horizontal
privity, not vertical privity. Claimants would not have been faced with want of vertical privity
as a defense.
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against non-privity sellers and will then argue that courts can and
should fashion equitable variations on Code-based and common law
remedies, in order to protect disappointed buyers' reasonable
262
expectations.
I have twice launched arguments in law review articles in favor
of allowing the so-called goods-oriented remedies, rejection and
revocation of acceptance, against non-privity sellers for breaches of
warranties or other contractual obligations. 26 My arguments
received judicial recognition in North Dakota,26 and were looked
25
upon with favor by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 1
My viewpoint also received favorable comment from Professor
Donald Clifford in an article about express warranties.266 However,
Professor Harry M. Flechtner strongly criticized my doctrinal
arguments in an article about pass-through warranties although he
agreed that the policies I had advanced were strong and that there
was a need for improvement in remedies generally allowed against
remote (non-privity) warrantors.2 67 Thus, even among persons
sparring on legal theory, there is a recognized need for a remedy
that accomplishes the objectives of rejection and revocation of
acceptance, coupled with refund, in those cases where the claimant
is not in vertical privity with the seller in breach. The need was
recognized by the drafting committee for revised Article 2 in the
mid-nineties, but efforts to solve the problem by textual changes
26
were aborted. 8
To illustrate the need, let us consider briefly the three
hypothetical situations from Part VI and the generally accepted
remedial options if goods sold are seriously defective. First, there
was Earl, the farmer, who bought an irrigation system for $400,000
262. The arguments made in Part VII pertain to common law third party beneficiaries
but also pertain to any persons qualifying as third party claimants under any jurisdiction's
version of section 2-318.
263. See Gary L. Monserud, Rounding Out the Remedial Structure of Article 2: The
Casefor a Forced Exchange Between a Buyer and a Remote Seller, 19 U. DAYTON L REv. 353
(1994) ("Monserud I") and Gary L. Monserud, Judgment Against a Non-Breaching Seller:
The Cost of Outrunning the Law to Do Justice Under Section 2-608 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 70 N.D. L REv. 809 (1994) ("Monserud II"). The articles mainly focus upon
allowing revocation of acceptance and refund against non-privity sellers.
264. See, eg., Fode v. Capital RV Ctr., Inc., 575 N.W.2d 682 (N.D. 1998).
265. See Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 649 N.E.2d 758 n.4 (Mass. 1995).
266. Donald L. Clifford, Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase,
Two Relationships, 75 WAsH. U. LQ. 413, 447-51 (1997).
267. Harry M. Flechtner, Enforcing Manufacturers' Warranties, 'Pass Through'
Warranties and the Like: Can the Buyer Get a Refund?, 50 RuTGERS L REV. 397 (1998)
("Flechtner").
268. See Flechtner, supra note 267.
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that was repairable for $100,000 though corn yields were also
reduced. Suppose, however, that the non-conformities substantially
impaired its value to him and that repairs at any price would not
solve the system's inherent deficiencies. To grant Earl his lost
expectancy, he would need not only consequential damages under
section 2-715(2) (lost profits) but enough money to take out the old
system and to install a functioning replacement system. The
seemingly logical approach would be to allow Earl revocation of
acceptance under section 2-608 against Great Western, allowing
also full refund of the $400,000 price (section 2-711(1)) plus cover
costs (section 2-712) and incidental damages (section 2-715(1)). If
Earl cannot revoke acceptance against the dealer (no breach by
dealer) and cannot revoke against Great Western (no privity), and
has no way to obtain a full refund, he will be stuck with
unworkable goods and the remedies allowed by section 2-714 -the value differential (what the goods would have been worth as
warranted less their actual value). Even if the value of the old
system were deemed to be zero, he could not gain cover costs for
a new system under the standard application of section 2-714(2).
Therefore, the goal of protecting Earl's justified expectations, the
accepted remedial goal under section 1-106(1), points in favor of
allowing revocation of acceptance and refund which could be
26 9
followed by cover costs.
The case would be the same with the ferryman in the next
hypothetical situation if the elevator were not repairable for
$30,000 as stipulated but rather had to be removed and disposed of
due to the severity of its defects. The same reasoning would follow
for the hospital in the last. hypothetical if revocation of acceptance
or an equitable variation of it were not allowed. The hospital sold
the defective HVAC components for salvage for the price of
$100,000 and hired another contractor to install a totally new
system that cost $2 million. To meet the objective of protecting an
aggrieved buyer's lost expectancy when revocation of acceptance
and refund against an immediate seller is not practical, creative use
of revocation of acceptance, or a remedy akin to it, against a
remote seller seems appropriate. 270 Courts in several jurisdictions
have discerned the need in cases similar to those outlined above
and have sought to creatively use revocation of acceptance and
269. Rejection under section 2-602 would have provided the appropriate relief if the
malfunctions had appeared soon after installation of the system.
270. In some cases, the same arguments would sustain use of rejection against a
non-privity seller, namely, when the acceptance of the goods had not occurred.
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refund for protection of an aggrieved buyer's lost expectancy in
271
litigation against non-privity sellers.
One of the chief objections commonly raised against allowing
buyers to employ revocation of acceptance (or rejection) and
refund against non-privity sellers is that these remedies are
inextricably connected to the last contract for sale and simply do
not fit the facts when a seller is remote. 272 Precisely because a
buyer rightly rejecting or revoking acceptance may cancel and gain
a refund under section 2-711(1), a problem arises: The buyer has
paid a retail price, and her seller owes or has paid the
manufacturer or distributor a wholesale price, normally a lesser
price, assuming profit was built into each resale. Advocates of
allowing revocation of acceptance (or rejection) against remote
sellers will face a problem for the perceptive critic will ask: To
which price does refund pertain? If we answer the wholesale price
paid by the intermediate seller to the remote seller, then the buyer'
rejecting or revoking acceptance winds up short of her expectancy
if she has made full payment of a higher price. If we answer the
retail price, we are met inevitably with the jibe that a demand is
being made for the manufacturer or distributor (n6n-privity seller)
to refund something it never received to someone with whom it
had no sales contract. Hence, the argument for allowing revocation
of acceptance (or rejection) against non-privity sellers is made to
look silly. The critics have laid claim to a simple truth: That
revocation of acceptance and rejection and refund were truly
designed as remedies for immediate parties to a contract for sale
and consequently do not fit easily when applied between remote
parties. This requires careful reflection before advocating
revocation of acceptance or rejection as remedies for the third
party beneficiary claimants in the hypothetical situations created in
Part VI where there is a lack of vertical privity, even though use of
revocation of acceptance (or rejection) and refund seems necessary
for the protection of the buyer's full expectancy.
An uneasiness with the fit should not stifle all creativity relating
to the use of Code remedies.2 73 On reflection, however, the best
271. See Monserud I, supra note 263, at 365-72, and Flechtner, supra note 267, at
436-38.
272. It is also sometimes asserted erroneously that rejection and revocation of
acceptance are the functional equivalents of common law rescission. This is not true insofar
as neither rejection under section 2-601 nor revocation of acceptance under section 2-608
puts an end to the contract for sale.
273. In my view, the utilization of judicial creativity and a constant eye on section
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answer to the question of which price should be refunded is,
simply, that there should be no "refund." Rather, when the buyer
has fully paid a retailer (or a contractor), and is a third party
beneficiary,7 4 a court should compute the buyer's total lost
expectancy with reference to section 2-714. Efforts to expand the
use of revocation of acceptance, and by implication rejection,
beyond immediate buyers and sellers were probably ill-conceived.
Courts moving in that direction may have taken a doctrinally false
step in order to do justice in particular cases. Even when the
remedial objective is laudable, expanding the goods-oriented
remedies for use against sellers not in vertical privity creates
doctrinal knots difficult to untie, and in any event, has proved to be
politically unacceptable to many people in favor of statutory law
reform.
Recognizing the justice of his criticisms and our common aims, I
propose to adopt and expand upon the approach advanced by
Professor Flechtner in his Rutgers Law Review article. Professor
Flechtner's solution to the problem is to make use of section
2-714(2), and to expand creatively upon the case law developed
under it.275 He starts with the simple formula in section 2-714(2)
which states that the measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if
they had been as warranted. Citing several cases, he notes that
courts have allowed three methods of proof under this formula: (1)
testimony on the value differences, including expert testimony and
testimony by aggrieved buyers, (2) fair market value as warranted
(however established) less salvage value, often established by a
good faith salvage sale, and (3) a buyer's actual or hypothetical
repair costs. 27 6 Professor Flechtner notes that use of the second
and third methods of assessing the value differential place a
practical, judicial gloss upon the statutory language. He suggests
that courts can go further by allowing a buyer to tender (turnover)
1-106(1) would have allowed revocation of acceptance and rejection to be adapted for use
against third party warrantors.

274. The argument pertains to common law third party beneficiaries as discussed in
this article and to third party beneficiaries recognized under section 2-318.
275. Flechtner, supra note 267, at 455-68. His explanation of his proposal in lieu of
allowing revocation of acceptance or rejection against remote parties is very clear and
should be consulted by anyone who seriously considers my proposal in Part VII. In this
academic argument, I yield to his approach, but I want to expand upon it as I do not think
he fully meets his stated goal of protecting the buyer's lost expectancy in all situations.
276. Flechtner, supra note 267, at 458-62.
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defective goods to the breaching non-privity seller claiming thereby
a value differential: The retail purchase price (assumed value as
warranted) less zero (having no goods. after turnover) which will
yield damages equal to the retail price. Seller's loss would be
reduced by whatever the seller could get for the defective goods.
Liability to the buyer could be reduced below the retail price if
seller proved depreciation prior to turnover or that the goods at the
time of acceptance would have had a value less than the contract
price even if they had been as warranted.277
Consider some numbers affixed to this theory. Suppose a lawyer
has paid $100,000 for a specially fabricated modular home, the
components of which were warranted by the manufacturer but sold
through a dealer who effectively disclaimed all warranties under
section 2-316.218 The modular home was bought by the lawyer to
serve as a country law office. Assume the manufacturer was paid
$90,000 by the dealer. Assume further that the defects appearing
after acceptance have substantially impaired the value of the home
rendering it virtually useless to the buyer. Assume that the
materials could be salvaged for an undetermined amount and that a
replacement modular unit would cost $110,000. Assume further that
the buyer cannot revoke acceptance against the dealer who has
made no warranties, and that the jurisdiction has not allowed
revocation of acceptance against a non-privity seller. In accordance
with Professor Flechtner's thinking, the buyer could, nonetheless,
turn over the goods to the breaching manufacturer, and demand
$100,000 pursuant to section 2-714(2) - this would be the
difference between the contract price (assumed value) and zero,
buyer having nothing after the turnover. Seller could try to
maximize the value of the components turned over, either by re-use
in another modular home or by resale. Moreover, if the seller could
prove that the lawyer enjoyed use of the building for a significant
time, before the problems were evident, a set-off would be in order.
Finally, if the seller could prove that the lawyer initially made a
bad deal, for example, by paying $100,000 for something worth
$85,000 in the marketplace, a downward adjustment would be
allowed. Assuming no set-offs were proved by the seller, the lawyer
in this hypothetical situation would have a just claim for $100,000,
79
the full purchase price, under Professor Flechtner's approach.2
277. Id. 463-66. Professor Flechtner rightly points to Gautheirv. Mayo, 258 N.W.2d 748
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977), as a precedent that tends to sustain his approach.
278. The hypothetical is loosely based upon the facts of Gautheir,258 N.W.2d at 748.
279. I believe this example corresponds with Professor Flechtner's view. In addition to
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I contend that Professor Flechtner's proposal should be extended
because further adjustments would sometimes be in order to
protect fully a buyer's lost expectancy. To gain her full expectancy,
the modular home buyer must be awarded enough money to
purchase a replacement modular home. Since the price has gone up
$10,000, this amount should be added to the $100,000 discussed
above; in effect, buyer should get the economic equivalent of cover
costs. Additionally, if the seller does not accept a good faith and
timely tender for turnover, the buyer should be allowed to make a
good faith and commercially reasonable salvage resale with
n6tice. 80 The buyer would be entitled to the proceeds which would
be a credit against the buyer's claim against the seller. On the other
hand, if the goods were toxic or for any reason there were
disposition costs in light of environmental or land use laws, and
consequently resale gave the goods a negative value, this should be
added to the value differential and "cover" costs calculated above.
All adjustments would be aimed at hitting the target set in section
1-106(1), putting the aggrieved party in the economic position that
party would have been in if both parties had fully performed. The
foregoing suggested adjustments expand slightly upon Professor
Flechtner's proposal, but are consistent with it.
It would have been desirable for the drafting committee for a
revised Article 2 to tackle this problem with an amendment such as
that proposed by Professor Flechtner. However, judges could
implement the foregoing remedial approach, including an award of
cover costs, without textual changes in Article 2. There are at least
two text-based reasons for this. First, section 2-714 is quite flexible
and open-ended. After stating the difference-in-value formula,
section 2-714(2) ends with the words, "unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount." Moreover, section
2-714(1) states, "Where the buyer has accepted goods and given
notification (subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as
damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the
ordinary course of events from the seller's breach determined in
any manner which is reasonable." In cases which could otherwise
qualify as revocation of acceptance cases, if the action were against
an immediate seller, the language of section 2-714(1) and (2)
the text of his article, he set out a model statutory provision embodying his approach in an
appendix. See Flechtner, supra note 267, at 471.
280. Section 2-706 sets the rules for resale by an aggrieved seller and for a buyer
selling pursuant to an Article 2 security interest created under section 2-711(3). A court by
analogy could judge the propriety of the sale by reference to section 2-706.
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provide an acceptable textual footing for the functional equivalent
of a refund and cover costs supplemented by incidental or
consequential damages, when proved. Second, section 1-103 is an
open door to principles of law and equity where the Code has not
displaced them." ' The general expectancy formula contained in
Restatement (Second) Contracts, section 347, furnishes common
law principles sufficient to sustain the approach recommended
above; 2 2 provided, however, that the court recognizes an inherent
equitable power to either order seller to accept a turnover or to
calculate damages taking account of the turnover. Admittedly, this
is not statutorily established as a buyer's right. In cases involving
component parts, and in the construction cases, applying the
principles just stated could be tricky because turnover would
necessarily involve detachment of a component part or severance
of goods from real estate. In many cases, this should be fairly
simple as in the case of tires, or even a motor. Likewise, a furnace
or water heater should be easily severable and should present no
particular difficulties for turnover. However, establishing the value
such goods would have had they been as warranted will require
upstream inquiries or formal discovery or proofs apart from any
contract price, for the complaining buyer will have paid for the
defective component as part of a more complex good or as part of
a construction price. Moreover, in such cases, repair would replace
cover as the meaningful concept to make a buyer whole unless
"cover" can be used flexibly to mean replacement of a. component
as well as replacement of the whole of a good as finally sold. The
lodestar should always be section 1-106(1).
Let us reconsider briefly how the approach to damages
recommended by Professor Flechtner could be applied to the
hypothetical situations in Part VI. The farmer, Earl, could turn over
his defunct system to Great Western by notice. The court could
compute Earl's direct loss as the total price paid for the system
281. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995) states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, 'including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions." Id.
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAC
§ 347 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the limitations stated in sections 350-353, the injured party has a right to damages
based on his expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in value to him of the other
party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other loss, including
incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less (c) any cost or other loss that he
has avoided by not having to perform. Id.
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(price as assumed value less zero) plus the increase in cost of an
acceptable, roughly equivalent, replacement system. Depending on
the jurisdiction, pre-judgment interest might be allowed. If Great
Western did not recognize the turnover, Earl could make a good
faith, commercially reasonable resale with notice in accord with
section 2-706. The damages would then be reduced by any salvage
value to Earl. Earl could rightly claim lost profits from reduced
yields and incidental damages. Of course, if Great Western's
representatives thought that the components could be resold for
more than the salvage value Earl would likely receive, or that the
components retrieved could be responsibly integrated into another
system for resale, there would be an incentive to accept the
turnover because it would mean immediate cash on resale which
would reduce Great Western's loss accordingly.
Consider now the more difficult case of the ferryman with the
elevator specially made as one component of the ferryboat. If the
elevator could not be repaired, but could be detached, the ferryman
should turn over the defective goods to Liftbuilders, Inc. The
ferryman could then demand the purchase price of the component
plus the difference between the cost of cover (replacement
installed) and the contract price. However, the ferryman would in
the normal course have no way of ascertaining what percentage of
its price was attributable to the component. Alternatively, the
ferryman could demand the total repair/replacement price which
would approximate a refund and additional cover costs if a
component were not involved. Likewise, with the last hypothetical
about the defective heating system components that were salvaged,
the hospital should be entitled to the full costs of replacement
(materials and labor) less proceeds of the salvage sale. Again, this
would approximate refund and the additional costs of cover in a
situation not involving a component of a construction project. In
any of these hypothetical situations, if salvage had a negative value,
meaning there was a disposition expense, the aggrieved buyer
should have that expense as well, assuming timely notice, since
this expense could have been avoided if the breaching seller had
taken possession and made his own disposition of the defective
goods by resale or otherwise.
On first glance, Professor Flechtner's proposal, as I have
extended it, may strike some readers as harsh against non-privity
sellers, or as an anti-business attitude. But why should this be
considered harsh or anti-business? The foregoing suggestions are
nothing more, or less, than the logical implications of the
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expectancy principle incorporated by section 1-106(1) which directs
a judge to put the aggrieved party where that party would have
been had there been no breach. This principle is exactly the same
as that agreed upon in Restatement (Second) section 344(a) and
implemented in section 347 as the accepted norm for monetary
damages. Moreover, the integration of law and equity need not
spell the death of equity. Equity is available to supplement the
Code's provisions; section 1-103 so states with specificity. Section
2-716(1) allows an expansive judicial liberty for specific
enforcement. Equity via section 1-103 should, with equal liberty,
allow a court to enforce turnover, a sort of reverse specific
performance when a seller is in breach. In appropriate cases, the
court should say in effect to the breaching non-privity seller: "Pick
up the defective goods and pay that aggrieved buyer her costs for
substitute goods, plus installation if necessary; if you do not pick
them up, your liability will be adjusted for salvage value and
disposition costs, if any." That approach delivers justice according
to the expectancy principle.
CONCLUSION

I began this article with a brief history of the common law of
third party beneficiaries. This history shows that third party claims
on contracts have an abiding strength. Classical contract law was
incompatible with third party claims but could not wholly snuff out
judicial recognition of such claims. Furthermore, over many
generations, there was an outward thrust in third party beneficiary
decisions meaning the coverage of third party beneficiary doctrine
expanded. In the twentieth century, the Restatements validated and
sharpened third party beneficiary law. At the beginning of the
twenty first century, this law is still evolving, searching for its outer
limits. Meanwhile, the Code's drafters partially codified third party
beneficiary law in official section 2-318 with its Alternatives.
History shows many just claims for economic loss which do not fit
within these alternatives but would be recognized under common
law principles.
The revision of Article 2 is an important project. The pressures
that have been brought to bear upon the drafters have been
significant. Nobody should fault them for not tackling every
festering issue of sales law, including problems associated with
third party beneficiaries. What courts and lawyers should recognize,
however, is that an incompleteness or openness in the text of
Article 2, current or revised, means more responsibility in
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advocating and judging.
A primary judicial task will be the continuing, careful blending of
the common law of third party beneficiaries with Article 2, current
or revised. A related task will be the fleshing out of the remedial
structure. For third party beneficiaries outside the chain of
distribution, the full array of Code remedies should be available.
For third party beneficiaries at the end of the distribution chain,
with a lack of vertical privity problem, special attention must be
given to building appropriate remedial mechanisms on the
foundation of the Code and supplementary common law principles.
To accomplish the foregoing, I have urged that the two-pronged
third party beneficiary principle, as developed by Professor
Eisenberg, be employed, and that on the remedial questions arising
from cases involving lack of vertical privity, the path charted by
Professor Flechtner be given special consideration. By blending
their insights with the text of the Code, and the best of case law, a
workable and coherent blend of sales law and the law of third
party beneficiaries can slowly be achieved.

